Contrafreeloading in maned wolves: Implications for their management and welfare

Contrafreeloading occurs when animals spend time and effort to obtain food in the presence of freely available food. There are several interpretations for such an apparent contradiction to optimal foraging models, with an emphasis either on the need to gather and update information about the environment or on the value of performing species-typical responses. Evidence suggests that both gathering information about the environment and the expression of species-typical behaviour are important for the welfare of captive animals. The aim of the present study was to assess the existence of contrafreeloading in maned wolves (Chrysocyon brachyurus), in a situation where animals could get food directly from a "free" source and/or search and handle hidden food items, an alternative that requires more effort and is probably more similar to natural foraging conditions. Eight captive, pair-housed maned wolves were given weekly choice tests in which they could obtain food either by approaching the usual food tray in one section of the enclosure (Tray), and/or by searching for food at variable sites amongst the vegetation in the other section of the enclosure (Scattered). Results indicate that maned wolves spent more time in the Scattered than in the Tray section of the enclosure (P = 0.02) and that they obtained about half of the food from that section (48.54% +/- SE 0.69). Our results, the first to demonstrate contrafreeloading in maned wolves, have implications for the husbandry and welfare of this endangered species. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Risk factors for death and unwanted early slaughter in Swiss veal calves kept at a specific animal welfare standard

Calf losses (CL, mortality and unwanted early slaughter) in veal production are of great economic importance and an indicator of welfare. The objective of the present study was to evaluate CL and the causes of death on farms with a specific animal welfare standard (SAW) which exceeds the Swiss statutory regulations. Risk factors for CL were identified based on information about management, housing, feeding, and medication. In total, 74 production cohorts (2783 calves) of 15 farms were investigated. CL was 3.6%, the main causes of death were digestive disorders (52%), followed by respiratory diseases (28%). Factors significantly associated with an increased risk for CL were a higher number of individual daily doses of antibiotics (DDA), insufficient wind deflection in winter, and male gender. For administration of antibiotics to all calves of the cohort, a DDA of 14-21 was associated with a decreased risk for CL compared to a DDA of 7-13 days.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

INFLUENCE OF A CLINIC BASED IMMUNIZATION INFORMATION SYSTEM ON INFANT IMMUNIZATIONS

This study focuses on the impact of a clinic-based intervention program on the immunization status of limited-income urban children. The intervention program consisted of an information session for clinic health care providers and the placement of individualized immunization information labels on clinic notes at the time of each visit. The degree of impact of the intervention on immunization administration was ascertained through a comparison of two similar groups of infants born in the same months of the year immediately before (N = 201) and after (N = 203) the information session and initiation of the labeling system. The timeliness of administration of each diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus and trivalent oral polio vaccine (DPT/TOPV) in the first year series of three was compared pre- to postintervention. Significantly more third immunizations were given the postintervention subjects within ten days of the recommended time of application ( p = .0361). Life table analysis indicated that the probability of an infant's passing one year of age without the administration of the third immunization decreased for postintervention infants (p = .0515). The intervention was most successful in assuring administration of the series of immunizations in those infants who were seen by the health care provider for at least 50% of their first year visits. Results indicate that minor changes in the format of information given a relatively continuous provider can increase completion of immunization series in infants. ^

Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Global practice experience: A useful lens for understanding patient and staff perceptions of successful integration of health information technology in primary care

Making healthcare comprehensive and more efficient remains a complex challenge. Health Information Technology (HIT) is recognized as an important component of this transformation but few studies describe HIT adoption and it's effect on the bedside experience by physicians, staff and patients. This study applied descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to data from the Patient-Centered Medical Home National Demonstration Project (NDP) of the American Academy of Family Physicians. Thirty-six clinics were followed for 26 months by clinician/staff questionnaires and patient surveys. This study characterizes those clinics as well as staff and patient perspectives on HIT usefulness, the doctor-patient relationship, electronic medical record (EMR) implementation, and computer connections in the practice throughout the study. The Global Practice Experience factor, a composite score related to key components of primary care, was then correlated to clinician and patient perspectives. This study found wide adoption of HIT among NDP practices. Patient perspectives on HIT helpfulness on the doctor-patient showed a suggestive trend that approached statistical significance (p = 0.172). Clinicians and staff noted successful integration of EMR into clinic workflow and their perception of helpfulness to the doctor-patient relationship show a suggestive increase also approaching statistical significance (p=0.06). GPE was correlated with clinician/staff assessment of a helpful doctor-patient relationship midway through the study (R 0.460, p = 0.021) with the remaining time points nearing statistical significance. GPE was also correlated to both patient perspectives of EMR helpfulness in the doctor-patient relationship (R 0.601, p = 0.001) and computer connections (R 0.618, p = 0.0001) at the start of the study. ^

An Agricultural continuum : a descriptive study of the farmworker population and the settling-out process : based on information collected under Contract no. HEW-OS-72-217.

"Jointly funded by the Department of Health, Education & Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity."

Guide for submission of information on lasers and products containing lasers pursuant to 21 CFR 1002.10 and 1002.12 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Indian child welfare act of 1977 [microform] : hearing before the United States Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, on S. 1214 ... August 4, 1977.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Handbook of information for physicians (M.D. and D.O.), dentists, optometrists, podiatrists, veterinarians, and pharmacists entering an agreement to practice in a shortage area.

Mode of access: Internet.

Information resources on the care and use of insects : 1968-2004.

"June 2004."

Management information systems in the drug field /

Mode of access: Internet.

Drug Abuse Epidemiology Data Center (DAEDAC) : general information /

Mode of access: Internet.