A new approach to measure tactical voting: evidence from the British elections

Although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention, it is very hard to measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals’ voting choices as well as their unobserved preferences. In this article, we present a simple empirical strategy to nonparametrically identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results. This approach allows us to study the magnitude and direction of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters and parties take into account to determine marginal constituencies. We show that tactical voting played a significant role in the 2010 election, mainly for Liberal–Democratic voters supporting Labour. Moreover, our results suggest that voters seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in vote shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main media outlets or previous election outcomes. We also present some evidence that suggests that campaign spending is not driving tactical voting.

Social media in selected Australian federal and state election campaigns, 2010-15

Campaigning in Australian election campaigns at local, state, and federal levels is fundamentally affected by the fact that voting is compulsory in Australia, with citizens who are found to have failed to cast their vote subject to fines. This means that - contrary to the situation in most other nations – elections are decided not by which candidate or party has managed to encourage the largest number of nominal supporters to make the effort to cast their vote, but by some 10-20% of genuine ‘swinging voters’ who change their party preferences from one election to the next. Political campaigning is thus aimed less at existing party supporters (so-called ‘rusted on’ voters whose continued support for the party is essentially taken for granted) than at this genuinely undecided middle of the electorate. Over the past decades, this has resulted in a comparatively timid, vague campaigning style from both major party blocs (the progressive Australian Labor Party [ALP] and the conservative Coalition of the Liberal and National Parties [L/NP]). Election commitments that run the risk of being seen as too partisan and ideological are avoided as they could scare away swinging voters, and recent elections have been fought as much (or more) on the basis of party leaders’ perceived personas as they have on stated policies, even though Australia uses a parliamentary system in which the Prime Minister and state Premiers are elected by their party room rather than directly by voters. At the same time, this perceived lack of distinctiveness in policies between the major parties has also enabled the emergence of new, smaller parties which (under Australia’s Westminster-derived political system) have no hope of gaining a parliamentary majority but could, in a close election, come to hold the balance of power and thus exert disproportionate influence on a government which relies on their support.

Valence and spatial explanations for voting in the 2013 Australian election

This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere.

Documenting the inevitable: Voting behaviour at the 2013 Australian election

This chapter uses data from the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES), conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Gibson (Bean et al. 2014) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in the election. The study was funded by the Australian Research Council and involved a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-completion questionnaire mailed to respondents on the day before the 7 September election. The sample was a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. Respondents were given the option of returning the completed questionnaire by reply-paid mail or completing the survey online. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings and the final sample size was 3955, representing a response rate of 34 per cent. The data were weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote.

Is it the economy, stupid? The role of social versus economic factors in people’s support for hosting the Olympic Games: Evidence from 12 democratic countries

Public referenda have gained momentum as a democratic tool to legitimize public mega projects such as hosting the Olympic Games. Interest groups in favour of hosting the Olympics therefore try to influence voters through public campaigns that primarily focus on economic benefits. However, recent studies find no or hardly any economic impact of hosting the Olympics, instead providing evidence for a positive social impact. This raises the question whether citizens consider economic or social factors when deciding on hosting the Olympics. Based on representative survey data from 12 countries, our results suggest that economic factors can influence voting behaviour, although the influence of social factors is stronger.

