What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Co-evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating - the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co-evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co-exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co-existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co-evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole-genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine-signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co-existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.

Yesterday’s Games: Contingency Learning and the Growth of Public Spending, 1890-1938

Neither democracy nor globalization can explain the doubling of the peacetime public share in many Western countries between World Wars I and II. Here we examine two other explanations that are consistent with the timing of the observed changes, namely, (1) a shift in the demand for public goods and (2) the effect of war on the willingness to share. We first model each of these approaches as a contingency-learning phenomenon within Schelling’s Multi-Person Dilemma. We then derive verifiable propositions from each hypothesis. National time series of public spending as a share of GNP reveal no unit root but a break in trend, a result shown to favor explanation (2) over (1).

Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally?

This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a utilitarian social planner when individuals with identical utility functions for a non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It shows that the superiority of a centralized provision of a non-rival public good over a federal one does not always hold. Specifically, when differences in individuals’ contributive capacities are large, it is better to provide the public good in several distinct jurisdictions rather than to pool these jurisdictions into a single one. In the specific situation where individuals have logarithmic utilities, the paper provides a complete characterization of the optimal jurisdiction structure in the two-type case.

Decision‐Making in Public Good Dilemmas: Theory and Agent‐Based Simulation

In many real world contexts individuals find themselves in situations where they have to decide between options of behaviour that serve a collective purpose or behaviours which satisfy one’s private interests, ignoring the collective. In some cases the underlying social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) is solved and we observe collective action (Olson, 1965). In others social mobilisation is unsuccessful. The central topic of social dilemma research is the identification and understanding of mechanisms which yield to the observed cooperation and therefore resolve the social dilemma. It is the purpose of this thesis to contribute this research field for the case of public good dilemmas. To do so, existing work that is relevant to this problem domain is reviewed and a set of mandatory requirements is derived which guide theory and method development of the thesis. In particular, the thesis focusses on dynamic processes of social mobilisation which can foster or inhibit collective action. The basic understanding is that success or failure of the required process of social mobilisation is determined by heterogeneous individual preferences of the members of a providing group, the social structure in which the acting individuals are contained, and the embedding of the individuals in economic, political, biophysical, or other external contexts. To account for these aspects and for the involved dynamics the methodical approach of the thesis is computer simulation, in particular agent-based modelling and simulation of social systems. Particularly conductive are agent models which ground the simulation of human behaviour in suitable psychological theories of action. The thesis develops the action theory HAPPenInGS (Heterogeneous Agents Providing Public Goods) and demonstrates its embedding into different agent-based simulations. The thesis substantiates the particular added value of the methodical approach: Starting out from a theory of individual behaviour, in simulations the emergence of collective patterns of behaviour becomes observable. In addition, the underlying collective dynamics may be scrutinised and assessed by scenario analysis. The results of such experiments reveal insights on processes of social mobilisation which go beyond classical empirical approaches and yield policy recommendations on promising intervention measures in particular.

La Universidad Nacional de Colombia: Entre el interés privado y el bien público en el transcurso de las dos últimas décadas.

El propósito de esta monografía es analizar la incidencia que ha tenido el modelo de autofinanciación incentivado por el Estado colombiano en el carácter público de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia en los últimos veinte años, a partir de la teoría de los bienes club. Se plantea desde el análisis teórico y factico una revisión a la normatividad de la Educación Superior en Colombia para explicar la forma en que el aumento desequilibrado de los recursos propios frente a los aportes de la nación en el presupuesto de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, sumado a algunas problemáticas en los gastos de funcionamiento, ha perpetuado los niveles de exclusión en el acceso al bien, restringiendo de esta forma el carácter público del servicio que ha prestado esta institución en las últimas dos décadas.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

