A Game-Theoretic Approach for Threats Detection and Intervention in Surveillance

Threat prevention with limited security resources is a challenging problem. An optimal strategy is to eectively predict attackers' targets (or goals) based on current available information, and use such predictions to prevent (or disrupt) their planned attacks. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to address this challenge which encompasses the following three elements. First, we design a method to analyze an attacker's types in order to determine the most plausible type of an attacker. Second, we propose an approach to predict possible targets of an attack and the course of actions that the attackers may take even when the attackers' types are ambiguous. Third, a game-theoretic based strategy is developed to determine the best protection actions for defenders (security resources).

Secure Communications in Smart Grid: Networking and Protocols

The key attributes of a smarter power grid include: pervasive interconnection of smart devices; extensive data generation and collection; and rapid reaction to events across a widely dispersed physical infrastructure. Modern telecommunications technologies are being deployed across power systems to support these monitoring and control capabilities. To enable interoperability, several new communications protocols and standards have been developed over the past 10 to 20 years. These continue to be refined, even as new systems are rolled out.

This new hyper-connected communications infrastructure provides an environment rich in sub-systems and physical devices that are attractive to cyber-attackers. Indeed, as smarter grid operations become dependent on interconnectivity, the communications network itself becomes a target. Consequently, we examine cyber-attacks that specifically target communications, particularly state-of-the-art standards and protocols. We further explore approaches and technologies that aim to protect critical communications networks against intrusions, and to monitor for, and detect, intrusions that infiltrate Smart Grid systems.

The effect of probe interval estimation on attack detection performance of a WLAN independent intrusion detection system

A new niche of densely populated, unprotected networks is becoming more prevalent in public areas such as Shopping Malls, defined here as independent open-access networks, which have attributes that make attack detection more challenging than in typical enterprise networks. To address these challenges, new detection systems which do not rely on knowledge of internal device state are investigated here. This paper shows that this lack of state information requires an additional metric (The exchange timeout window) for detection of WLAN Denial of Service Probe Flood attacks. Variability in this metric has a significant influence on the ability of a detection system to reliably detect the presence of attacks. A parameter selection method is proposed which is shown to provide reliability and repeatability in attack detection in WLANs. Results obtained from ongoing live trials are presented that demonstrate the importance of accurately estimating probe request and probe response timeouts in future Independent Intrusion Detection Systems.

Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart Grids

As modern power grids move towards becoming a smart grid, there is an increasing reliance on the data that is transmitted and processed by ICT systems. This reliance introduces new digital attack vectors. Many of the proposed approaches that aim to address this problem largely focus on applying well-known ICT security solutions. However, what is needed are approaches that meet the complex concerns of the smart grid as a cyber-physical system. Furthermore, to support the automatic control loops that exist in a power grid, similarly automatic security and resilience mechanisms are needed that rely on minimal operator intervention. The research proposed in this paper aims to develop a framework that ensures resilient smart grid operation in light of successful cyber-attacks.

Neural Network Based Attack on a Masked Implementation of AES

Masked implementations of cryptographic algorithms are often used in commercial embedded cryptographic devices to increase their resistance to side channel attacks. In this work we show how neural networks can be used to both identify the mask value, and to subsequently identify the secret key value with a single attack trace with high probability. We propose the use of a pre-processing step using principal component analysis (PCA) to significantly increase the success of the attack. We have developed a classifier that can correctly identify the mask for each trace, hence removing the security provided by that mask and reducing the attack to being equivalent to an attack against an unprotected implementation. The attack is performed on the freely available differential power analysis (DPA) contest data set to allow our work to be easily reproducible. We show that neural networks allow for a robust and efficient classification in the context of side-channel attacks.

