Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

On trend estimation under monotone Gaussian subordination with long-memory: application to fossil pollen series

Fossil pollen data from stratigraphic cores are irregularly spaced in time due to non-linear age-depth relations. Moreover, their marginal distributions may vary over time. We address these features in a nonparametric regression model with errors that are monotone transformations of a latent continuous-time Gaussian process Z(T). Although Z(T) is unobserved, due to monotonicity, under suitable regularity conditions, it can be recovered facilitating further computations such as estimation of the long-memory parameter and the Hermite coefficients. The estimation of Z(T) itself involves estimation of the marginal distribution function of the regression errors. These issues are considered in proposing a plug-in algorithm for optimal bandwidth selection and construction of confidence bands for the trend function. Some high-resolution time series of pollen records from Lago di Origlio in Switzerland, which go back ca. 20,000 years are used to illustrate the methods.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Option contracts for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of the Tagus-Segura Basin in Spain

Users in the Mediterranean region face significant water supply risks. Water markets mechanisms can provide flexibility to water systems run in tight situations. The largest water infrastructure in the Iberian Peninsula connects the Segura and Tagus Basins. Stakeholders and politicians in the Tagus Basin have asked that water transfers between the two basins be eventually phased out. The need to increase the statutory minimum environmental flow in the middle Tagus and to meet new urban demands is going to result in a redefinition of the Transfer?s management rules, leading to a reduction in the transferable volumes. To minimise the consequences of such restrictions to irrigators in the Segura Basin who depend on the transferred volumes, we propose the establishment of water option contracts between both basins that represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin spot market experiences. Based on the draft of the new Tagus Basin Plan, we propose both a modification of the Transfer?s management rule and an innovative inter-basin option contract. The main goal of the paper is to define this contract and evaluate it with respect to non-market scenarios. We also assess the resulting impact on environmental flows in the Tagus River and water availability for users in the Segura Basin, together with the economic impacts of such contract on both basins. Our results show that the proposed option contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer?s management rule, and reduce the supply risks of the recipient area.

Phase V of a comparative study of VA and private sector procurement, contracting and distribution of medical supplies and non-perishable subsistence /

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The effect of non-standard employment on work-family balance

Across the last four decades, the structure of the Australian labour market has changed profoundly as non-standard forms of employment have become more prevalent. According to many researchers, the growth of non-standard work has been driven by employee preferences, particularly among married women, for greater flexibility to balance paid work with domestic responsibilities and other non-work related pursuits. In contrast, other researchers argue that the increasing prevalence of non-standard employment reflects employer demands for greater staffing flexibility. From this perspective, non-standard forms of employment are considered to have a negative effect on work-family balance. This paper explores whether non-standard employment is associated with improved or poorer work-to-family conflict and tests whether experiences vary by gender. It concentrates on three common forms of non-standard employment: part-time employment, casual and fixed-term work contracts and flexible scheduling practices (such as evening work, weekend work and irregular rostering). Analysis is based on 2299 employed parents from the first wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics on Australia (HILDA) project. Results show that few scheduling measures are significant determinants of work-family balance. However, part-time employment is associated with reduced work-to-family strain for both men and women, even after controlling for various other employment and household related characteristics. Casual employment, in contrast, incurs the cost of poorer work-family balance for men. Surprisingly, HILDA data show that overall men experience greater work-to-family strain than women.

The propensity to hedge with futures contracts:the case of potato futures contracts

This paper studies why UK non-financial firms hedge with potato futures contracts. It is found that the financial characteristics of firms in the sample play an important role in influencing the propensity to hedge. For example, it is found that firms that hedge are on average larger than firms that do not hedge. Firms that hedge also have more volatile earnings. Furthermore, firms that do hedge appear to want to smooth earnings to reduce the costs of financial distress and avoid entering the highest tax threshold. © 2005 Taylor & Francis.

Stability of the Iteration Method for non Expansive Mappings

The general iteration method for nonexpansive mappings on a Banach space is considered. Under some assumption of fast enough convergence on the sequence of (“almost” nonexpansive) perturbed iteration mappings, if the basic method is τ−convergent for a suitable topology τ weaker than the norm topology, then the perturbed method is also τ−convergent. Application is presented to the gradient-prox method for monotone inclusions in Hilbert spaces.

Homogenization of the p-Laplacian with nonlinear boundary condition on critical size particles: Identifying the strange term for the some non smooth and multivalued operators

We extend previous papers in the literature concerning the homogenization of Robin type boundary conditions for quasilinear equations, in the case of microscopic obstacles of critical size: here we consider nonlinear boundary conditions involving some maximal monotone graphs which may correspond to discontinuous or non-Lipschitz functions arising in some catalysis problems.

Correcting for bias when estimating the cost of hospital-acquired infection : an analysis of lower respiratory tract infections in non-surgical patients

Hospital acquired infections (HAI) are costly but many are avoidable. Evaluating prevention programmes requires data on their costs and benefits. Estimating the actual costs of HAI (a measure of the cost savings due to prevention) is difficult as HAI changes cost by extending patient length of stay, yet, length of stay is a major risk factor for HAI. This endogeneity bias can confound attempts to measure accurately the cost of HAI. We propose a two-stage instrumental variables estimation strategy that explicitly controls for the endogeneity between risk of HAI and length of stay. We find that a 10% reduction in ex ante risk of HAI results in an expected savings of £693 ($US 984).