Trade Liberalization and Organizational Change

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms.In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices, while integration occurs at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Second, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can lead to inefficient reorganization and adversely affect consumers. Third, “deep integration” — the liberalization of both product and factor markets — leads to the convergence of organizational design across countries.

The impacts of US agricultural and trade policy on trade liberalization and integration via a US- Central America free trade agreement

Resumen Este estudio analiza importantes acciones legislativas del 2002 que afectarán sustancialmente las negociaciones comerciales con Estados Unidos; examina, asimismo, la protección de importaciones de ese país con respecto a productos agrícolas que serán críticos en las negociaciones con los países centroamericanos. Las acciones legislativas mencionadas fueron la aprobación del Proyecto de ley Agrícola del 2002 y la aprobación de la Autorización de Promoción Legal, que provee tratamiento del ‘trámite rápido’ de los acuerdos comerciales…

Proposals for the liberalization of trade and investment in the Association of Caribbean States (ACS)

Includes bibliography

Establishing global value chains through the liberalization of trade in services

This paper addresses the importance of establishing global value chains through the liberalization of trade in services. A database has revealed rather disconnected policy arrangements across APEC members in terms of service trade liberalization. While the economic benefits arising from harmonized and liberalized policy across APEC members are widely recognized in the business sector, relevant policy coordination seems to be missing. With this in mind, APEC could work on establishing its own harmonized "service trade commitment table" that would be centered on simple foreign capital participation criteria. This would surely contribute to forming an APEC-wide global value chain.

Reflections on the preferential liberalization of services trade

This paper takes stock of the forces that lie behind the recent rise of preferential agreements in services trade. Its initial focus is with a number of distinguishing features of services trade that set it apart from trade in goods and shapes trade liberalization and rule-making approaches in the services field. The paper then documents the nature, modal, and sectoral incidence of the trade and investment preferences spawned by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in services. It does so with a view to addressing the question of how preferential the preferential treatment of services trade is. Finally, the paper addresses a number of considerations arising from attempts to multilateralize preferential access and rule-making in services trade.

Reflections on the Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade

This paper takes stock of the forces that lie behind the recent rise of preferential agreements in services trade. Its focuses first on a number of distinguishing features of services trade that sets it apart from trade in goods and shapes trade liberalization and rule-making approaches in the services field. The paper then documents the nature, modal and sectoral incidence of the trade and investment preferences spawned by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in services. It does so with a view to addressing the question: how “preferential” is the preferential treatment of services trade? Finally, the paper addresses a number of considerations arising from attempts to multilateralize preferential access and rule-making in services trade.

Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep Trade Agenda

The EU is considered to be one of the main proponents of what has been called the deep trade agenda—that is, the push for further trade liberalization with an emphasis on the removal of domestic non-tariff regulatory measures affecting trade, as opposed to the traditional focus on the removal of trade barriers at borders. As negotiations on the Doha Development Round have stalled, the EU has attempted to achieve these aims by entering into comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) that are not only limited exclusively to tariffs but also extend to non-tariff barriers, including services, intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition, and investment. These FTAs place great emphasis on regulatory convergence as a means to secure greater market openings. The paper examines the EU's current external trade policy in the area of IP, particularly its attempts to promote its own regulatory model for the protection of IP rights through trade agreements. By looking at the IP enforcement provisions of such agreements, the article also examines how the divisive issues that are currently hindering the progress of negotiations at WTO level, including the demands from developing countries to maintain a degree of autonomy in the area of IP regulation as well as the need to balance IP protection with human rights protection, are being dealt with in recent EU FTAs.

A Study on India’s Trade Relationship with SAARC Countries with Special Reference to SATA

The present study reveals that there are enormous opportunities for forging closer economic relations among SAARC countries. These opportunities could be fully utilized through the twin processes of trade liberalization and industrial restructuring which are complementary to each other. The SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) is the first step in trade liberalization. However, the scope of SAPTA has to be sufficiently widened in order to derive substantial benefits from preferential trading agreements. It is suggested that the SAARC countries adopt a combined approach for tariff elimination, tariff reduction and preferential or concessional tariffs. This process will help in moving quickly towards the creation of a Free Trade Area in the SAARC region. It is necessary to emphasis that, in any regional organization, smaller countries may feel that greater trade co-operation with their larger neighbors may result in larger countries taking over their economies. India occupies 70% of the SAARC region, both geographically and economically, and the remaining 6 nations of the SAARC borders only with India and not with each other. As the biggest, and the most industrialized trading partner among the SAARC countries, India has to recognize that a special responsibility devolves on her and take a lead in making the Regional Economic Co-operation a reality in South Asia.

Endogenous liberalization and within-country inequality

We model and empirically test the link between income inequality and trade liberalization. We consider a society in which a median voter (MV) will make the decision as to whether the country should switch from its current regime of import substitution (IS) (which protects agriculture) to export promotion (EP). Liberalization entails starting importing the agricultural good and specializing in and exporting the manufacturing good. This will require transferring labor to manufacturing. We find that if MV is a worker, the IS-EP switch will take place regardless. If MV is a farmer, the switch will take place given (1) the relative productivity of an ex-farmer and worker in manufacturing,ß is high, and (2) the society’s tastes for agricultural goods, α, are not as strong as those for manufacturing goods. We also find that, following a switch, the income distribution too will improve if α is low and ß is high. In our empirical analysis, we find the endogenous inflection points of α and ß in our sample, at which the direction of change in income distribution alters its sign. Our results also show in a very robust fashion that, EP regimes - on average and with the presence of certain control variables - have better income distributions than IS regimes. This implies that mostly “right” countries have made the switch.

Trade liberalisation and economic growth in Fiji : an empirical assessment using the ARDL approach

This study investigates the effect of trade liberalization on economic performance in Fiji using a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is expanded to take into account political instability and trade liberalization. The long run results conform to theoretical expectations, except for the contribution of labour force, which is negatively related to real Gross Domestic Product. We attribute this to the rapid and consistent emigration of skilled labour following the 1987 coups. While human capital was found to be the most influential variable, exports and investment were found to be weakly related to Gross Domestic Product. The key finding is that the dummy variable for signing the IMF agreement in 1984 had a statistically significant positive effect on real Gross Domestic Product in the long run, but the short run effects of signing the agreement as well as the short run and long run effects of implementing the agreement in 1986 were statistically insignificant.

Trade and infrastructure: evidences from the Andean Community

This paper presents evidence on the key role of infrastructure in the Andean Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are used. The first model aims at identifying the importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a proxy for transportation costs, infrastructure development and improvement drastically modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, will only be achieved by an improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Trade barriers and productivity growth: cross-industry evidence

This article investigates the impact of trade protection on the evolution of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. An annual panel-dataset of 16 industries for the years 1985 through 1997, a period that includes a major trade liberalization, was used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator (nominal tari®s and e®ective protection rate were used), control variables and time period and suggest that barriers to trade negatively a®ects productivity growth at industry level: those sectors with lower barriers experienced higher growth. We were also able to link the observed increase of industry productivity growth after 1991 to the widespread reduction on exective protection experienced in the country in the nineties.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.