Multinational corporations and United States foreign policy : hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-third - [Ninety-fourth] Congress.

Hearings held March 1973-Sept. 1976.

Government competition : a threat to small business : report of the SBA Advocacy Task Group on Government Competition with Small Business /

Cover title.

Economic policy and full employment,

"Companion volume to ... [the author's] Fiscal policy and business cycles."-Pref.

The foreign trade policy of the United States

DU1 .I5 1936 vol. 13, no. 5 with : Business and government under the National Recovery Administration / Theodore J. Kreps. New York : American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936. Bound together subsequent to publication.

Extending choreography with business contract constraints

Business contracts play a central role in governing commercial interactions between organizations. It is increasingly recognized that business contract conditions need to be closely linked to internal and external business processes, both to reduce the risk of contract violations and to ensure compliance with legislative regimes. Recent research has proposed contract languages allowing the specification of obligations, permissions and prohibitions in business contracts. Business processes that cross-organizational boundaries can be specified in choreography and coordination languages but these do not provide appropriate abstractions for contract constraints. In this paper, we examine the transformation of contract constraints in a business contract language into expressions in a choreography language. An example cross-organizational process is presented, along with a specification of the process in a choreography language and a specification of a set of contract conditions for the process in a business contract language. The contract terms are then translated into choreography expressions that govern the process to ensure compliance. Subsequent discussion explores a number of business and technology issues related to the results. We conclude that cross-organizational business processes can be monitored and enforced according to business contract specifications through the transformation of a contract definition to constraints on process behavior.

A victim of its own success: Internationalization, neoliberalism, and organizational involution at the Business Council of Australia

The focus of this article is on the Business Council of Australia (BCA), an association of the CEOs of the 100 or so largest companies operating in Australia. Since its inception the BCA has been an influential supporter of largely successful efforts to neoliberalize and internationalize the Australian economy. Running in parallel with these developments, however, the BCA has moved from being a "somewhat strong" to a relatively weak policy organization. This article argues these two trends are causally related. Neoliberal-inspired economic restructuring and economic internationalization have weakened the "logic of membership" and the "logic of influence" of the BCA, leading to a process of organizational involution. Furthermore, potential offsets to what I describe as the organizational predations of neoliberalism and internationalization - especially via a willingness or capacity to forge supportive or mutualistic relations with the state - have not been realized.

Comparing the conditions for small business and entrepreneurship in Sweden and Australia: Lessons for the European Charter for Small Enterprises

A growing body of literature is concerned with explaining cross-national performance of small business and entrepreneurs in advanced economies. This literature has considered a range of policy and institutional variables which create an environment supportive of small firms and entrepreneurial activities including macroeconomic variables such as taxation, labour market regulation, social security and income policy; regulatory factors such as establishment legislation, bankruptcy policy, administrative burdens, compliance costs, deregulation and competition policy; and cultural factors such as social and cultural norms that support entrepreneurship. However, this literature has not always distinguished between the policy environment of small firms operating in different industry sectors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional and policy environment of small firms in knowledge intensive sectors. The characteristics of the business environment of particular relevance to knowledge intensive firms are somewhat different from the conditions for entrepreneurship and small business success more generally. This paper compares the science, technology and industry infrastructure of Australia, Denmark, Sweden with other OECD countries. The purpose of the paper is to identify cross-national differences in the business environment of small knowledge intensive firms. The paper seeks to explore whether particular institutional environments appear to be more supportive of small firms in knowledge intensive sectors.

Corporate Citizenship: What are the Social Responsibilities of Australian Business? School of Social Work and Applied Human Sciences Occasional Paper Series No. 6

Corporate Citizenship: What are the Social Responsibilities of Australian Business? School of Social Work and Applied Human Sciences Occasional Paper Series No. 6

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.