983 resultados para Business lobby groups
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Suicidal behaviour among young people represents a major public health problem. This study seeks to compare the major sociological, clinical, schooling and family features of suicidal and non-suicidal subgroups of adolescents hospitalised in the Health Foundation Center for French Students of neufmoutiers en Brie (France). All these adolescents suffered from the severe mental disorders. The adolescents from the suicidal subgroup presented significantly fewer psychoses and more mood disorders than those of the non-suicidal subgroup. Half of the patients from the suicidal subgroup presented some features of personality disorders, mostly borderline personality disorders. Nevertheless, their global functioning was more frequently improved between admission and discharge than was the case for the non-suicidal group.
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Els business angels són persones físiques que inverteixen una part dels seus diners en empreses joves, tot just acabades de crear, en alguns casos fins i tot ajuden a crear-les. El nom d’àngels té el seu origen en els rics filantrops de Nova York que finançaven les obres que s’estrenaven a Broadway. Aquests filantrops invertien els seus diners en una obra de teatre, pel plaer de contribuir a la cultura, molt sovint no arribaven a recuperar mai aquests diners. Els business angels, no són filantrops, inverteixen esperant guanyar diners, però al igual que els àngels de Broadway, els mou alguna cosa més que els diners, ja que està àmpliament documentat que darrera d’aquestes inversions hi ha també raons no financeres, com ara fomentar l’esperit emprenedor o fins i tot la cerca de diversió. Podríem dir que el terme “business angel” es va encunyar a principis dels 80 als EUA, per tant aviat farà 30 anys, no obstant, encara avui, la majoria de catalans no coneixen el significat d’aquest terme. A Catalunya i Espanya anem terriblement retardats en l’estudi i la promoció d’aquesta figura en relació a països com els EUA i el Regne Unit, però també massa enrera en relació a països com Finlàndia, Suècia, Noruega i Alemanya. L’objectiu d’aquest treball és doncs oferir una complerta aproximació a aquesta figura del business angel, una figura que entenem clau en el desenvolupament empresarial i per tant una figura que cal potenciar a tots els nivells. Per tal de contextualitzar aquesta important figura, el treball parteix de l’anàlisi de la relació existent entre emprenedoria i creixement econòmic, s’endinsa després en el capital risc, per presentar finalment qui és i que fa el business angel. El treball intenta també mostrar l’abús d’usos i la inconsistència de les definicions que es donen del terme “business angel” i per tant la gran confusió que tot això genera.
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Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.
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Business cycle theory is normally described as having evolved out of a previous tradition of writers focusing exclusively on crises. In this account, the turning point is seen as residing in Clément Juglar's contribution on commercial crises and their periodicity. It is well known that the champion of this view is Schumpeter, who propagated it on several occasions. The same author, however, pointed to a number of other writers who, before and at the same time as Juglar, stressed one or another of the aspects for which Juglar is credited primacy, including the recognition of periodicity and the identification of endogenous elements enabling the recognition of crises as a self-generating phenomenon. There is indeed a vast literature, both primary and secondary, relating to the debates on crises and fluctuations around the middle of the nineteenth century, from which it is apparent that Juglar's book Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour Périodique en France, en Angleterre et aux États-Unis (originally published in 1862 and very much revised and enlarged in 1889) did not come out of the blue but was one of the products of an intellectual climate inducing the thinking of crises not as unrelated events but as part of a more complex phenomenon consisting of recurring crises related to the development of the commercial world - an interpretation corroborated by the almost regular occurrence of crises at about 10-year intervals.
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Network airlines have been increasingly focusing their operations on hub airports through the exploitation of connecting traffic, allowing them to take advantage of economies of traffic density, which are unequivocal in the airline industry. Less attention has been devoted to airlines? decisions on point-to-point thin routes, which could be served using different aircraft technologies and different business models. This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the impact on airlines ?networks of the two major innovations in the airline industry in the last two decades: the regional jet technology and the low-cost business model. We show that, under certain circumstances, direct services on point-to-point thin routes can be viable and thus airlines may be interested in deviating passengers out of the hub.
