Economía institucional de la intervención urbanística estatal

La intervención urbanística del Estado es insustituible. En primer lugar porque el capital privado no está dispuesto a asumir el riesgo de depreciación virtual inherente a la provisión de bienes públicos. Tampoco ha alcanzado los  niveles de acumulación previa que de manera individual estén en capacidad de reemplazar los esfuerzos colectivos que se deben movilizar para tal efecto. Es por ello que estratégicamente el capital privado ha seducido al público con la idea de la eficiencia de las alianzas público-privadas y la gobernanza. En segundo lugar porque el mercado inmobiliario residencial formal es un mercado segmentado e imperfecto en el que el poder de mercado de los estructuradores urbanos y metropolitanos alcanza niveles cuasi-monopólicos. Por tanto, y siguiendo a Commons, la regulación y el control de la oferta inmobiliaria residencial incide positivamente en la ampliación de la libertad en la producción y en la elección de localización de las familias que habitan en las metrópolis. Un orden menos segregado que el perseverante se torna posible. Este trabajo se ocupa de analizar, desde una perspectiva teórica pluridisciplinar como la economía institucional urbana, las posibilidades e instrumentos con que se cuenta para alcanzar tal orden.

Controlling regional monopolies in the natural gas industry: the role of transport capacity

This paper analyzes some optimal fiscal, pricing, and capacity investment policies for controlling regional monopoly power in the natural gas industry. By letting the set of control instruments available to the social planner vary, we provide a characterization of the technological and demand conditions under which “excess” capacity in the transport network arises in response to the loss of the two other control instruments, namely, transfers and pricing. Hence, the analysis yields some insights on an economy’s incentives to invest in infrastructures for the purpose of integrating geographically isolated markets.

Sector agrícola y política de competencia

Los procesos de integración económica han puesto en evidencia que la separación tradicionalmente hecha entre las políticas comercial y de competencia no sólo es ficticia, sino que mantenerla es simplemente contradictorio con la realidad de la economía internacional. En la medida en que los mercados domésticos se han abierto al comercio internacional, se ha considerado que las políticas de competencia pueden hacerse redundantes, ya que la competencia extranjera tiende a garantizar que dichos mercados tienen un nivel adecuado de contestabilidad. Sin embargo, como se muestra en este documento para el caso del sector agrícola, en estas circunstancias, la política de competencia adquiere un nuevo e importante papel que cumplir. Acá se discute la relación general entre el sector agrícola y la política de competencia, en un contexto de relativa liberalización comercial. Se sostiene que es necesario aplicar la política de competencia al sector, ya que esto garantiza las mejores condiciones posibles para incentivar los procesos de cambio tecnológico, indispensables para desarrollar una agricultura dinámica. Igualmente, se afirma que es indispensable una aplicación rigurosa de la política de competencia que, teniendo en cuenta las particularidades de la estructura de mercado de los sectores vinculados a la agricultura hacia adelante y hacia atrás, garantice que el más competitivo sector agrícola no sea sujeto de prácticas anticompetitivas por otros agentes. Esto puede incluir la instauración de algunas excepciones puntuales para el sector, con relación a la política de competencia,

Concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights: Some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector.

Concentration in ownership of plant variety rights: some implications for developing countries

This paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide. An analysis of data for 30 UPOV member-countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world. Much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions, especially in the 1990s. A high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights, in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes, is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies. For developing countries, concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies. These implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation, emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Dominance in the Tetra Pak case: an empirical approach

The 1991 decision of the European Commission on the Tetra Pak case was based on information which seemed to prove the firm's anti-competitive behavior. The Tetra Pak case is investigated here focusing on the meaning of multimarket dominance, using empirical techniques. We find that a more rigorous analysis of the data available would not confirm the Commission's assertions. That is, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Commission was right to relate Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector to its market power in the non-aseptic sector. Our results suggest a general framework for the analysis of abusive transfer of market power across vertically or/and horizontally related markets.

Section 46:where we have been and where we are going: a review of the recent debate

Two recent reviews of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (Commonwealth) (1974) have looked specifically at the operation of Section 46 of this Act and have come to very different conclusions concerning its efficacy. The Dawson review (2003) argued that no change to S 46 was required as the courts were providing sufficient guidance in the application of the legislation in this respect. The Senate Committee review (2004) came to different conclusions arguing that the Act needed clarification in regard to certain sections. These reports highlight the controversy that has surrounded this section of the Trade Practices Act for the past thirty years. The aim of this paper is to consider these reviews and evaluate the extent to which the High Court has been able to provide guidance in the application of legislation that prohibits the misuse of market power.

Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act-has the High Court made a "u-turn" on "taking advantage"?

