At Your Convenience: Facilitating Voting and Registration

This work proposes answers to methodological and substantive questions related to convenience voting. The first analytical chapter surveys the various research designs that have been proposed within this literature, and concludes that the field benefits from using all in conjunction. The next chapter uses matching to identify the relationship between disability status and political participation, and considers whether any forms of convenience voting mediate in the relationship. The final two analytical chapters examine how online voter registration, one of the most recent policy innovations, affects participation and vote share in American elections. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings presented herein, and briefly discusses the natural extensions of this work.

Testing of Depth-Encoded Hough Voting for Infrastructure Object Detection

The lack of viable methods to map and label existing infrastructure is one of the engineering grand challenges for the 21st century. For instance, over two thirds of the effort needed to geometrically model even simple infrastructure is spent on manually converting a cloud of points to a 3D model. The result is that few facilities today have a complete record of as-built information and that as-built models are not produced for the vast majority of new construction and retrofit projects. This leads to rework and design changes that can cost up to 10% of the installed costs. Automatically detecting building components could address this challenge. However, existing methods for detecting building components are not view and scale-invariant, or have only been validated in restricted scenarios that require a priori knowledge without considering occlusions. This leads to their constrained applicability in complex civil infrastructure scenes. In this paper, we test a pose-invariant method of labeling existing infrastructure. This method simultaneously detects objects and estimates their poses. It takes advantage of a recent novel formulation for object detection and customizes it to generic civil infrastructure scenes. Our preliminary experiments demonstrate that this method achieves convincing recognition results.

Non-tactical symmetric nets

Mavron, Vassili; Al-Kenani, A.N., (2003) 'Non-tactical symmetric nets', Journal of the London Mathematical Society 67(2) pp.273-288 RAE2008

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.

Biased group decision-making and the effect of computer-mediated communication: separating the effects of anonymity, voting and blind picking

The influence of communication technology on group decision-making has been examined in many studies. But the findings are inconsistent. Some studies showed a positive effect on decision quality, other studies have shown that communication technology makes the decision even worse. One possible explanation for these different findings could be the use of different Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) in these studies, with some GDSS better fitting to the given task than others and with different sets of functions. This paper outlines an approach with an information system solely designed to examine the effect of (1) anonymity, (2) voting and (3) blind picking on decision quality, discussion quality and perceived quality of information.

Dimensions, issues, and bills: Appropriations voting on the house floor

One of the fundamental findings in the congressional literature is that one or sometimes two dimensions can successfully describe roll-call voting. In this paper we investigate if we can reach the same conclusions about low dimensionality when we divide the roll-call agenda into subsets of relatively homogeneous subject matter. We are primarily interested in the degree to which the same ordering of representatives is yielded across these different groups of votes. To conduct our analysis we focus on all roll calls on the 13 annual appropriations bills across eight congresses. When we concentrate on these smaller issue areas, we find that voting is multidimensional and members do not vote in a consistent ideological fashion across all issue areas. Copyright © Southern Political Science Association 2010.

Mobilizing Maryland: a look into the voting tendencies of students at the University of Maryland

Gemstone Team VOTE-CP (Voice of the Electorate - Collegiate Participation)

'The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums' Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus

This article examines recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and suggests a number of changes to the proposed electoral system. Specifically, cross-voting and other electoral methods that encourage coalition-building across ethnic communities might add significantly to the functionality of the Annan Plan. Combined with other innovative mechanisms already in the plan, cross-voting could force political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of the two Cypriot communities, an element that is currently missing from both the Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek Cypriot (GC) political systems. Special conditions on the island, as well as the way most political parties operated in the critical pre-April 2004 referendum period, suggest the need for this amendment. Although this study respects the consociational logic of the Annan Plan, it supplements consociationalism with elements that foster integration and inter-dependence between the two communities and their voters. The article also reviews the postreferendum developments in Cyprus which might have worrisome future implications, not only for its two communities, but also for EU enlargement in general. Cyprus both holds one of the keys to Turkey's entrance into the EU and is a litmus test for the Euro-Atlantic nexus and its capacity to pacify and integrate ethnically divided societies in Europe and elsewhere.

Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.