Effects of credit rating change on risk-taking

This thesis investigates whether there are changes in risk-taking behavior following an upgrade or downgrade in credit ratings. Research on effects of rating changes on capital markets is well-documented but the literature on how rating changes may affect firm behavior is sparse. Following, a downgrade in credit rating, managers may increase risk-taking to improve their overall performance or reduce risk-taking following upgrades to ensure that their performance is assessed more on the basis of what they may deem success in the form of an upgrade. Using a sample of firms trading in the U.S from 1994-2013, we find evidence of change in risk-taking behavior. We use cross-sectional regressions and matching using propensity scores and Barber and Lyon (1997) methodology to measure changes in risk-taking and we do find evidence of changes in managerial risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, we find that the direction of change (increase or decrease) in some cases is dependent on the type of measure rather than the type of rating change.

Kindergarten characteristics and risk-taking behaviors in middle childhood = Caractéristiques à la maternelle et comportements de prise de risques en 6e année

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Association between neighbourhood socioeconomic characteristics and high-risk injection behaviour amongst injection drug users living in inner vs. other city areas in Montréal, Canada

Ce manuscrit est une pré-publication d'un article paru dans International Journal of Drug Policy 2010; 21(1): 49-55.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

Does anticipation training affect drivers' risk taking?

Skill and risk taking are argued to be independent and to require different remedial programs. However, it is possible to contend that skill-based training could be associated with an increase, a decrease, or no change in risk taking behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors examined the influence of a skill-based training program (hazard perception) on the risk taking behavior of car drivers (using video-based driving simulations). Experiment 1 demonstrated a decrease in risk taking for novice drivers. In Experiment 2, the authors examined the possibilities that the skills training might operate through either a nonspecific reduction in risk taking or a specific improvement in hazard perception. Evidence supported the latter. These findings were replicated in a more ecological context in Experiment 3, which compared advanced and nonadvanced police drivers.

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.

The risk-taking and self-harm inventory for adolescents: Development and psychometric evaluation

In this study, we report on the development and psychometric evaluation of the Risk-Taking (RT) and Self-Harm (SH) Inventory for Adolescents (RTSHIA), a self-report measure designed to assess adolescent RT and SH in community and clinical settings. 651 young people from secondary schools in England ranging in age from 11.6 years to 18.7 years and 71 young people referred to mental health services for SH behavior in London between the ages of 11.9 years and 17.5 years completed the RTSHIA along with standardized measures of adolescent psychopathology. Two factors emerged from the principal axis factoring, and RT and SH were further validated by a confirmatory factor analysis as related, but different, constructs, rather than elements of a single continuum. Inter-item and test–retest reliabilities were high for both components (Cronbach's α = .85, rtt = .90; Cronbach's α .93, rtt = .87), and considerable evidence emerged in support of the measure's convergent, concurrent, and divergent validity. The findings are discussed with regard to potential usefulness of the RTSHIA for research and clinical purposes with adolescents.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.

Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

Risk taking for oneself and others: a structural model approach

Economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk. We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality, and compare them to individual decisions. By estimating a structural model, we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. We also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion, but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter. These results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature. They also have implications for financial agency, which we discuss.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.