Examination of High Court decisions on misuse of market power in regard to the element of "taking advantage" reveals inconsistency of application. Whilst being consistent regarding the need for a connection between the market power and the impugned conduct, the High Court has not been consistent regarding the degree of connection required. Two streams have developed, one supporting a high degree of connection, the other a lower degree before a firm is found to have "taken advantage" of its market power. Added to this has been the development of the "rational business explanation" which, it is argued, is either used as a defence to a s 46 action or is premised on the higher threshold of connection. Initially the high Court supported the lower threshold. In later decisions, whilst expressing support for the earlier decisions, in application the High Court favoured the higher threshold and at one point the rational business explanation. This trend appears to have been reversed with the most recent High Court decision which indicates substantive support for the earlier s 46 decisions.

TPA bill fails small business

Proposed legislation before federal parliament continues to come under fire from legal experts for not doing enough to protect small businesses against cartels and the misuse of market power.

Unions and profits : a meta-regression analysis

The effect of unions on profits continues to be an unresolved theoretical and empirical issue. In this paper, clustered data analysis and hierarchical linear meta-regression models are applied to the population of forty-five econometric studies that report 532 estimates of the direct effect of unions on profits. Unions have a significant negative effect on profits in the United States, and this effect is larger when market-based measures of profits are used. Separate meta-regression analyses are used to identify the effects of market power and long-lived assets on profits, as well as the sources of union-profit effects. The accumulated evidence rejects market power as a source of union-profit effects. While the case is not yet proven, there is some evidence in support of the appropriation of quasi-rent hypothesis. There is a clear need for further American and non-American primary research in this area.

Consolidation within the Australian real estate investment trust sector : an evaluation of the impact on unitholder returns

Mergers and acquisitions within the Australian-real estate investment trusts (A-REITs) sector have become a noticeable trend in the last decade. Utilising
event study methodology, 36 successful A-REIT mergers and acquisitions
between January 1995 and December 2008 were examined. Both target and
bidding shareholders experience positive excess returns of 4.27% and 0.54%
respectively over the 41 day event window [−20, +20]. Analysis indicates that the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidding firms are considerably greater
than previous research suggests. This study finds higher bidder CARs when scrip
or a combination of scrip and cash is used to finance the acquisition. We also find
that the relative size or the size of the acquirer have a positive and significant
impact on the excess returns of bidding A-REITs. This suggests that the
synergistic benefits from the acquisition are a result of economies of scale and
increased market power. There is also some evidence that the relative size and
method of payment influence the CARs of target firms during the event window.

An agent-based approach to value theory and wealth distribution in economics

Any attempt to model an economy requires foundational assumptions about the relations between prices, values and the distribution of wealth. These assumptions exert a profound influence over the results of any model. Unfortunately, there are few areas in economics as vexed as the theory of value. I argue in this paper that the fundamental problem with past theories of value is that it is simply not possible to model the determination of value, the formation of prices and the distribution of income in a real economy with analytic mathematical models. All such attempts leave out crucial processes or make unrealistic assumptions which significantly affect the results. There have been two primary approaches to the theory of value. The first, associated with classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx were substance theories of value, which view value as a substance inherent in an object and which is conserved in exchange. For Marxists, the value of a commodity derives solely from the value of the labour power used to produce it - and therefore any profit is due to the exploitation of the workers. The labour theory of value has been discredited because of its assumption that labour was the only ‘factor’ that contributed to the creation of value, and because of its fundamentally circular argument. Neoclassical theorists argued that price was identical with value and was determined purely by the interaction of supply and demand. Value then, was completely subjective. Returns to labour (wages) and capital (profits) were determined solely by their marginal contribution to production, so that each factor received its just reward by definition. Problems with the neoclassical approach include assumptions concerning representative agents, perfect competition, perfect and costless information and contract enforcement, complete markets for credit and risk, aggregate production functions and infinite, smooth substitution between factors, distribution according to marginal products, firms always on the production possibility frontier and firms’ pricing decisions, ignoring money and credit, and perfectly rational agents with infinite computational capacity. Two critical areas include firstly, the underappreciated Sonnenschein-Mantel- Debreu results which showed that the foundational assumptions of the Walrasian general-equilibrium model imply arbitrary excess demand functions and therefore arbitrary equilibrium price sets. Secondly, in real economies, there is no equilibrium, only continuous change. Equilibrium is never reached because of constant changes in preferences and tastes; technological and organisational innovations; discoveries of new resources and new markets; inaccurate and evolving expectations of businesses, consumers, governments and speculators; changing demand for credit; the entry and exit of firms; the birth, learning, and death of citizens; changes in laws and government policies; imperfect information; generalized increasing returns to scale; random acts of impulse; weather and climate events; changes in disease patterns, and so on. The problem is not the use of mathematical modelling, but the kind of mathematical modelling used. Agent-based models (ABMs), objectoriented programming and greatly increased computer power however, are opening up a new frontier. Here a dynamic bargaining ABM is outlined as a basis for an alternative theory of value. A large but finite number of heterogeneous commodities and agents with differing degrees of market power are set in a spatial network. Returns to buyers and sellers are decided at each step in the value chain, and in each factor market, through the process of bargaining. Market power and its potential abuse against the poor and vulnerable are fundamental to how the bargaining dynamics play out. Ethics therefore lie at the very heart of economic analysis, the determination of prices and the distribution of wealth. The neoclassicals are right then that price is the enumeration of value at a particular time and place, but wrong to downplay the critical roles of bargaining, power and ethics in determining those same prices.