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Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s "business" characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.
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Aquest Treball Final de Carrera pretén desenvolupar un Pla de Viabilitat, que garanteixi una millora en la rendibilitat de PARQUETS S.A., una empresa amb més de 40 anys d’existència en el sector de la instal-lació de paviments per al terra. A partir de la realització inicial d’un estudi del mercat, s’ha elaborat un complet anàlisi sobre els punts principals que componen qualsevol Pla de Negoci: el Pla de Marketing, el Pla d’Operacions, el Pla d’Organització i el Pla Econòmic-Financer. A més, amb la realització d’aquest estudi, hem pogut verificar que al mercat hi ha importants economies d’escala que cal aprofitar, i que intervindrien amb èxit amb l’expansió geogràfica, organitzativa i operativa de l’empresa.
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This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. A "sincere-lobby-formation" condition for equilibrium is introduced: an individual joins a lobby if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a contribution fee. Thus, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. I fi nd that lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences, i.e., it shifts the final policy in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's pro- or anti-policy preferred position. Under a utilitarian government, however, lobbying does not affect the fi nal policy, and political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. JEL classi cation: D72. Keywords: Sincere lobby formation; common agency; endogenous lobbying.
Resumo:
Network airlines have been increasingly focusing their operations on hub airports through the exploitation of connecting traffic, allowing them to take advantage of economies of traffic density, which are unequivocal in the airline industry. Less attention has been devoted to airlines' decisions on point-to-point thin routes, which could be served using different aircraft technologies and different business models. This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the impact on airlines' networks of the two major innovations in the airline industry in the last two decades: the regional jet technology and the low-cost business model. We show that, under certain circumstances, direct services on point-to-point thin routes can be viable and thus airlines may be interested in deviating passengers out of the hub. Keywords: regional jet technology; low-cost business model; point-to-point network; hub-and-spoke network JEL Classi…fication Numbers: L13; L2; L93
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The following hypotheses were tested for groups of simultaneous hermaphrodites Biomphalaria tenagophila: (a) snails that have low reproductive success during the process of self-fertilization do not increase their reproductive success after the end of grouping; (b) the copulation behaviour and the presence of one snail whose eggs have a low viability rate influence the partner's reproductive success by cross-fertilization. Groups were constituted by a homozygous pigmented snail and two albinos: one with a viability rate higher than 70% ("good reproducers") and the other less than 10% ("bad reproducers"). All pigmented snails had viability rates higher than 70%. The "good" and "bad" reproducer albino snails had similar copulation behaviour. However, after the end of grouping, the "bad reproducers" continued to have viability rates less than 10% over 30 days. In 100% of the cases that pigmented snails copulated (performing either a male role or simultaneously male and female roles) exclusively with "good" reproducer albinos, they presented high reproductive success (producing, on average of 8.4 pigmented embryos/egg-mass). However, in 100% of the cases that pigmented snails copulated with both partners, the "good" reproducer albino snails produced none or very few embryos (the highest average was 2.2 pigmented embryos/egg-mass). Therefore, the production of viable embryos by cross-fertilization was more influenced by self-fertilization performance than by copulation behaviour. The presence of a snail whose eggs have a low viability rate could decrease their partners reproductive success
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This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate rst-best level of cronyism within a firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.
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We use a dynamic factor model to provide a semi-structural representation for 101 quarterly US macroeconomic series. We find that (i) the US economy is well described by a number of structural shocks between two and six. Focusing on the four-shock specification, we identify, using sign restrictions, two non-policy shocks, demand and supply, and two policy shocks, monetary and fiscal. We obtain the following results. (ii) Both supply and demand shocks are important sources of fluctuations; supply prevails for GDP, while demand prevails for employment and inflation. (ii) Policy matters, Both monetary and fiscal policy shocks have sizeable effects on output and prices, with little evidence of crowding out; both monetary and fiscal authorities implement important systematic countercyclical policies reacting to demand shocks. (iii) Negative demand shocks have a large long-run positive effect on productivity, consistently with the Schumpeterian "cleansing" view of recessions.