Talouskäsitysten vaikutus hallituksen suosioon Puolassa 2006–2007

Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan äänestäjien talouskäsitysten vaikutusta hallituksen suosioon Puolassa vuosina 2006 ja 2007. Tutkimusasetelma juontaa juurensa poliittisten suhdannevaihteluiden teoriaan, jonka mukaan poliitikot pyrkivät manipuloimaan taloutta vaalien alla tullakseen uudelleen valituiksi. Vastuullisuushypoteesin mukaan äänestäjät palkitsevat poliitikot hyvästä taloustilanteesta. Näin ollen mikäli äänestäjät ovat tyytyväisiä talouteen he äänestävät hallitusta. Mikäli eivät, he äänestävät oppositiota. Miten äänestäjät sitten tekevät arvionsa taloudesta? Tutkielmassa selvitetään vaikuttiko äänestäjien mielipiteisiin käsitys nykyisestä vai tulevaisuuden taloustilanteesta. Käsitys nykyisestä taloustilanteesta perustuu havaintoihin jo toteutuneesta talouspolitiikasta. Tätä käsitystä kutsutaan retrospektiiviseksi näkemykseksi. Prospektiiviset talousnäkemykset koostuvat näkemyksestä ja odotuksista talouden tulevasta tilasta ja uskosta hallituksen kykyyn tarjota paras vaihtoehto suotuisalle talouskehitykselle. Aikaulottuvuuden lisäksi tutkielmassa testataan, vaikuttaako äänestäjiin enemmän heidän oma taloustilanteensa vai näkemys yleisestä talouden tilanteesta. Mikäli hallituksen suosio perustuu näkemyksiin henkilökohtaisen talouden tilasta, ovat äänestäjät egotrooppisia. Mikäli kannatuspäätös perustuu näkemykseen kansantalouden tilasta, ovat äänestäjät puolestaan sosiotrooppisia. Aineistona tutkielmassa käytetään uusinta saatavilla olevaa Puolan mielipidetiedustelun (Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej) keräämää kyselyaineistoa vuosilta 2006 ja 2007. Tutkielmassa on yhdistetty kyselyaineistot 22:n kuukauden ajalta. Aineistoa on analysoitu logistisen regressioanalyysin menetelmin. Tutkielman perusteella talousnäkemyksistä suurin vaikutus hallituksen suosioon on äänestäjien näkemyksillä kansantalouden tulevaisuuden tilasta. Henkilökohtaisen talouden osalta positiiviset tulevaisuudennäkymät vaikuttavat positiivisesti myös hallituksen kannatukseen. Retrospektiivinen arvio henkilökohtaisesta taloudesta toimii kuitenkin teorian vastaisesti; oman taloudellisen tilanteen hyväksi arvioineiden todennäköisyys kannatta hallitusta oli pienempää kuin niillä, jotka arvioivat oman taloustilanteensa huonoksi. Kontrollimuuttujiksi valittiin joukko aiemmassa tutkimuksessa äänestyskäyttäytymiseen Puolassa vaikuttaneita tekijöitä. Näitä olivat ikä, sukupuoli, koulutus, asuinpaikka, näkemys työllisyystilanteesta, ideologinen sijoittuminen oikeisto–vasemmisto-akselilla sekä uskonnollisuus. Kontrollimuuttujista merkitseviksi osoittautuivat uskonnollisuus, oikeisto–vasemmisto-ideologia, koulutus, asuinpaikka sekä ikä. Kun edellä mainitut taustamuuttujat on kontrolloitu, taloustekijät selittävät noin viidesosan hallituksen kannatuksen todennäköisyyden vaihtelusta.

Kansan raittiudeksi ja kotien onneksi : Naisten kieltolakimielipiteet ja toiminta kieltolain puolesta ja sitä vastaan 1919 - 1932

It is often maintained that the Prohibition Act (in force from 1 June 1919 to 5 April 1932) still influences both the Finnish alcohol policy and notions about alcohol. This study focuses on the development of women s opinions concerning Prohibition in Finland. What role did the formulation and expression of women s opinions and women's actions play in the final outcome of the Prohibition Act? What do the debate on Prohibition and women s activities for and against the legislation tell us about the status and possibilities of women to exert influence in the Finnish society of the Prohibition era? Women s opinions are particularly interesting since they deviated radically from what has generally been assumed. It was expected that the referendum of 1931 would result in a resounding vote of 100% in favour of Prohibition, but the outcome was a majority vote against it. Over 65% of the women who cast their vote in the referendum wanted a full repeal of Prohibition. The study approaches the history of Prohibition by combining methods and theories of the history of mentalities and social history with gender history. Women are examined as a heterogeneous group with dissimilar objectives and differing ways of acting and thinking. The research material consists of press materials, archival materials from organisations, personal materials and statistics from the Prohibition period. Both discourses and practices are examined; the object of the research is best described by Michel Foucault's concept of dispositif. When participating in the public debate on Prohibition, women based their right to express their opinions and take part in action on an ideological continuum spanning a hundred years, according to which home and family were central areas of women s interest. This idea was linked to questions of morality and social policy. On the other hand, women presented themselves as working taxpayers, voters and equal citizens. The most crucial issue in women's discussions was whether Prohibition improved or worsened the temperance of fathers, husbands and sons. The dichotomies town dweller - countryside dweller, Swedish-speaking Finnish-speaking, and middle class - working class were highly significant backgrounds both as factors dividing women and in public discussions regarding Prohibition. The 1931 referendum showed that the lines of demarcation drawn during the preceding debate did not materialise in political action in line with these dichotomies: the dispositif did not correspond to the discourse. Contrary to what was expressed in public, a great number of women among the labour and rural classes, among inland inhabitants and among Finnish-speakers were also against Prohibition. The media and organisations defended temperance and Prohibition almost until the end of the Prohibition era. This discourse was in conflict with the discourse of everyday conversations and practices in which alcohol was present.

La investigación comercial como instrumento básico para el conocimiento de las actitudes del electorado: un estudio empírico en la Universidad del País Vasco

[ES] Hoy en día, cualquier partido político debe utilizar el marketing para analizar su mercado y posicionarse en el mismo con una estrategia adecuada. Para ello, el papel de la investigación comercial resulta fundamental, dado que nos permite detectar las necesidades y deseos de los electores, pudiendo el partido adoptar decisiones tendentes a satisfacerlas.