Hisendes locals i turisme: tres assaigs

Aquesta tesi utilitza l'anàlisi econòmica per a estudiar les hisendes locals, especialment els aspectes relacionats amb la provisió i finançament dels béns i serveis públics locals. Les hisendes locals, tant a Catalunya com a la resta d'Espanya, pateixen diversos problemes. Dos són especialment rellevants per a aquesta tesi. El primer és la reduïda dimensió dels municipis, l'altre la seva insuficient dotació financera. A la tesi es tracten aquestes dues qüestions en cinc capítols. Primer s'introdueix la problemàtica, exposant-ne els antecedents, la situació actual i la metodologia per al seu anàlisi. A continuació s'aborda la relació entre la grandària dels municipis i la seva capacitat per a proveir béns i serveis públics. De manera recurrent es produeixen debats sobre els problemes que pateixen els municipis petits. El problema més evident d'aquests municipis és el dèficit de serveis públics. Es sol argumentar que els municipis petits pateixen aquests dèficits en la provisió de serveis públics a causa de la manca d'un nombre crític d'habitants. Normalment es presenta la consolidació municipal com a solució a aquest problema. En aquest treball analitzem les diferents vessants de la qüestió dels dèficits de serveis municipals. Es continua analitzant com influeix sobre el sector privat la incapacitat per part dels municipis de prestar la quantitat i/o qualitat correcta de béns i serveis públics. Sembla clar que l'atractiu d'un hotel per als seus clients depèn tant dels serveis que ofereix com de l'entorn en què es troba. Com s'ha dit sovint "un hotel de quatre estrelles necessita un entorn de quatre estrelles". Aquests atributs que configuren l'entorn són complementaris a l'oferta privada dels serveis hotelers i són essencials a l'hora de definir les opcions de comercialització, ja que sembla raonable que diferències en les dotacions de serveis públics, capital natural i imatge de la localitat generaran diferències en els preus d'hotels que altrament són idèntics. A la següent etapa s'estudia la situació financera a la qual s'enfronten els municipis a l'hora de proveir els béns i serveis públics, especialment en el cas de les localitats amb forta implantació de l'activitat turística. L'objectiu d'aquest estudi és doble. Primer, realitzar una anàlisi i un diagnòstic del finançament als municipis turístics i, segon, discutir diferents vies de millora. En una primera part s'exposa el marc que cal tenir en compte a l'hora de considerar les qüestions de provisió de serveis públics i els consegüents aspectes pressupostaris. Després es presenta un model estilitzat de provisió de béns públics i d'estructura pressupostària que explicita, amb la intenció de portar a terme l'anàlisi economètrica, les interrelacions rellevants entre provisió de serveis públics, ingressos fiscals i despeses. Tot seguit es presenten les dades que han de servir per a una anàlisi empírica que té dues vessants. Primer, estudiar si realment els municipis amb un fort pes de l'activitat turística presenten diferències en l'àmbit pressupostari i, segon, concretar quantificar en què consisteixen i de què depenen les diferències. El sisè apartat tracta la complementarietat entre béns i serveis públics des d'un marc normatiu, posant de manifest els aspectes que ha de tenir en compte un municipi turístic en les qüestions de provisió i finançament dels béns públics i que fan que tingui un comportament diferent d'un municipi no turístic. El penúltim apartat del treball inclou la discussió i l'avaluació d'algunes propostes correctores dels problemes detectats a l'anàlisi estadística i economètrica. El treball conclou amb un resum de les principals conclusions. La tesi conclou amb una discussió dels resultats obtinguts.

Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision

People contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.

A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

A note on growth, welfare and public policy

In this note the growth anti welfare effects of fiscal anti monetary policies are investigated in three economies where public investment is part of the productive process It is shown that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation but that there is no direct relationship between government size, productivity and growth or between inflation and growth. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization and the optimal tax rate and government size are greater than those that maximize growth. Money is not superneutral anti the optimal rate of money creation is below the maximizing rate of growth.

Public versus private provision of infrastructure in a neoclassical growth model

This article studies the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public (“infrastructure”). A positive externality due to infrastructure capital is assumed, so that the government could improve upon decentralized allocations internalizing the externality, but public investmentis …nanced through distortionary taxation. It is shown that privatization is welfare-improving for a large set of economies and that after privatization under-investment is optimal. When operation inefficiency in the public sectoror subsidy to infrastructure accumulation are introduced, gains from privatization are higherand positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Private or public? a taxonomy of optimal ownership and management regimes

We develop a theory of public versus private ownership based on value diversion by managers. Government is assumed to face stronger institutional constraints than has been assumed in previous literature. The model which emerges from these assumptions is fexible and has wide application. We provide amapping between the qualitative characteristics of an asset, its main use - including public goods characteristics, and spillovers toother assets values - and the optimal ownership and management regime. The model is applied to single and multiple related assets. We address questions such as; when is it optimal to have one of a pair ofr elated assets public and the other private; when is joint management desirable; and when should a public asset be managed by the owner of a related private asset? We show that while private ownership can be judged optimal in some cases solely on the basis of qualitative information, the optimality of any other ownership and management regimes relies on quantitative analysis. Our results reveal the situations in which policy makers will have difficulty in determining the opimal regime.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.