Measuring market power in electricity generation: A long-term perspective using a programming model

This paper focuses on measuring the extent to which market power has been exercised in a recently deregulated electricity generation sector. Our study emphasises the need to consider the concept of market power in a long-run dynamic context. A market power index is constructed focusing on differences between actual market returns and long-run competitive returns, estimated using a programming model devised by the authors. The market power implications of hedge contracts are briefly considered. The state of Queensland Australia is used as a context for the analysis. The results suggest that generators have exercised significant market power since deregulation.

Load profiling and data mining techniques in electricity deregulated market

This paper presents load profiles of electricity customers, using the knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) procedure, a data mining technique, to determine the load profiles for different types of customers. In this paper, the current load profiling methods are compared using data mining techniques, by analysing and evaluating these classification techniques. The objective of this study is to determine the best load profiling methods and data mining techniques to classify, detect and predict non-technical losses in the distribution sector, due to faulty metering and billing errors, as well as to gather knowledge on customer behaviour and preferences so as to gain a competitive advantage in the deregulated market. This paper focuses mainly on the comparative analysis of the classification techniques selected; a forthcoming paper will focus on the detection and prediction methods.

Cost-based pricing in the NHS internal market : accounting choices and the achievement of economic efficiency

Since 1988, quasi-markets have been introduced into many areas of social policy in the UK, the NHS internal market is one example. Markets operate by price signals. The NHS Internal Market, if it is to operate efficiently, requires purchasers and providers to respond to price signals. The research hypothesis is - cost accounting methods can be developed to enable healthcare contracts to be priced on a cost-basis in a manner which will facilitate the achievement of economic efficiency in the NHS internal market. Surveys of hospitals in 1991 and 1994 established the cost methods adopted in deriving the prices for healthcare contracts in the first year of the market and three years on. An in-depth view of the costing for pricing process was gained through case studies. Hospitals had inadequate cost information on which to price healthcare contracts at the inception of the internal market: prices did not reflect the relative performance of healthcare providers sufficiently closely to enable the market's espoused efficiency aims to be achieved. Price variations were often due to differing costing approaches rather than efficiency. Furthermore, price comparisons were often meaningless because of inadequate definition of the services (products). In April 1993, the NHS Executive issued guidance on costing for contracting to all NHS providers in an attempt to improve the validity of price comparisons between alternative providers. The case studies and the 1994 survey show that although price comparison has improved, considerable problems remain. Consistency is not assured, and the problem of adequate product definition is still to be solved. Moreover, the case studies clearly highlight the mismatch of rigid, full-cost pricing rules with both the financial management considerations at local level and the emerging internal market(s). Incentives exist to cost-shift, and healthcare prices can easily be manipulated. In the search for a new health policy paradigm to replace traditional bureaucratic provision, cost-based pricing cannot be used to ensure a more efficient allocation of healthcare resources.

Professional Services in the EU Internal Market: Quality Regulation and Self-Regulation, by T. Heremans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, ISBN 9781849462402); xxii+366pp., £75.00 hb.

Book review

Essays on market design and regulation in electricity systems

This thesis discusses market design and regulation in electricity systems, focusing on the information exchange of the regulated grid firm and the generation firms as well as the regulation of the grid firm. In the first chapter, an economic framework is developed to consistently analyze different market designs and the information exchange between the grid firm and the generation firms. Perfect competition between the generation firms and perfect regulation of the grid firm is assumed. A numerical algorithm is developed and its feasibility demonstrated on a large-scale problem. The effects of different market designs for the Central Western European (CWE) region until 2030 are analyzed. In the second chapter, the consequences of restricted grid expansion within the current market design in the CWE region until 2030 are analyzed. In the third chapter the assumption of efficient markets is modified. The focus of the analysis is then, whether and how inefficiencies in information availability and processing affect different market designs. For different parameter settings, nodal and zonal pricing are compared regarding their welfare in the spot and forward market. In the fourth chapter, information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated firm are analyzed. The optimal regulatory strategy for a firm, providing one output with two substitutable inputs, is defined. Thereby, one input and the absolute quantity of inputs is not observable for the regulator. The result is then compared to current regulatory approaches.

Intelligent decision making in electricity markets: simulated annealing Q-Learning

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. MASCEM is a multi-agent electricity market simulator to model market players and simulate their operation in the market. Market players are entities with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players. MASCEM is integrated with ALBidS, a system that provides several dynamic strategies for agents’ behavior. This paper presents a method that aims at enhancing ALBidS competence in endowing market players with adequate strategic bidding capabilities, allowing them to obtain the higher possible gains out of the market. This method uses a reinforcement learning algorithm to learn from experience how to choose the best from a set of possible actions. These actions are defined accordingly to the most probable points of bidding success. With the purpose of accelerating the convergence process, a simulated annealing based algorithm is included.

A multi-agent system for the support of producer coalition formation in electricity markets

All over the world Distributed Generation is seen as a valuable help to get cleaner and more efficient electricity. To get negotiation power and advantages of scale economy, distributed producers can be aggregated giving place to a new concept: the Virtual Power Producer. Virtual Power Producers are multitechnology and multi-site heterogeneous entities. Virtual Power Producers should adopt organization and management methodologies so that they can make Distributed Generation a really profitable activity, able to participate in the market. In this paper we address the development of a multi-agent market simulator – MASCEM – able to study alternative coalitions of distributed producers in order to identify promising Virtual Power Producers in an electricity market.

