Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Object transportation by multiple mobile robots controlled by attractor dynamics: theory and implementation

Dynamical systems theory is used as a theoretical language and tool to design a distributed control architecture for teams of mobile robots, that must transport a large object and simultaneously avoid collisions with (either static or dynamic) obstacles. Here we demonstrate in simulations and implementations in real robots that it is possible to simplify the architectures presented in previous work and to extend the approach to teams of n robots. The robots have no prior knowledge of the environment. The motion of each robot is controlled by a time series of asymptotical stable states. The attractor dynamics permits the integration of information from various sources in a graded manner. As a result, the robots show a strikingly smooth an stable team behaviour.

Fractional control of dynamic systems

The concepts involved with fractional calculus (FC) theory are applied in almost all areas of science and engineering. Its ability to yield superior modeling and control in many dynamical systems is well recognized. In this article, we will introduce the fundamental aspects associated with the application of FC to the control of dynamic systems.

Fractional order modelling of dynamic backlash

This paper studies the dynamical properties of systems with backlash and impact phenomena. This type of non-linearity can be tackled in the perspective of the fractional calculus theory. Fractional and integer order models are compared and their influence upon the emerging dynamics is analysed. It is demonstrated that fractional models can memorize dynamical effects due to multiple micro-collisions.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Dynamic stiffness of the piled foundation of a onshore wind turbine

One of today's biggest concerns is the increase of energetic needs, especially in the developed countries. Among various clean energies, wind energy is one of the technologies that assume greater importance on the sustainable development of humanity. Despite wind turbines had been developed and studied over the years, there are phenomena that haven't been yet fully understood. This work studies the soil-structure interaction that occurs on a wind turbine's foundation composed by a group of piles that is under dynamic loads caused by wind. This problem assumes special importance when the foundation is implemented on locations where safety criteria are very demanding, like the case of a foundation mounted on a dike. To the phenomenon of interaction between two piles and the soil between them it's given the name of pile-soil-pile interaction. It is known that such behavior is frequency dependent, and therefore, on this work evaluation of relevant frequencies for the intended analysis is held. During the development of this thesis, two methods were selected in order to assess pile-soil-pile interaction, being one of analytical nature and the other of numerical origin. The analytical solution was recently developed and its called Generalized pile-soil-pile theory, while for the numerical method the commercial nite element software PLAXIS 3D was used. A study of applicability of the numerical method is also done comparing the given solution by the nite element methods with a rigorous solution widely accepted by the majority of the authors.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Change in defense mechanisms and coping over the course of short-term dynamic psychotherapy for adjustment disorder.

Short-term dynamic psychotherapy (STDP) has rarely been investigated with regard to its underlying mechanisms of change, even if psychoanalytic theory informs us about several potential putative mechanisms of change in patients. Change in overall defensive functioning is one. In this study, we explored the role of overall defensive functioning, by comparing it on the process level with the neighbouring concept of overall coping functioning. A total of N=32 patients, mainly presenting adjustment disorder, were included in the study. The patients underwent STDP up to 40 sessions; three sessions per psychotherapy were transcribed and analyzed by using two observer-rating scales: Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (Perry, 1990) and Coping Action Patterns (Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005). Hierarchical linear modeling was applied to model the change over the course of therapy and relate it to outcome. Results suggest that STDP has an effect on the target variable of overall defensive functioning, which was absent for overall coping functioning. Links with outcome confirm the importance of the effect. These results are discussed from methodological and clinical viewpoints.

Variational calculation of static and dynamic vibrational nonlinear optical properties

The vibrational configuration interaction method used to obtain static vibrational (hyper)polarizabilities is extended to dynamic nonlinear optical properties in the infinite optical frequency approximation. Illustrative calculations are carried out on H2 O and N H3. The former molecule is weakly anharmonic while the latter contains a strongly anharmonic umbrella mode. The effect on vibrational (hyper)polarizabilities due to various truncations of the potential energy and property surfaces involved in the calculation are examined

Electronic couplings and on-site energies for hole transfer in DNA: systematic quantum mechanical/molecular dynamic study

