Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green Versus Scitovsky on Profit and Utility Maximization

I contrast the theoretical foundation of profit maximization of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green’s “Microeconomics” against that provided by Scitovsky in a paper of 1943. Whereas Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green try to show that profit maximization can be derived from utility maximization, Scitovsky categorically states the contrary view. I argue, first, that the foundation provided by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green is not sound and, secondly, that Scitovsky’s line of reasoning opens a better way to model business behavior.

Profit and Cost in "Modern" Post-Marxian Profit Theory: A Case Study from Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

In this paper, I examine the treatment of competitive profit of professor Varian in his textbook on Microeconomics, as a representative of the “modern” post-Marxian view on competitive profit. I show how, on the one hand, Varian defines profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as a part of the value of commodities that is not any cost. On the other hand, however, Varian defines profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital, so that, in competitive conditions, the profit or income of capital is determined by the opportunity cost of capital. I argue that this second definition contradicts the first and that it is based on an incoherent conception of opportunity cost.

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Improving aquaculture feed in Bangladesh: From feed ingredients to farmer profit to safe consumption

Use of manufactured feeds in aquaculture in Bangladesh has grown rapidly over the last five years. More than 1 million tonnes of commercially formulated feeds and 0.3-0.4 million tonnes of farm-made feeds were produced in 2012, and sectoral growth is projected to increase substantially over the medium term. This working paper summarizes findings from a study, conducted as part of the WorldFish/USAID “Feed the Future-Aquaculture” project in 2012, assessing the current status of the aquaculture feed sector in Bangladesh. Fish feed value chains, market trends, ingredients and formulation systems, farm feeding practices, ancillary services and feed regulations were investigated. The study identifies a number of entry points for interventions in the sector, and investments which would improve feed quality and farmer access to better feeds and support the growth of sustainable aquaculture.

Islamic corporate financing : does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.

Optimal Credit Rationing in Not-For-Profit Financial Institutions

We examine the dynamic optimization problem for not-for-profit financial institutions (NFPs) that maximize consumer surplus, not profits. We characterize the optimal dynamic policy and find that it involves credit rationing. Interest rates set by mature NFPs will typically be more favorable to customers than market rates, as any surplus is distributed in the form of interest rate subsidies, with credit rationing being required to prevent these subsidies from distorting loan volumes from their optimal levels. Rationing overcomes a fundamental problem in NFPs; it allows them to distribute the surplus without distorting the volume of activity from the efficient level.