Diferenciação vertical em um modelo de hotelling com firmas heterogêneas

O trabalho apresenta um modelo de competição duopolista, com firmas heterogêneas (custos marginais diferentes), produtos espacialmente diferenciados quanto a dimensão vertical e horizontal, e informação privada sobre as preferências por qualidade dos consumidores. Identifica-se que a assimetria de informação sobre a dimensão vertical e a diferença de custos exercem grande relevância sobre a decisão de apreçamento das firmas e sobre as estruturas de mercado de equilíbrio. Um resultado relevante decorrente desses dois aspectos é a existência de uma massa de consumidores que, em equilíbrio, pode demandar de qualquer uma das firmas, sendo essa decisão pautada sobre o real parâmetro de preferência por qualidade de cada consumidor. Observa-se também que quanto maior a heterogeneidade dos custos, maior é o poder de mercado da firma de menor custo.

Uma análise da concorrência no setor brasileiro de celulose

Este trabalho analisa o setor brasileiro de celulose e tenta responder a duas questões principais: a abrangência do mercado relevante e a existência de poder de mercado das empresas que atuam neste setor. A dimensão produto do mercado relevante foi definida a partir de dados qualitativos. Devido à indisponibilidade de dados para uma análise qualitativa mais apurada, a opção foi pela celulose de fibra curta de eucalipto, produto mais importante do setor, tanto pela posição brasileira em tecnologia como pela pauta de exportações. Já quanto à dimensão geográfica, o procedimento realizado baseou-se em Forni (2004) que utiliza testes de raiz unitária para a definição do mercado. Concluiu-se que, com os dados disponíveis, o mercado deste produto pode ser considerado como internacional, não somente pelo resultado do teste como também pelo modo de funcionamento deste mercado. Definido o mercado de produto e geográfico, realizou-se um teste de poder de mercado, pois neste nicho, a Aracruz é líder mundial. Tal teste foi realizado com base na demanda residual descrita por Mayo, Kaserman e Kahai (1996) e estimado segundo Motta (2004). Concluiu-se que, apesar de a Aracruz possuir um elevado market share no setor, ela não possui poder de mercado.

A cadeia da carne bovina no Brasil: uma análise de poder de mercado e teoria da informação

Esta tese analisou a cadeia da carne bovina no Brasil com o objetivo de identificar a existência de assimetrias nas relações comerciais entre seus agentes (pecuaristas, frigoríficos e supermercados). Foram investigadas duas formas de assimetria: a diferença de conteúdo informacional entre os agentes econômicos, no mercado futuro de boi gordo da BM&F e a possibilidade de exercício de poderes de mercado e de barganha nas relações comerciais dentro dessa cadeia. A análise de poder de mercado baseou-se na estrutura analítica de Crespi, Gao e Peterson (2005), e permitiu inferir que existe poder de mercado na aquisição de bois pelos frigoríficos, o que vai ao encontro dos resultados observados em outros oligopólios de estrutura caracterizada por um mercado pulverizado na ponta fornecedora e por um processo local, isto é, na própria região, de escoamento da produção. Implementou-se uma análise complementar sobre a estrutura de formação do preço do boi, na qual identificou-se que São Paulo é a região formadora dos preços. A relação entre frigoríficos e supermercados foi analisada através do modelo momentum threshold autoregression (M-TAR) e observou-se que os supermercados apropriam-se das reduções observada no preço do atacado e repassam ao varejo eventuais aumentos de preços no atacado. Portanto, é possível concluir que os supermercados têm poder de barganha junto aos frigoríficos, o que era esperado, pelo fato de esses estabelecimentos adquirirem volumes significativos e se posicionarem como principais canais de distribuição da carne. E, por fim, verificou-se a existência de assimetrias informacionais entre os participantes do mercado futuro de boi gordo da BM&F, mensurada por meio de uma análise sobre a relação entre a volatilidade dos preços futuros e as posições por tipo de participante. Os resultados encontrados corroboraram a hipótese de que os frigoríficos têm mais informação, no mercado futuro, que os demais agentes.