An overview of Australian intrans*igence : a systemic Pandora’s Box

Despite the fact that Australia is a socially progressive country and boasts one of the largest Gender Dysphoria Clinics in the Southern Hemisphere, delivering services for almost four decades, Australian Governments fail to arrive at any consensus on the legal and human rights approaches to Trans*people. The subsequent lack of recognition does little more than increase the levels of frustration of and the continued discrimination to Trans*people, including adverse mental health problems, in this country. The purpose of this presentation is to provide an overview of the Australian systems that govern Trans*people and to identify how Trans*identities are manipulated in our Federal system of government; a system which offers little to protect the human rights of Trans*people. In order to contextualise the Australian situation, I commence with a brief description on the layers of government which will include how Australian Trans*people are currently protected under the law in those jurisdictions. I then present some of the impracticalities endured by the transitioning individual (single or married) including change of documentation and legal gender status before, during and after surgical transition for both those born on and off shore. This presentation will also include discussion of legislation that has been described by Trans*advocates as “Gesture”, “Cart before the Horse” and “Harmful”. I will conclude with a way forward by suggesting the development of a coordinated all of government approach in consultation with key stakeholders for “Trans* Friendly Legislation” to improve the human and legal rights, and ultimately the health and wellbeing of Australian Trans*identities.

Interview with Professor Mark Brodin about his book "William P. Homans Jr.: A Life In Court"

Boston lawyer William P. Homans Jr. devoted his fifty-year career to the defense of the poor and downtrodden, the protection of our most basic civil liberties, and the abolition of the death penalty. Descendant of two of Boston's oldest and most prominent families, and combat veteran of both the British and American Navies during World War II, Homans became unlikely guru to the 1960s generation of radical lawyers and antiwar activists. He was on the defense team in the 1968 conspiracy trial of Dr. Benjamin Spock and four other leading opponents of the Vietnam War accused of aiding and abetting resistance to the military draft, and represented Dr. Kenneth Edelin in the 1975 manslaughter prosecution arising out of a lawful abortion performed after Roe v. Wade. The narrative contrasts Bill Homans' storied legal career with a troubled personal life in a balanced but unvarnished manner, testifying to the strength of the human spirit when committed to the pursuit of the common good. About the author: Mark S. Brodin is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and the author of numerous books and law journal articles in the areas of civil and criminal procedure, evidence, litigation, and employment discrimination. A graduate of Columbia College (1969) and Columbia Law School (1972), he served as law clerk to United States District Judge Joseph L. Tauro and staff attorney with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights in Boston. He has also practiced for brief periods as a public defender in Boston and a prosecutor in Norfolk County.

Democracy in Iraq : history, politics, discourse

This book proposes a significant reassessment of the history of Iraq, documenting democratic experiences from ancient Mesopotamia through to the US occupation. Such an analysis takes to task claims that the ‘West’ has a uniquely democratic history and a responsibility to spread democracy across the world. It also reveals that Iraq has a democratic history all of its own, from ancient Middle Eastern assemblies and classical Islamic theology and philosophy, through to the myriad political parties, newspapers and protest movements of more recent times. This book argues that the democratic history of Iraq could serve as a powerful political and discursive tool where the Iraqi people may come to feel a sense of ownership over democracy and take pride in endorsing it. This could go a long way towards mitigating the current conflicts across the nation and in stabilizing and legitimating its troubled democracy.

Taking an interdisciplinary approach and referring to some of the most influential critical theorists to question ideological assumptions about democracy and its history, this book will be useful to those interested in political and legal history, human rights and democracy.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

A model of air transport passenger incidents and rights

This paper describes a representation of the legal framework in the air transport passenger's rights domain and the foremost incidents that trigger the top of consumer complaints ranking in the EU. It comprises the development of a small network of three ontologies, formalisation of scenarios, specification of properties and identification of relations. The approach is illustrated by means of a case study based in the context of a real life cancelled flight incident. This is part of an intended support-system that aims to provide both consumers and companies with relevant legal information to enhance the decision-making process.

Harry Beaufroy, or, The pupil of nature /

Cf. Osborne Coll., p. 824.

The family-history book,

Mode of access: Internet.

The processes of history

CONTENTS.--The nature and scope of the inquiry.--The geographical factor in history.--The human factor in history.--Method and results.

La synthèse philosophico-juridique de V.S. Soloviev : élaboration et mise en œuvre d’un cadre théorique

