United States investor.

Mode of access: Internet.

Securities investor protection act amendments : hearing before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session, on H.R. 8331 ... April 25, 1978.

Mode of access: Internet.

Accounting reform and investor protection : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, on the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, accounting reform and investor protection issues raised by Enron and other public companies.

Shipping list number: 2003-0249-P (volumes 1-2, 4), 2003-0247-P (volume 3).

The Australian colonies in 1896. Three letters addressed to an investor in Australian securities, describing the country and its resources, population, public works, and finances.

Mode of access: Internet.

Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.

Shipping list no.: 88-329-P.

Measuring and modelling the influence of investor behaviour on investment decision making

Guest editorial

The SEC’s retail investor 2.0: Interactive data and the rise of calculative accountability

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States mandated a new digital reporting system for US companies in late 2008. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, ‘interactive data’ (SEC, 2006a). Despite the promise of its name, we find that in the development of the project retail investors are invoked as calculative actors rather than engaged in dialogue. Similarly, the potential for the underlying technology to be applied in ways to encourage new forms of accountability appears to be forfeited in the interests of enrolling company filers. We theorise the activities of the SEC and in particular its chairman at the time, Christopher Cox, over a three year period, both prior to and following the ‘credit crisis’. We argue that individuals and institutions play a central role in advancing the socio-technical project that is constituted by interactive data. We adopt insights from ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005b) and governmentality (Miller, 2008; Miller and Rose, 2008) to show how regulators and the proponents of the technology have acted as spokespersons for the interactive data technology and the retail investor. We examine the way in which calculative accountability has been privileged in the SEC’s construction of the retail investor as concerned with atomised, quantitative data (Kamuf, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Tsoukas, 1997). We find that the possibilities for the democratising effects of digital information on the Internet has not been realised in the interactive data project and that it contains risks for the very investors the SEC claims to seek to protect.

Interactive data and retail investor decision-making:an experimental study

The results of an experimental study of retail investors' use of eXtensible Business Reporting Language tagged (interactive) data and PDF format for making investment decisions are reported. The main finding is that data format made no difference to participants' ability to locate and integrate information from statement footnotes to improve investment decisions. Interactive data were perceived by participants as quick and 'accurate', but it failed to facilitate the identification of the adjustment needed to make the ratios accurate for comparison. An important implication is that regulators and software designers should work to reduce user reliance on the comparability of ratios generated automatically using interactive data.

Interactive data in financial reporting:the construction of the non-professional investor

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and in particular its immediately past chairman, Christopher Cox, has been actively promoting an upgrade of the EDGAR system of disseminating filings. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, "Interactive Data" (SEC, 2006). In October this year the Office of Interactive Disclosure was created(http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-213.htm). The focus of this paper is to examine the way in which the non-professional investor has been constructed by various actors. We examine the manner in which Interactive Data has been sold as the panacea for financial market 'irregularities' by the SEC and others. The academic literature shows almost no evidence of researching non-professional investors in any real sense (Young, 2006). Both this literature and the behaviour of representatives of institutions such as the SEC and FSA appears to find it convenient to construct this class of investor in a particular form and to speak for them. We theorise the activities of the SEC and its chairman in particular over a period of about three years, both following and prior to the 'credit crunch'. Our approach is to examine a selection of the policy documents released by the SEC and other interested parties and the statements made by some of the policy makers and regulators central to the programme to advance the socio-technical project that is constituted by Interactive Data. We adopt insights from ANT and more particularly the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 1996, 2002; Law & Singleton, 2005) to show how individuals and regulators have acted as spokespersons for this malleable class of investor. We theorise the processes of accountability to investors and others and in so doing reveal the regulatory bodies taking the regulated for granted. The possible implications of technological developments in digital reporting have been identified also by the CEO's of the six biggest audit firms in a discussion document on the role of accounting information and audit in the future of global capital markets (DiPiazza et al., 2006). The potential for digital reporting enabled through XBRL to "revolutionize the entire company reporting model" (p.16) is discussed and they conclude that the new model "should be driven by the wants of investors and other users of company information,..." (p.17; emphasis in the original). Here rather than examine the somewhat illusive and vexing question of whether adding interactive functionality to 'traditional' reports can achieve the benefits claimed for nonprofessional investors we wish to consider the rhetorical and discursive moves in which the SEC and others have engaged to present such developments as providing clearer reporting and accountability standards and serving the interests of this constructed and largely unknown group - the non-professional investor.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.

