Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

Payone : incentive for epidemic protocol-based anonymity system

Anonymity systems maintain the anonymity of communicating nodes by camouflaging them, either with peer nodes generating dummy traffic or with peer nodes participating in the actual communication process. The probability of any adversary breaking down the anonymity of the communicating nodes is inversely proportional to the number of peer nodes participating in the network. Hence to maintain the anonymity of the communicating nodes, a large number of peer nodes are needed. Lack of peer availability weakens the anonymity of any large scale anonymity system. This work proposes PayOne, an incentive based scheme for promoting peer availability. PayOne aims to increase the peer availability by encouraging nodes to participate in the anonymity system by awarding them with incentives and thereby promoting the anonymity strength. Existing incentive schemes are designed for single path based approaches. There is no incentive scheme for multipath based or epidemic based anonymity systems. This work has been specifically designed for epidemic protocols and has been implemented over MuON, one of the latest entries to the area of multicasting based anonymity systems. MuON is a peer-to-peer based anonymity system which uses epidemic protocol for data dissemination. Existing incentive schemes involve paying every intermediate node that is involved in the communication between the initiator and the receiver. These schemes are not appropriate for epidemic based anonymity systems due to the incurred overhead. PayOne differs from the existing schemes because it involves paying a single intermediate node that participates in the network. The intermediate node can be any random node that participates in the communication and does not necessarily need to lie in the communication path between the initiator and the receiver. The light-weight characteristics of PayOne make it viable for large-scale epidemic based anonymity systems.

Virtues and Perils of Anonymity: Should Intermediaries Bear the Burden?

On October 10, 2013, the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down a judgment (Delfi v. Estonia) condoning Estonia for a law which, as interpreted, held a news portal liable for the defamatory comments of its users. Amongst the considerations that led the Court to find no violation of freedom of expression in this particular case were, above all, the inadequacy of the automatic screening system adopted by the website and the users’ option to post their comments anonymously (i.e. without need for prior registration via email), which in the Court’s view rendered the protection conferred to the injured party via direct legal action against the authors of the comments ineffective. Drawing on the implications of this (not yet final) ruling, this paper discusses a few questions that the tension between the risk of wrongful use of information and the right to anonymity generates for the development of Internet communication, and examines the role that intermediary liability legislation can play to manage this tension.

Group Dynamics in Sex Offender Treatment Involving Individuals with Personality Disorders

This qualitative investigation primarily employing a phenomenological perspective and psychoanalytic interview approach intends to provide contextual understanding of group dynamics in sex offender treatment involving individuals with strong features of personality disorders or Axis II psychopathology according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (4 ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Of note, this study particularly focuses on the cluster B type (Narcissistic, Borderline, Histrionic, and Antisocial Personality Disorders), based on the assumption that this type is more interpersonally operational in its nature. The present study is based on semi-structured interviews of three clinicians who arecurrently providing group treatment for sex offenders. The interview was designed to elicit the participants' clinical observations of group dynamics involving group members with features of the Axis II, Cluster B type. In this study, 11 therapeutic factors postulated by Yalom (2005) were utilized to qualitatively investigate group dynamics. Analyses of qualitative data highlighted how group members with features of the Axis II, Cluster B type may distinctively affect group dynamics. Based on the results, group members with Axis II diagnoses, as reported bythe therapists who responded to this study, were observed to present with altruistic behaviors in group. In addition, motivation appeared to be one of the most influential factors in promoting and maintaining therapeutic group behaviors. Group members with antisocial features appeared to present with low motivation for treatment, and individualswith a pervasive history of criminal institutionalization seemed more prone to disengagement in group. Individuals with borderline and histrionic traits seemed to be interpersonally oriented and affectively engaged in group process. Persons with a narcissistic tendency also appeared to be interpersonally invested and showed altruistic behaviors, yet the importance of confirming their superiority seemed to outweigh the need for acceptance or approval from other group members. As briefly discussed above, the qualitative analyses of the current data showed that individuals with Axis II disorders, Cluster B type uniquely affect group dynamics, which suggest clinical considerations foreffective treatment planning, maintenance, and outcomes.

First interim analysis of multiple offender treatment effectiveness. Interim report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver and Pedestrian Programs, Washington, D.C.

First interim analysis of first offender treatment effectiveness. Interim report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver and Pedestrian Programs, Washington, D.C.

Criminal justice alternatives for disposition of drug abusing offender cases : prosecutor.

Mode of access: Internet.

Sex offender community notification : assessing the impact in Wisconsin /

This article discusses the effects of Wisconsin's community notification statute that authorizes officials to alert residents about the release and reintegration of sex offenders in their communities.

Victim compensation and offender restitution : a selected bibliography /

Mode of access: Internet.

Rehabilitation of the alcoholic; a report from the Study Group on Rehabilitation of the Alcoholic and Public Offender.

Report presented at the Sixth Institute on Rehabilitation Services, held May 20-22, 1968, at University Park, Pa.