Vladimir S. Soloviev (1853-1900) était un philosophe russe, poète et dissident de la période prérévolutionnaire. Comme celle de beaucoup de ses contemporains prérévolutionnaires russes, la pensée de Soloviev fut constamment sollicitée par la réfection imminente de l’État russe dans un futur très proche. Dans le contexte de cette époque, un examen des fondements théoriques du système juridique était peut-être inévitable. Néanmoins, dans la pensée russe, c’est seulement avec Soloviev que le droit cessa d’être un sujet spécialisé dans le domaine de l’administration, ne concernant guère les grands enjeux de société, et devint intimement lié au développement même de la philosophie morale et sociale. Au sein du projet philosophique systématique que propose Soloviev, le concept de l’unitotalité est envahissant, en termes épistémologique et social. Une pierre d’assise également fondamentale est le concept philosophico-religieux de la divino-humanité, à travers lequel la source de la dignité humaine est ultimement exprimée. La philosophie juridique de Soloviev, contenue pour l’essentiel dans un traité intitulé La Justification du bien : essai de philosophie morale (1897), a pour principal objet l’interaction entre le droit et la morale. Alors que l’objet et la portée du droit peuvent être directement déduits de principes moraux, le droit ne peut pas coïncider exactement avec la morale, compte tenu de son caractère plus limité, fini et coercitif. Pour Soloviev, le droit doit imposer un niveau minimum du bien en fournissant les conditions de base (par ex. la primauté du droit, le droit à une existence digne, la liberté de conscience) pour le libre développement des facultés humaines sans transposer directement en lui la plénitude complète du bien. La principale motivation de Soloviev réside dans la prémisse théologique sous-jacente que le bien ne peut jamais être complètement subsumé sauf par un acte conscient de liberté personnelle. En tandem, Soloviev souligne le rôle progressiste de l’État pour favoriser le libre perfectionnement humain. En tant que tel, Soloviev nous fournit certaines voies innovatrices dans le façonnement de la relation tant théorique que pratique entre le droit et la religion. À l’encontre d’un compromis entre objets, c’est-à-dire un arrangement de type interculturel situé entre fragmentation culturelle (multiculturalisme idéologique) et assimilation antireligieuse (laïcité militante), l’analyse de Soloviev présente la nécessité d’une conciliation temporelle, dans une perspective historique beaucoup plus large, où la laïcité est considérée non pas comme une finalité ontologique en soi, figée dans le temps, mais comme un moyen au service d’une destinée humaine en cours d’actualisation. Le cadre philosophico-juridique de Soloviev peut être utilement mis en dialogue avec des auteurs contemporains comme Stephen L. Carter, Charles Taylor, John Witte Jr, Ronald Dworkin et Jürgen Habermas. La contribution potentielle de Soloviev sur la place de la religion dans la société russe contemporaine est également mentionnée, avec un accent particulier sur le réexamen critique de l’héritage durable de la notion byzantine de la symphonie entre l’Église et l’État. Enfin, une théorie du fédéralisme inspirée par Soloviev est développée en appliquant, sur une base comparative, des avancées théoriques dans le domaine de l’histoire juridique global à l’évolution constitutionnelle du Canada et d’Israël.

La synthèse philosophico-juridique de V.S. Soloviev : élaboration et mise en œuvre d’un cadre théorique

Vladimir S. Soloviev (1853-1900) était un philosophe russe, poète et dissident de la période prérévolutionnaire. Comme celle de beaucoup de ses contemporains prérévolutionnaires russes, la pensée de Soloviev fut constamment sollicitée par la réfection imminente de l’État russe dans un futur très proche. Dans le contexte de cette époque, un examen des fondements théoriques du système juridique était peut-être inévitable. Néanmoins, dans la pensée russe, c’est seulement avec Soloviev que le droit cessa d’être un sujet spécialisé dans le domaine de l’administration, ne concernant guère les grands enjeux de société, et devint intimement lié au développement même de la philosophie morale et sociale. Au sein du projet philosophique systématique que propose Soloviev, le concept de l’unitotalité est envahissant, en termes épistémologique et social. Une pierre d’assise également fondamentale est le concept philosophico-religieux de la divino-humanité, à travers lequel la source de la dignité humaine est ultimement exprimée. La philosophie juridique de Soloviev, contenue pour l’essentiel dans un traité intitulé La Justification du bien : essai de philosophie morale (1897), a pour principal objet l’interaction entre le droit et la morale. Alors que l’objet et la portée du droit peuvent être directement déduits de principes moraux, le droit ne peut pas coïncider exactement avec la morale, compte tenu de son caractère plus limité, fini et coercitif. Pour Soloviev, le droit doit imposer un niveau minimum du bien en fournissant les conditions de base (par ex. la primauté du droit, le droit à une existence digne, la liberté de conscience) pour le libre développement des facultés humaines sans transposer directement en lui la plénitude complète du bien. La principale motivation de Soloviev réside dans la prémisse théologique sous-jacente que le bien ne peut jamais être complètement subsumé sauf par un acte conscient de liberté personnelle. En tandem, Soloviev souligne le rôle progressiste de l’État pour favoriser le libre perfectionnement humain. En tant que tel, Soloviev nous fournit certaines voies innovatrices dans le façonnement de la relation tant théorique que pratique entre le droit et la religion. À l’encontre d’un compromis entre objets, c’est-à-dire un arrangement de type interculturel situé entre fragmentation culturelle (multiculturalisme idéologique) et assimilation antireligieuse (laïcité militante), l’analyse de Soloviev présente la nécessité d’une conciliation temporelle, dans une perspective historique beaucoup plus large, où la laïcité est considérée non pas comme une finalité ontologique en soi, figée dans le temps, mais comme un moyen au service d’une destinée humaine en cours d’actualisation. Le cadre philosophico-juridique de Soloviev peut être utilement mis en dialogue avec des auteurs contemporains comme Stephen L. Carter, Charles Taylor, John Witte Jr, Ronald Dworkin et Jürgen Habermas. La contribution potentielle de Soloviev sur la place de la religion dans la société russe contemporaine est également mentionnée, avec un accent particulier sur le réexamen critique de l’héritage durable de la notion byzantine de la symphonie entre l’Église et l’État. Enfin, une théorie du fédéralisme inspirée par Soloviev est développée en appliquant, sur une base comparative, des avancées théoriques dans le domaine de l’histoire juridique global à l’évolution constitutionnelle du Canada et d’Israël.

