Expert judgement in the processes of commercial property market forecasting

In this paper, we investigate the role of judgement in the formation of forecasts in commercial property markets. The investigation is based on interview surveys with the majority of UK forecast producers, who are using a range of inputs and data sets to form models to predict an array of variables for a range of locations. The findings suggest that forecasts need to be acceptable to their users (and purchasers) and consequently forecasters generally have incentives to avoid presenting contentious or conspicuous forecasts. Where extreme forecasts are generated by a model, forecasters often engage in ‘self‐censorship’ or are ‘censored’ following in‐house consultation. It is concluded that the forecasting process is significantly more complex than merely carrying out econometric modelling, forecasts are mediated and contested within organisations and that impacts can vary considerably across different organizational contexts.

Expert judgement in the processes of commercial property market forecasting

In this paper we investigate the role of judgement in the formation of forecasts in commercial real estate markets. Based on interview surveys with the majority of forecast producers, we find that real estate forecasters are using a range of inputs and data sets to form models to predict an array of variables for a range of locations. The findings suggest that forecasts need to be acceptable to their users (and purchasers) and consequently forecasters generally have incentives to avoid presenting contentious or conspicuous forecasts. Where extreme forecasts are generated by a model, forecasters often engage in ‘self-censorship’ or are ‘censored’ following in-house consultation. It is concluded that the forecasting process is more complex than merely carrying out econometric modelling and that the impact of the influences within this process vary considerably across different organizational contexts.

Judgement

Solo Exhibition.

Judgement now

Performance with Thrape as part of Performa 2015, curated by Mark Beasley.

Judgement, decision, and integrity

Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.

Decision making in health care: limitations of the substituted judgement principle

The substituted judgement principle is often recommended as a means of promoting the self-determination of an incompetent individual when proxy decision makers are faced with having to make decisions about health care. This article represents a critical ethical analysis of this decision-making principle and describes practical impediments that serve to undermine its fundamental purpose. These impediments predominantly stem from the informality associated with the application of the substituted judgement principle. It is recommended that the principles upon which decisions are made about health care for another person should be transparent to all those involved in the process. Furthermore, the substituted judgement principle requires greater rigour in its practical application than currently tends to be the case. It may be that this principle should be subsumed as a component of advance directives in order that it fulfils its aim of serving to respect the self-determination of incompetent individuals.

Measuring moral judgement and the implications of cooperative education and rule-based learning

The Defining Issues Test (DIT), developed by Rest (1986), measures a person's level of moral development using hypothetical social dilemmas. Although the DIT is useful for measuring moral development in social settings, it might not adequately capture an individual's moral judgement abilities in solving work-related problems (Weber, 1990; Trevino, 1992; Welton et al., 1994). In the present study, the moral judgement levels of 97 accounting students were measured over a 1 year period using two separate test instruments, the DIT and a context-specific instrument developed by Welton et al. (1994). The test scores are significantly higher on the DIT than the Welton instrument (between the instruments and over time), suggesting that accounting students use higher levels of moral reasoning in resolving hypothetical social dilemmas and lower levels of moral reasoning in resolving context-specific dilemmas. The difference in test scores was highest during cooperative education (work placement programme), implying that the environment is a significant determinant on students' test scores.