The BRUTUS Automatic Cryptanalytic Framework: Testing CAESAR Authenticated Encryption Candidates for Weaknesses

This report summarizes our results from security analysis covering all 57 competitions for authenticated encryption: security, applicability, and robustness (CAESAR) first-round candidates and over 210 implementations. We have manually identified security issues with three candidates, two of which are more serious, and these ciphers have been withdrawn from the competition. We have developed a testing framework, BRUTUS, to facilitate automatic detection of simple security lapses and susceptible statistical structures across all ciphers. From this testing, we have security usage notes on four submissions and statistical notes on a further four. We highlight that some of the CAESAR algorithms pose an elevated risk if employed in real-life protocols due to a class of adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks. Although authenticated encryption with associated data are often defined (and are best used) as discrete primitives that authenticate and transmit only complete messages, in practice, these algorithms are easily implemented in a fashion that outputs observable ciphertext data when the algorithm has not received all of the (attacker-controlled) plaintext. For an implementor, this strategy appears to offer seemingly harmless and compliant storage and latency advantages. If the algorithm uses the same state for secret keying information, encryption, and integrity protection, and the internal mixing permutation is not cryptographically strong, an attacker can exploit the ciphertext–plaintext feedback loop to reveal secret state information or even keying material. We conclude that the main advantages of exhaustive, automated cryptanalysis are that it acts as a very necessary sanity check for implementations and gives the cryptanalyst insights that can be used to focus more specific attack methods on given candidates.

WHIRLBOB, the Whirlpool Based Variant of STRIBOB: Lighter, Faster, and Constant Time

WHIRLBOB, also known as STRIBOBr2, is an AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) algorithm derived from STRIBOBr1 and the Whirlpool hash algorithm. WHIRLBOB/STRIBOBr2 is a second round candidate in the CAESAR competition. As with STRIBOBr1, the reduced-size Sponge design has a strong provable security link with a standardized hash algorithm. The new design utilizes only the LPS or ρ component of Whirlpool in flexibly domain-separated BLNK Sponge mode. The number of rounds is increased from 10 to 12 as a countermeasure against Rebound Distinguishing attacks. The 8 ×8 - bit S-Box used by Whirlpool and WHIRLBOB is constructed from 4 ×4 - bit “MiniBoxes”. We report on fast constant-time Intel SSSE3 and ARM NEON SIMD WHIRLBOB implementations that keep full miniboxes in registers and access them via SIMD shuffles. This is an efficient countermeasure against AES-style cache timing side-channel attacks. Another main advantage of WHIRLBOB over STRIBOBr1 (and most other AEADs) is its greatly reduced implementation footprint on lightweight platforms. On many lower-end microcontrollers the total software footprint of π+BLNK = WHIRLBOB AEAD is less than half a kilobyte. We also report an FPGA implementation that requires 4,946 logic units for a single round of WHIRLBOB, which compares favorably to 7,972 required for Keccak / Keyak on the same target platform. The relatively small S-Box gate count also enables efficient 64-bit bitsliced straight-line implementations. We finally present some discussion and analysis on the relationships between WHIRLBOB, Whirlpool, the Russian GOST Streebog hash, and the recent draft Russian Encryption Standard Kuznyechik.

Cybersecurity Test-Bed for IEC 61850 based Smart Substations

With the development and deployment of IEC 61850 based smart substations, cybersecurity vulnerabilities of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are increasingly emerging. In response to the emergence of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in smart substations, a test-bed is indispensable to enable cybersecurity experimentation. In this paper, a comprehensive and realistic cyber-physical test-bed has been built to investigate potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities and the impact of cyber-attacks on IEC 61850 based smart substations. This test-bed is close to a real production type environment, and has the ability to carry out end-to-end testing of cyber-attacks and physical consequences. A fuzz testing approach is proposed for detecting IEC 61850 based intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and validated in the proposed test-bed.

A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.

Pre-Processing Power Traces with a Phase-Sensitive Detector

As cryptographic implementations are increasingly subsumed as functional blocks within larger systems on chip, it becomes more difficult to identify the power consumption signatures of cryptographic operations amongst other unrelated processing activities. In addition, at higher clock frequencies, the current decay between successive processing rounds is only partial, making it more difficult to apply existing pattern matching techniques in side-channel analysis. We show however, through the use of a phase-sensitive detector, that power traces can be pre-processed to generate a filtered output which exhibits an enhanced round pattern, enabling the identification of locations on a device where encryption operations are occurring and also assisting with the re-alignment of power traces for side-channel attacks.