Toward understanding social engineering

There is no doubt that social engineering plays a vital role in compromising most security defenses, and in attacks on people, organizations, companies, or even governments. It is the art of deceiving and tricking people to reveal critical information or to perform an action that benefits the attacker in some way. Fraudulent and deceptive people have been using social engineering traps and tactics using information technology such as e-mails, social networks, web sites, and applications to trick victims into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes and attacks such as phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many other forms of attack. Although organizations, researchers, practitioners, and lawyers recognize the severe risk of social engineering-based threats, there is a severe lack of understanding and controlling of such threats. One side of the problem is perhaps the unclear concept of social engineering as well as the complexity of understand human behaviors in behaving toward, approaching, accepting, and failing to recognize threats or the deception behind them. The aim of this paper is to explain the definition of social engineering based on the related theories of the many related disciplines such as psychology, sociology, information technology, marketing, and behaviourism. We hope, by this work, to help researchers, practitioners, lawyers, and other decision makers to get a fuller picture of social engineering and, therefore, to open new directions of collaboration toward detecting and controlling it.

Legal rights during pandemics : federalism, rights and public health laws - a view from Australia

Pandemic influenza will cause significant social and economic disruption. Legal frameworks can play an important role in clarifying the rights and duties of individuals, communities and governments for times of crisis. In addressing legal frameworks, there is a need for jurisdictional clarity between different levels of government in responding to public health emergencies. Public health laws are also informed by our understandings of rights and responsibilities for individuals and communities, and the balancing of public health and public freedoms. Consideration of these issues is an essential part of planning for pandemic influenza.

"Secoituxesta järjettömäin luondocappalden canssa" : Perversiot, oikeuselämä ja kansankulttuuri 1700-luvun Suomessa

Bestiality was in the 18th century a more difficult problem in terms of criminal policy in Sweden and Finland than in any other Christian country in any other period. In the legal history of deviant sexuality, the phenomenon was uniquely widespread by international comparison. The number of court cases per capita in Finland was even higher than in Sweden. The authorities classified bestiality among the most serious crimes and a deadly sin. The Court of Appeal in Turku opted for an independent line and was clearly more lenient than Swedish courts of justice. Death sentences on grounds of bestiality ended in the 1730s, decades earlier than in Sweden. The sources for the present dissertation include judgment books and Court of Appeal decisions in 253 cases, which show that the persecution of those engaging in bestial acts in 18th century Finland was not organised by the centralised power of Stockholm. There is little evidence of local campaigns that would have been led by authorities. The church in its orthodoxy was losing ground and the clergy governed their parishes with more pragmatism than the Old Testament sanctioned. When exposing bestiality, the legal system was compelled to rely on the initiative of the public. In cases of illicit intercourse or adultery the authorities were even more dependent on the activeness of the local community. Bestiality left no tangible evidence, illegitimate children, to betray the crime to the clergy or secular authorities. The moral views of the church and the local community were not on a collision course. It was a common view that bestiality was a heinous act. Yet nowhere near all crimes came to the authorities' knowledge. Because of the heavy burden of proof, the legal position of the informer was difficult. Passiveness in reporting the crime was partly because most Finns felt it was not their place to intervene in their neighbours' private lives, as long as that privacy posed no serious threat to the neighbourhood. Hidden crime was at least as common as crime more easily exposed and proven. A typical Finnish perpetrator of bestiality was a young unmarried man with no criminal background or mental illness. The suspects were not members of ethnic minorities or marginal social groups. In trials, farmhands were more likely to be sentenced than their masters, but a more salient common denominator than social and economical status was the suspects' young age. For most of the defendants bestiality was a deep-rooted habit, which had been adopted in early youth. This form of subculture spread among the youth, and the most susceptible to experiment with the act were shepherds. The difference between man and animal was not clear-cut or self-evident. The difficulty in drawing the line is evident both in legal sources and Finnish folklore. The law that required that the animal partners be slaughtered led to the killing of thousands of cows and mares, and thereby to substantial material losses to their owners. Regarding bestiality as a crime against property motivated people to report it. The belief that the act would produce human-animal mongrels or that it would poison the milk and the meat horrified the public more than the teachings of the church ever could. Among the most significant aspects in the problems regarding the animals is how profoundly different the worldview of 18th century people was from that of today.

Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manoeuvres

This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978-9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during Northern Ireland's experience of devolution prior to 1972.