645 resultados para Disability insurance
Resumo:
Lack of access to insurance exacerbates the impact of climate variability on smallholder famers in Africa. Unlike traditional insurance, which compensates proven agricultural losses, weather index insurance (WII) pays out in the event that a weather index is breached. In principle, WII could be provided to farmers throughout Africa. There are two data-related hurdles to this. First, most farmers do not live close enough to a rain gauge with sufficiently long record of observations. Second, mismatches between weather indices and yield may expose farmers to uncompensated losses, and insurers to unfair payouts – a phenomenon known as basis risk. In essence, basis risk results from complexities in the progression from meteorological drought (rainfall deficit) to agricultural drought (low soil moisture). In this study, we use a land-surface model to describe the transition from meteorological to agricultural drought. We demonstrate that spatial and temporal aggregation of rainfall results in a clearer link with soil moisture, and hence a reduction in basis risk. We then use an advanced statistical method to show how optimal aggregation of satellite-based rainfall estimates can reduce basis risk, enabling remotely sensed data to be utilized robustly for WII.
Resumo:
Remotely sensed rainfall is increasingly being used to manage climate-related risk in gauge sparse regions. Applications based on such data must make maximal use of the skill of the methodology in order to avoid doing harm by providing misleading information. This is especially challenging in regions, such as Africa, which lack gauge data for validation. In this study, we show how calibrated ensembles of equally likely rainfall can be used to infer uncertainty in remotely sensed rainfall estimates, and subsequently in assessment of drought. We illustrate the methodology through a case study of weather index insurance (WII) in Zambia. Unlike traditional insurance, which compensates proven agricultural losses, WII pays out in the event that a weather index is breached. As remotely sensed rainfall is used to extend WII schemes to large numbers of farmers, it is crucial to ensure that the indices being insured are skillful representations of local environmental conditions. In our study we drive a land surface model with rainfall ensembles, in order to demonstrate how aggregation of rainfall estimates in space and time results in a clearer link with soil moisture, and hence a truer representation of agricultural drought. Although our study focuses on agricultural insurance, the methodological principles for application design are widely applicable in Africa and elsewhere.
Resumo:
Objectives. To investigate health self-assessment and to estimate the prevalence of chronic diseases and recent illnesses in people with and without physical disabilities (PD) in the state of Sao Paulo, southeastern Brazil. Study design. A Cross-sectional study comprising two population-based health surveys conducted in 2002 and 2003. Methods. A total of 8317 persons (165 with PD) were interviewed in the two studies. Variables concerning to health self-assessment; chronic disease and recent illness were compared in the people with and without PD. Negative binomial regression was used in the analysis. Results. Subjects with PD more often assessed their health as poor/very poor compared to non-disabled ones. They reported more illnesses in the 15 days prior to interview as well as more chronic diseases (skin conditions, anaemia, chronic kidney disease, stroke, depression/anxiety, migraine/headache, pulmonary diseases, hypertension, diabetes, arthritis/arthrosis/rheumatic conditions and heart disease). This higher disease prevalence can be either attributed to disability itself or be associated to gender, age and schooling. Conclusions. Subjects with PD had more recent illnesses and chronic diseases and poorer health self-assessment than non-disabled ones. Age, gender, schooling and disability have individual roles in disease development among disabled people.
Resumo:
We describe three patients with a comparable deletion encompassing SLC25A43, SLC25A5, CXorf56, UBE2A, NKRF, and two non-coding RNA genes, U1 and LOC100303728. Moderate to severe intellectual disability (ID), psychomotor retardation, severely impaired/absent speech, seizures, and urogenital anomalies were present in all three patients. Facial dysmorphisms include ocular hypertelorism, synophrys, and a depressed nasal bridge. These clinical features overlap with those described in two patients from a family with a similar deletion at Xq24 that also includes UBE2A, and in several patients of Brazilian and Polish families with point mutations in UBE2A. Notably, all five patients with an Xq24 deletion have ventricular septal defects that are not present inpatients with a point mutation, which might be attributed to the deletion of SLC25A5. Taken together, the UBE2A deficiency syndrome in male patients with a mutation in or a deletion of UBE2A is characterized by ID, absent speech, seizures, urogenital anomalies, frequently including a small penis, and skin abnormalities, which include generalized hirsutism, low posterior hairline, myxedematous appearance, widely spaced nipples, and hair whorls. Facial dysmorphisms include a wide face, a depressed nasal bridge, a large mouth with downturned corners, thin vermilion, and a short, broad neck. (C) 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
Resumo:
The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.
Resumo:
One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.