On the Security of Balanced Encoding Countermeasures

Most cryptographic devices should inevitably have a resistance against the threat of side channel attacks. For this, masking and hiding schemes have been proposed since 1999. The security validation of these countermeasures is an ongoing research topic, as a wider range of new and existing attack techniques are tested against these countermeasures. This paper examines the side channel security of the balanced encoding countermeasure, whose aim is to process the secret key-related data under a constant Hamming weight and/or Hamming distance leakage. Unlike previous works, we assume that the leakage model coefficients conform to a normal distribution, producing a model with closer fidelity to real-world implementations. We perform analysis on the balanced encoded PRINCE block cipher with simulated leakage model and also an implementation on an AVR board. We consider both standard correlation power analysis (CPA) and bit-wise CPA. We confirm the resistance of the countermeasure against standard CPA, however, we find with a bit-wise CPA that we can reveal the key with only a few thousands traces.

Modelling Duqu 2.0 Malware using Attack Trees with Sequential Conjunction

In this paper we identify requirements for choosing a threat modelling formalisation for modelling sophisticated malware such as Duqu 2.0. We discuss the gaps in current formalisations and propose the use of Attack Trees with Sequential Conjunction when it comes to analysing complex attacks. The paper models Duqu 2.0 based on the latest information sourced from formal and informal sources. This paper provides a well structured model which can be used for future analysis of Duqu 2.0 and related attacks.

IEEE C37.118-2 Synchrophasor Communication Framework

Synchrophasors have become an important part of the modern power system and numerous applications have been developed covering wide-area monitoring, protection and control. Most applications demand continuous transmission of synchrophasor data across large geographical areas and require an efficient communication framework. IEEE C37.118-2 evolved as one of the most successful synchrophasor communication standards and is widely adopted. However, it lacks a predefined security mechanism and is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper analyzes different types of cyber attacks on IEEE C37.118-2 communication system and evaluates their possible impact on any developed synchrophasor application. Further, the paper also recommends an efficent security mechanism that can provide strong protection against cyber attacks. Although, IEEE C37.118-2 has been widely adopted, there is no clear understanding of the requirements and limitations. To this aim, the paper also presents detailed performance evaluation of IEEE C37.118-2 implementations which could help determine required resources and network characteristics before designing any synchrophasor application.

Contextual Intrusion Alerts for SCADA Networks

The complexity of modern SCADA networks and their associated cyber-attacks requires an expressive but flexible manner for representing both domain knowledge and collected intrusion alerts with the ability to integrate them for enhanced analytical capabilities and better understanding of attacks. This paper proposes an ontology-based approach for contextualized intrusion alerts in SCADA networks. In this approach, three security ontologies were developed to represent and store information on intrusion alerts, Modbus communications, and Modbus attack descriptions. This information is correlated into enriched intrusion alerts using simple ontology logic rules written in Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rules (SQWRL). The contextualized alerts give analysts the means to better understand evolving attacks and to uncover the semantic relationships between sequences of individual attack events. The proposed system is illustrated by two use case scenarios.

Investigation into DCT Feature Selection for Visual Lip-Based Biometric Authentication

This paper investigated using lip movements as a behavioural biometric for person authentication. The system was trained, evaluated and tested using the XM2VTS dataset, following the Lausanne Protocol configuration II. Features were selected from the DCT coefficients of the greyscale lip image. This paper investigated the number of DCT coefficients selected, the selection process, and static and dynamic feature combinations. Using a Gaussian Mixture Model - Universal Background Model framework an Equal Error Rate of 2.20% was achieved during evaluation and on an unseen test set a False Acceptance Rate of 1.7% and False Rejection Rate of 3.0% was achieved. This compares favourably with face authentication results on the same dataset whilst not being susceptible to spoofing attacks.