Compilation of states' laws and regulations on matters affecting rail-highway crossings. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

Effectiveness of motorist warning devices at rail-highway crossings. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Research, Development and Technology, Washington, D.C.

The Topographical, statistical, and historical gazetteer of Scotland : with a complete county-atlas from recent surveys, exhibiting all the lines of road, rail, and canal communication and an appendix, containing the results in detail of the census of 1851.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Photo enforcement at highway-rail grade crossings : 2001 status report to the General Assembly.

"#546r"--Colophon.

Human factors at the interface between road and rail systems

Railway level crossings present an arguably unique interface between two transport systems that differ markedly in their performance characteristics, their degrees of regulation and their safety cultures. Railway level crossings also differ dramatically in the importance they represent as safety issues for the two modes. For rail, they are the location of a large proportion of fatalities within the system and are therefore the focus of much safety concern. For the road system, they comprise only a few percent of all fatalities, although the potential for catastrophic outcomes exist. Rail operators and regulators have traditionally required technologies to be failsafe and to demonstrate high levels of reliability. The resultant level of complexity and cost has both limited their extent of application and led to a need to better understand how motorists comprehend and respond to these systems.

How safe is safe enough? : a socio-technical view of low-cost level crossing safety

Low-cost level crossings are often criticized as being unsafe. Does a SIL (safety integrity level) rating make the railway crossing any safer? This paper discusses how a supporting argument might be made for low-cost level crossing warning devices with lower levels of safety integrity and issues such as risk tolerability and derivation of tolerable hazard rates for system-level hazards. As part of the design of such systems according to fail-safe principles, the paper considers the assumptions around the pre-defined safe states of existing warning devices and how human factors issues around such states can give rise to additional hazards.