The electron hole transfer (HT) properties of DNA are substantially affected by thermal fluctuations of the π stack structure. Depending on the mutual position of neighboring nucleobases, electronic coupling V may change by several orders of magnitude. In the present paper, we report the results of systematic QM/molecular dynamic (MD) calculations of the electronic couplings and on-site energies for the hole transfer. Based on 15 ns MD trajectories for several DNA oligomers, we calculate the average coupling squares 〈 V2 〉 and the energies of basepair triplets X G+ Y and X A+ Y, where X, Y=G, A, T, and C. For each of the 32 systems, 15 000 conformations separated by 1 ps are considered. The three-state generalized Mulliken-Hush method is used to derive electronic couplings for HT between neighboring basepairs. The adiabatic energies and dipole moment matrix elements are computed within the INDO/S method. We compare the rms values of V with the couplings estimated for the idealized B -DNA structure and show that in several important cases the couplings calculated for the idealized B -DNA structure are considerably underestimated. The rms values for intrastrand couplings G-G, A-A, G-A, and A-G are found to be similar, ∼0.07 eV, while the interstrand couplings are quite different. The energies of hole states G+ and A+ in the stack depend on the nature of the neighboring pairs. The X G+ Y are by 0.5 eV more stable than X A+ Y. The thermal fluctuations of the DNA structure facilitate the HT process from guanine to adenine. The tabulated couplings and on-site energies can be used as reference parameters in theoretical and computational studies of HT processes in DNA

Multiuser detection in a dynamic environment — Part II: Joint user identification and parameter estimation

The problem of jointly estimating the number, the identities, and the data of active users in a time-varying multiuser environment was examined in a companion paper (IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol. 53, no. 9, September 2007), at whose core was the use of the theory of finite random sets on countable spaces. Here we extend that theory to encompass the more general problem of estimating unknown continuous parameters of the active-user signals. This problem is solved here by applying the theory of random finite sets constructed on hybrid spaces. We doso deriving Bayesian recursions that describe the evolution withtime of a posteriori densities of the unknown parameters and data.Unlike in the above cited paper, wherein one could evaluate theexact multiuser set posterior density, here the continuous-parameter Bayesian recursions do not admit closed-form expressions. To circumvent this difficulty, we develop numerical approximationsfor the receivers that are based on Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)methods (“particle filtering”). Simulation results, referring to acode-divisin multiple-access (CDMA) system, are presented toillustrate the theory.

Large-system analysis of a CDMA dynamic channel under a Markovian input process

We study the minimum mean square error (MMSE) and the multiuser efficiency η of large dynamic multiple access communication systems in which optimal multiuser detection is performed at the receiver as the number and the identities of active users is allowed to change at each transmission time. The system dynamics are ruled by a Markov model describing the evolution of the channel occupancy and a large-system analysis is performed when the number of observations grow large. Starting on the equivalent scalar channel and the fixed-point equation tying multiuser efficiency and MMSE, we extend it to the case of a dynamic channel, and derive lower and upper bounds for the MMSE (and, thus, for η as well) holding true in the limit of large signal–to–noise ratios and increasingly large observation time T.

The genetical theory of social behaviour.

We survey the population genetic basis of social evolution, using a logically consistent set of arguments to cover a wide range of biological scenarios. We start by reconsidering Hamilton's (Hamilton 1964 J. Theoret. Biol. 7, 1-16 (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)) results for selection on a social trait under the assumptions of additive gene action, weak selection and constant environment and demography. This yields a prediction for the direction of allele frequency change in terms of phenotypic costs and benefits and genealogical concepts of relatedness, which holds for any frequency of the trait in the population, and provides the foundation for further developments and extensions. We then allow for any type of gene interaction within and between individuals, strong selection and fluctuating environments and demography, which may depend on the evolving trait itself. We reach three conclusions pertaining to selection on social behaviours under broad conditions. (i) Selection can be understood by focusing on a one-generation change in mean allele frequency, a computation which underpins the utility of reproductive value weights; (ii) in large populations under the assumptions of additive gene action and weak selection, this change is of constant sign for any allele frequency and is predicted by a phenotypic selection gradient; (iii) under the assumptions of trait substitution sequences, such phenotypic selection gradients suffice to characterize long-term multi-dimensional stochastic evolution, with almost no knowledge about the genetic details underlying the coevolving traits. Having such simple results about the effect of selection regardless of population structure and type of social interactions can help to delineate the common features of distinct biological processes. Finally, we clarify some persistent divergences within social evolution theory, with respect to exactness, synergies, maximization, dynamic sufficiency and the role of genetic arguments.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.