Accounting Earnings Announcements, Institutional Investor Concentration, and Common Stock Returns

[Excerpt] This study examines the relation between the level of institutional investor ownership and the magnitude of security price variability at quarterly earnings announcement dates. Prior research consistently documents a negative association between firm size and announcement-date return variability. One explanation for this finding is that as more timely, alternative information becomes available on large firms prior to an announcement date, their security prices become informative, thereby reducing the information content of the earnings announcement. Large firms are closely followed by institutional investors. These investors dedicate substantial resources to information search. Therefore, the link between size and information production may be attributable to the influence of institutional investors on the information production process. Because institutional trades can also affect security prices, however, the precise impact of institutional following on the variability of prices at quarterly earnings dates is not evident.

Integrating corporate responsbility into investor relations. Sustainability report as a part of investor relations.

Corporate responsibility is a question that many stakeholders are interested in. These stakeholders can be e.g. company’s employees, partners, clients, media or investors. Especially for listed companies, investors are one of the most important stakeholders. It is essential for a company to maintain the trust of current investors and gain the trust of potential investors. Investors cannot be divided only into two groups, individual and institutional investors. Investors differ a lot, especially when it comes to investment decisions. Investors can make their investment decisions based on many things, and strong financial performance is not necessarily good enough a reason. Socially responsible investors value responsibility and sustainability related factors when making investment decisions. These things can be divided into three dimensions: environmental, social and economic responsibility. Many companies disclose a sustainability report in order to be able to answer to the needs of different stakeholders, including investors. The purpose of this thesis was to study how companies integrate corporate responsibility into investor relations, and how sustainability report can be used in investor relations. Furthermore, this thesis examined the key elements of sustainability reports. The research was made by a qualitative study in two phases. In the first phase five representatives of two Finnish listed companies, KONE and Kesko were interviewed. The interviewees are professionals within investor relations and corporate responsibility communications. In the second phase of the study the sustainability reports of these two companies were analyzed with content analysis. The existing theory and the interviews created the base for the content analysis. This study suggests that there is a connection between corporate responsibility and investor relations, and those should be integrated. Socially responsible investors are an important target group for companies, and companies should be able to respond to their and other stakeholders’ needs. Sustainability report can be used as a tool both within the company and in external communication for these purposes.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE BRAZILIAN REAL ESTATE MARKET

This article discusses the main aspects of the Brazilian real estate market in order to illustrate if it would be attractive for a typical American real estate investor to buy office-building portfolios in Brazil. The article emphasizes: [i] - the regulatory frontiers, comparing investment securitization, using a typical American REIT structure, with the Brazilian solution, using the Fundo de Investimento Imobiliario - FII; [ii] - the investment quality attributes in the Brazilian market, using an office building prototype, and [iii] - the comparison of [risk vs. yield] generated by an investment in the Brazilian market, using a FII, benchmarked against an existing REIT (OFFICE SUB-SECTOR) in the USA market. We conclude that investing dollars exchanged for Reais [the Brazilian currency] in a FII with a triple A office-building portfolio in the Sao Paulo marketplace will yield an annual income and a premium return above an American REIT investment. The highly aggressive scenario, along with the strong persistent exchange rate detachment to the IGP-M variations, plus instabilities affecting the generation of income, and even if we adopt a 300-point margin for the Brazil-Risk level, demonstrates that an investment opportunity in the Brazilian market, in the segment we have analyzed, outperforms an equivalent investment in the American market.

Revisiting the interest rate puzzle

This article makes a connection between Lucas` (1978) asset pricing model and the macroeconomic dynamics for some selected countries. Both the relative risk aversion and the impatience for postponing consumption by synthesizing the investor behaviour can help to understand some key macroeconomic issues across countries, such as the savings decision and the real interest rate. I find that the government consumption makes worse the so-called `equity premium-interest rate puzzle`. The first root of the quadratic function for explaining the real interest rate can produce this puzzle, but not the second root. Thus, Mehra and Prescott (1985) identified only one possible solution.

Evidence of portuguese stock market abnormal returns

According to the stock market efficiency theory, it is not possible to consistently beat the market. However, technical analysis is more and more spread as an efficient way to achieve abnormal returns. In fact there is evidence that momentum investing strategies provide abnormal returns in different stock markets, Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993), George, T. and Hwang, C. (2004) and Du, D. (2009). In this work we study if like other markets, the Portuguese stock market also allows to obtain abnormal returns, using a strategy that consists in picking stocks according to their past performance. Our work confirms the results of Soares, J. and Serra, A. (2005) and Pereira, P. (2009), showing that an investor can get abnormal returns investing in momentum portfolios. The Portuguese stock market evidences momentum returns in short term, exhibiting reversal in long term.