Multiagent system for adaptive strategy formulation in electricity markets

Electricity markets are complex environments with very particular characteristics. MASCEM is a market simulator developed to allow deep studies of the interactions between the players that take part in the electricity market negotiations. This paper presents a new proposal for the definition of MASCEM players’ strategies to negotiate in the market. The proposed methodology is multiagent based, using reinforcement learning algorithms to provide players with the capabilities to perceive the changes in the environment, while adapting their bids formulation according to their needs, using a set of different techniques that are at their disposal.

Renewable-based generation integration in electricity markets with virtual power producers

The development of renewable energy sources and Distributed Generation (DG) of electricity is of main importance in the way towards a sustainable development. However, the management, in large scale, of these technologies is complicated because of the intermittency of primary resources (wind, sunshine, etc.) and small scale of some plants. The aggregation of DG plants gives place to a new concept: the Virtual Power Producer (VPP). VPPs can reinforce the importance of these generation technologies making them valuable in electricity markets. VPPs can ensure a secure, environmentally friendly generation and optimal management of heat, electricity and cold as well as optimal operation and maintenance of electrical equipment, including the sale of electricity in the energy market. For attaining these goals, there are important issues to deal with, such as reserve management strategies, strategies for bids formulation, the producers’ remuneration, and the producers’ characterization for coalition formation. This chapter presents the most important concepts related with renewable-based generation integration in electricity markets, using VPP paradigm. The presented case studies make use of two main computer applications:ViProd and MASCEM. ViProd simulates VPP operation, including the management of plants in operation. MASCEM is a multi-agent based electricity market simulator that supports the inclusion of VPPs in the players set.

Multi-agent negotiation for coalition formation and management in electricity markets

Negotiation is a fundamental tool for reaching understandings that allow each involved party to gain an advantage for themselves by the end of the process. In recent years, with the increasing of compe-titiveness in most sectors, negotiation procedures become present in practically all of them. One particular environment in which the competitiveness has been increasing exponentially is the electricity markets sector. This work is directed to the study of electricity markets’ partici-pating entities interaction, namely in what concerns the formation, management and operation of aggregating entities – Virtual Power Players (VPPs). VPPs are responsible for managing coalitions of market players with small market negotiating influence, which take strategic advantage in entering such aggregations, to increase their negotiating power. This chapter presents a negotiation methodology for the creation and management of coalitions in Electricity Markets. This approach is tested using MASCEM, taking advantage of its ability to provide the means to model and simulate VPPs. VPPs are represented as coalitions of agents, with the capability of negotiating both in the market, and internally, with their members, in order to combine and manage their individual specific characteristics and goals, with the strategy and objectives of the VPP itself.

Commercial agents portfolio optimization in electricity markets

As it is well known, competitive electricity markets require new computing tools for power companies that operate in retail markets in order to enhance the management of its energy resources. During the last years there has been an increase of the renewable penetration into the micro-generation which begins to co-exist with the other existing power generation, giving rise to a new type of consumers. This paper develops a methodology to be applied to the management of the all the aggregators. The aggregator establishes bilateral contracts with its clients where the energy purchased and selling conditions are negotiated not only in terms of prices but also for other conditions that allow more flexibility in the way generation and consumption is addressed. The aggregator agent needs a tool to support the decision making in order to compose and select its customers' portfolio in an optimal way, for a given level of profitability and risk.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

A trader portfolio optimization of bilateral contracts in electricity retail markets

Electricity markets are systems for effecting the purchase and sale of electricity using supply and demand to set energy prices. Two major market models are often distinguished: pools and bilateral contracts. Pool prices tend to change quickly and variations are usually highly unpredictable. In this way, market participants often enter into bilateral contracts to hedge against pool price volatility. This article addresses the challenge of optimizing the portfolio of clients managed by trader agents. Typically, traders buy energy in day-ahead markets and sell it to a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving three-rate tariffs. Traders sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.

Investment focused strategies in electricity markets using the ITEM-game simulator

This paper presents a methodology to establish investment and trading strategies of a power generation company. These strategies are integrated in the ITEM-Game simulator in order to test their results when played against defined strategies used by other players. The developed strategies are focused on investment decisions, although trading strategies are also implemented to obtain base case results. Two cases are studied considering three players with the same trading strategy. In case 1, all players also have the same investment strategy driven by a market target share. In case 2, player 1 has an improved investment strategy with a target share twice of the target of players 2 and 3. Results put in evidence the influence of the CO2 and fuel prices in the company investment decision. It is also observed the influence of the budget constraint which might prevent the player to take the desired investment decision.

Commercial agentes portfolio optimization in electricity markets

As it is well known, competitive electricity markets require new computing tools for power companies that operate in retail markets in order to enhance the management of its energy resources. During the last years there has been an increase of the renewable penetration into the micro-generation which begins to co-exist with the other existing power generation, giving rise to a new type of consumers. This paper develops a methodology to be applied to the management of the all the aggregators. The aggregator establishes bilateral contracts with its clients where the energy purchased and selling conditions are negotiated not only in terms of prices but also for other conditions that allow more flexibility in the way generation and consumption is addressed. The aggregator agent needs a tool to support the decision making in order to compose and select its customers' portfolio in an optimal way, for a given level of profitability and risk.