Sistema seguro de votação eletrônica multi-células

Em uso desde a Grécia antiga e atualmente massificado na maioria dos países do mundo, o sistema de votação tradicional baseado em cédulas de papel possui diversos problemas associados à segurança, tais como dificuldades para evitar coerção do eleitor, venda do voto e substituição fraudulenta do eleitor. Além de problemas de usabilidade que acarretam erros de preenchimento da cédula e um processo de apuração lento, que pode durar dias. Ao lado disso, o sistema tradicional não fornece a contraprova do voto, que permite ao eleitor conferir se o seu voto foi corretamente contabilizado na apuração. Inicialmente acreditou-se que a informatização do sistema de votação resolveria todos os problemas do sistema tradicional. Porém, com a sua implantação em alguns países o sistema de votação eletrônica não mostrou-se capaz de fornecer garantias irrefutáveis que não tivesse sido alvo de alterações fraudulentas durante o seu desenvolvimento ou operação. A má reputação do sistema eletrônico está principalmente associada à falta de transparência dos processos que, em sua maioria, não proporcionam a materialização do voto, conferido pelo eleitor para fins de contagem manual, e nem geram evidências (contraprova) da correta contabilização do voto do eleitor. O objetivo deste trabalho é propor uma arquitetura de votação eletrônica que integra, de forma segura, o anonimato e autenticidade do votante, a confidencialidade e integridade do voto/sistema. O sistema aumenta a usabilidade do esquema de votação baseado em "Três Cédulas" de papel, implementando-o computacionalmente. O esquema oferece maior credibilidade ao sistema de votação através da materialização e contraprova do voto, resistência à coerção e ao comércio do voto. Utilizando esquemas de criptografia assimétrica e segurança computacional clássica, associado a um sistema de auditoria eficiente, a proposta garante segurança e transparência nos processos envolvidos. A arquitetura de construção modular distribui a responsabilidade entre suas entidades, agregando-lhe robustez e viabilizando eleições em grande escala. O protótipo do sistema desenvolvido usando serviços web e Election Markup Language mostra a viabilidade da proposta.

To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per cent

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Awakening a sleeping giant: The riddle of Latino political participation

For some time now, the Latino voice has been gradually gaining strength in American politics, particularly in such states as California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, where large numbers of Latino immigrants have settled and large numbers of electoral votes are at stake. Yet the issues public officials in these states espouse and the laws they enact often do not coincide with the interests and preferences of Latinos. The fact that Latinos in California and elsewhere have not been able to influence the political agenda in a way that is commensurate with their numbers may reflect their failure to participate fully in the political process by first registering to vote and then consistently turning out on election day to cast their ballots.

To understand Latino voting behavior, I first examine Latino political participation in California during the ten general elections of the 1980s and 1990s, seeking to understand what percentage of the eligible Latino population registers to vote, with what political party they register, how many registered Latinos to go the polls on election day, and what factors might increase their participation in politics. To ensure that my findings are not unique to California, I also consider Latino voter registration and turnout in Texas for the five general elections of the 1990s and compare these results with my California findings.

I offer a new approach to studying Latino political participation in which I rely on county-level aggregate data, rather than on individual survey data, and employ the ecological inference method of generalized bounds. I calculate and compare Latino and white voting-age populations, registration rates, turnout rates, and party affiliation rates for California's fifty-eight counties. Then, in a secondary grouped logit analysis, I consider the factors that influence these Latino and white registration, turnout, and party affiliation rates.

I find that California Latinos register and turn out at substantially lower rates than do whites and that these rates are more volatile than those of whites. I find that Latino registration is motivated predominantly by age and education, with older and more educated Latinos being more likely to register. Motor voter legislation, which was passed to ease and simplify the registration process, has not encouraged Latino registration . I find that turnout among California's Latino voters is influenced primarily by issues, income, educational attainment, and the size of the Spanish-speaking communities in which they reside. Although language skills may be an obstacle to political participation for an individual, the number of Spanish-speaking households in a community does not encourage or discourage registration but may encourage turnout, suggesting that cultural and linguistic assimilation may not be the entire answer.

With regard to party identification, I find that Democrats can expect a steady Latino political identification rate between 50 and 60 percent, while Republicans attract 20 to 30 percent of Latino registrants. I find that education and income are the dominant factors in determining Latino political party identification, which appears to be no more volatile than that of the larger electorate.

Next, when I consider registration and turnout in Texas, I find that Latino registration rates are nearly equal to those of whites but that Texas Latino turnout rates are volatile and substantially lower than those of whites.

Low turnout rates among Latinos and the volatility of these rates may explain why Latinos in California and Texas have had little influence on the political agenda even though their numbers are large and increasing. Simply put, the voices of Latinos are little heard in the halls of government because they do not turn out consistently to cast their votes on election day.

While these findings suggest that there may not be any short-term or quick fixes to Latino participation, they also suggest that Latinos should be encouraged to participate more fully in the political process and that additional education may be one means of achieving this goal. Candidates should speak more directly to the issues that concern Latinos. Political parties should view Latinos as crossover voters rather than as potential converts. In other words, if Latinos were "a sleeping giant," they may now be a still-drowsy leviathan waiting to be wooed by either party's persuasive political messages and relevant issues.

The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.