Essays on the economics of natural disasters and political institutions

This thesis examines how natural disasters—earthquakes, floods and storms—affect democracy by altering economic outcomes. The results indicate that earthquakes and floods improve the level of democracy, while storms lead to non-democratic transitions, particularly in island countries.

Essays in political and development economics

 This research analyses the role of terrain ruggedness and elite domination as obstacles undermining the cooperation and cohesiveness of groups in societies. Specifically, terrain ruggedness hinders state capacity development and fiscal decentralisation could mitigate this negative effect. Additionally, it proves the role of elites in the selection of economic policies.

Corporate political connections and the 2008 Malaysian election

We examine whether the relationship between political connections and firm value is moderated by the length of time firms have been politically connected. We find that compared to firms with political connections for a short period, firms with political connections for a long period have a smaller magnitude of negative stock price reaction to the 2008 General Election loss of the supermajority by the ruling party in Malaysia. We also find that the smaller magnitude of negative stock price reaction is, in part, attributable to improvements in board of director characteristics. Furthermore, we find that while the performance subsequent to the General Election of politically connected firms is worse than that of non-politically connected firms, firms with political connections for a long period exhibit better performance than those connected for short periods. Collectively, the evidence shows that the length of political connections is an important factor that moderates economic value.

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms. © 2012.

Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper investigates the association between Malaysian politically connected (PCON) firms and the cost of debt. We extend previous research that finds Malaysian PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk by the market, and by audit firms, by providing evidence that lenders also perceive these firms as being of higher risk. We also find that PCON firms have a significantly (1) higher extent of leverage, (2) higher likelihood of reporting a loss, (3) higher likelihood of having negative equity, and (4) higher likelihood of being audited by a big audit firm. We suggest that PCON firms are charged higher interest rates by lenders as a result of efficient contracting given their higher inherent risks. Additionally, we find that CEO duality present in PCON firms is perceived by lenders as being more risky, and that a higher proportion of independent directors on the audit committee mitigate this perceived risk. © 2012.

Is enterprise value affected by political nominations for a regulatory agency's presidency?

Economists have argued that regulation is the appropriate approach to maintain output in its economically efficient level in a natural monopoly, and that can be achieved by submitting these companies to regulatory agencies’ decisions. The autonomous agencies are, however, not free in an absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the priorities of the new administration are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional experts might often be politically motivated. The objective of this study is to investigate whether political nominations to the presidency of regulatory agencies, rather than technical appointments, affect the level of regulatory risk. In order to achieve this purpose, an event study was performed, where the regulatory risk in a political nomination will be compared to a technical nomination, in terms of abnormal return.

Paraguay: a housing finance proposal for middle- to low-income groups

The construction and ownership of homes is fundamental to economic development, the generation of wealth and the formation of the middle class. Although a number of studies have been conducted and programmes implemented in recent decades, there remains a significant housing deficit in Paraguay and Latin America, indicating that such programmes have been unsuccessful. For families unable to document a steady income, the main obstacle to homeownership is often financing. This paper aims to demonstrate the economic and financial feasibility —provided there is sufficient political will and coordination between public and private entities— of a project to build 75,000 homes for 300,000 people (4.5% of the Paraguayan population) with middle to low incomes. The median household income in this segment, for which there is a significant shortage of decent housing, is US$ 396.50. A maximum of US$ 63.44 per month may be set aside for housing costs.

Open Finance Apps: Chancen und Voraussetzungen bei der Visualisierung von Finanzdaten

Die Open Government Bewegung soll der Verwaltungsführung mehr Transparenz und Verständnis entgegenbringen. Durch Open Finance Apps werden Finanzangaben und dazugehörige Informationen verständlich zugänglich gemacht und Grössenverhältnisse veranschaulicht.

Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation

This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.

Growth and public finance in Bihar

This paper explores the causal links between the role of public finance and Bihar's growth and development in the last decade; and argues that these links are tenuous. Bihar's growth acceleration precedes the ‘policy reforms' in public finance based on the ‘good governance' agenda initiated since 2005-06. However, the constraints on sustaining efforts to close Bihar's development gap with the rest of India stems from the nature of the growth process in its regional, sectoral and social dimensions and the contradictory means and ends of the ‘policy reforms' in public finance. Together, this has not only prevented the economic growth to add to public coiffeurs of the state but also occluded the role of tax institutions.

Infrastructure Finance in Developing Countries by State and Multilateral Development Banks

Infrastructure concession is an alternative widely used by governments to increase investment. In the case of the road sector, the main characteristics of the concessions are: long-term projects, high investments in the early years of the contract and high risks. A viability analysis must be carried out for each concession and consider the characteristics of the project. When the infrastructure is located in a developing country, political and market growth uncertainties should be add in the concession project analysis, as well as economic instability, because they present greater risks. This paper is an analysis of state bank participation in road infrastructure finance in developing countries. For this purpose, we studied road infrastructure financing and its associated risks, and also the features of developing countries. Furthermore, we considered the issue of state banks and multilateral development banks that perform an important role by offering better credit lines than the private banks, in terms of cost, interest and grace period. Based on this study, we analyzed the Brazilian Development Bank - BNDES – and their credit supply to road infrastructure concessions. The results show that BNDES is the main financing agent for long-term investment in the sector, offering loans with low interest rates in Brazilian currency. From this research we argue that a single state bank should not alone support the increasing demand for finance in Brazil. Therefore, we conclude that there is a need to expand the supply of credit in Brazil, by strengthening private banks in the long-term lending market.

Political dictionary : forming a work of universal reference, both constitutional and legal.

"...and embracing the terms of civil administration, of political economy and social relations, and of all the more important statistical departments of finance and commerce."

The saving of Ireland, industrial, financial, political,

Mode of access: Internet.

The works of Alexander Hamilton ; comprising his correspondence, and his political and official writings, exclusive of the Federalist, civil and military.

Mode of access: Internet.