906 resultados para epistemic marking


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Tagging animals is frequently employed in ecological studies to monitor individual behaviour, for example postrelease survival and dispersal of captive-bred animals used in conservation programmes. While the majority of studies focus on the efficacy of tags in facilitating the relocation and identification of individuals, few assess the direct effects of tagging in biasing animal behaviour. We used an experimental approach with a control to differentiate the effects of handling and tagging captive-bred juvenile freshwater pearl mussels, Margaritifera margaritifera, prior to release into the wild. Marking individuals with passive integrated transponder (PIT) tags significantly decreased their burrowing rate and, therefore, increased the time taken to burrow into the substrate. This effect was contributed to, in part, by the detrimental impacts of handling, which also significantly affected activity, burrowing ability and the time taken for each individual to emerge and start probing the substrate. Disturbance during handling and tagging may lead to indirect mortality after release by increasing the risk of predation or dislodgement during flooding, thereby potentially compromising any conservation strategy contingent on population supplementation or reintroduction. This is the first study to demonstrate that handling and PIT tagging has a detrimental impact on invertebrate behaviour. Moreover, our results provide useful information that will inform freshwater bivalve conservation strategies.

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An important issue in risk analysis is the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. In this paper, the use of distinct representation formats for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is advocated, the latter being modelled by sets of possible values. Modern uncertainty theories based on convex sets of probabilities are known to be instrumental for hybrid representations where aleatory and epistemic components of uncertainty remain distinct. Simple uncertainty representation techniques based on fuzzy intervals and p-boxes are used in practice. This paper outlines a risk analysis methodology from elicitation of knowledge about parameters to decision. It proposes an elicitation methodology where the chosen representation format depends on the nature and the amount of available information. Uncertainty propagation methods then blend Monte Carlo simulation and interval analysis techniques. Nevertheless, results provided by these techniques, often in terms of probability intervals, may be too complex to interpret for a decision-maker and we, therefore, propose to compute a unique indicator of the likelihood of risk, called confidence index. It explicitly accounts for the decisionmaker’s attitude in the face of ambiguity. This step takes place at the end of the risk analysis process, when no further collection of evidence is possible that might reduce the ambiguity due to epistemic uncertainty. This last feature stands in contrast with the Bayesian methodology, where epistemic uncertainties on input parameters are modelled by single subjective probabilities at the beginning of the risk analysis process.

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We present three natural language marking strategies based on fast and reliable shallow parsing techniques, and on widely available lexical resources: lexical substitution, adjective conjunction swaps, and relativiser switching. We test these techniques on a random sample of the British National Corpus. Individual candidate marks are checked for goodness of structural and semantic fit, using both lexical resources, and the web as a corpus. A representative sample of marks is given to 25 human judges to evaluate for acceptability and preservation of meaning. This establishes a correlation between corpus based felicity measures and perceived quality, and makes qualified predictions. Grammatical acceptability correlates with our automatic measure strongly (Pearson's r = 0.795, p = 0.001), allowing us to account for about two thirds of variability in human judgements. A moderate but statistically insignificant (Pearson's r = 0.422, p = 0.356) correlation is found with judgements of meaning preservation, indicating that the contextual window of five content words used for our automatic measure may need to be extended. © 2007 SPIE-IS&T.

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Credal networks are graph-based statistical models whose parameters take values on a set, instead of being sharply specified as in traditional statistical models (e.g., Bayesian networks). The result of inferences with such models depends on the irrelevance/independence concept adopted. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of inferences under the concepts of epistemic irrelevance and strong independence. We strengthen complexity results by showing that inferences with strong independence are NP-hard even in credal trees with ternary variables, which indicates that tractable algorithms, including the existing one for epistemic trees, cannot be used for strong independence. We prove that the polynomial time of inferences in credal trees under epistemic irrelevance is not likely to extend to more general models, because the problem becomes NP-hard even in simple polytrees. These results draw a definite line between networks with efficient inferences and those where inferences are hard, and close several open questions regarding the computational complexity of such models.

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This paper investigates the computation of lower/upper expectations that must cohere with a collection of probabilistic assessments and a collection of judgements of epistemic independence. New algorithms, based on multilinear programming, are presented, both for independence among events and among random variables. Separation properties of graphical models are also investigated.

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Revising its beliefs when receiving new information is an important ability of any intelligent system. However, in realistic settings the new input is not always certain. A compelling way of dealing with uncertain input in an agent-based setting is to treat it as unreliable input, which may strengthen or weaken the beliefs of the agent. Recent work focused on the postulates associated with this form of belief change and on finding semantical operators that satisfy these postulates. In this paper we propose a new syntactic approach for this form of belief change and show that it agrees with the semantical definition. This makes it feasible to develop complex agent systems capable of efficiently dealing with unreliable input in a semantically meaningful way. Additionally, we show that imposing restrictions on the input and the beliefs that are entailed allows us to devise a tractable approach suitable for resource-bounded agents or agents where reactiveness is of paramount importance.

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Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.