Reflexivity in sovereign debt markets

Finanssi-instrumentin hinta määräytyy sen fundamenttitekijöiden perusteella, eikä päinvastoin. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, että myös instrumentin hinta voi vaikuttaa fundamenttitekijöihin. Yhteys havainnollistetaan tapaustukimuksella Kreikan velkakriisistä. Hinnan ja fundamenttien välistä yhteyttä arvioidaan ja käänteisen kausaliteetin olemassaolo testataan. Tulokset tukevat ajatusta, jonka mukaan tarvitsemme dynaamisempia valuaatiomenetelmiä, jotka ottavat huomioon myös mahdolliset itseään vahvistavat hintakierteet.

Análisis de la crisis financiera de estados unidos (2007-2008) y la crisis de deuda (2011): su relación e impacto sobre uno de los fundamentales de la economía colombiana, la tasa de cambio

Este documento presenta una perspectiva de como una economía pequeña y abierta (en temas comerciales y de inversión) como la colombiana, se ve afectada por choques que sufren economías grandes como la estadounidense. Durante el periodo de estudio la economía de Estados Unidos sufrió dos choques: primero la crisis de las hipotecas subprime en los años 2007-2008; luego la crisis de deuda soberana de Estados Unidos en 2011. Estos dos choques afectaron la economía colombiana. En ambos casos, se puede establecer un hecho clave que detonó las crisis. En el primero, la entrada en el capítulo 11 de protección a bancarrotas por parte de Lehman Brothers, el 15 de septiembre de 2008. En el segundo, el detonante fue la baja de la calificación de la deuda soberana de Estados Unidos por parte de Standard and Poor´s el 5 de agosto de 2011. Estos días claves en las crisis, afectaron los principales índices de la bolsa de Estados Unidos, especialmente los relacionados con la actividad financiera, luego es de suponer que posiblemente también afectaron fundamentales de la economía colombiana como lo es la tasa de cambio peso-dólar (USD/COP). Este documento tiene como objeto principal, establecer el impacto de las crisis Norteamericana de 2007-2008 y de 2011, sobre la economía colombiana, específicamente sobre la tasa de cambio USD/COP. El documento también, analiza las causas que generaron dichas crisis en Estados Unidos, haciendo énfasis en la falta de regulación y control por parte de las instituciones del gobierno en la crisis de las hipotecas subprime. De igual forma se analiza el papel de las firmas calificadoras de riesgo, en la crisis de deuda estadounidense.

Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods

In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk managers and financial regulators.

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.

The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the emerging markets

A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.

International trade in Latina America and the Caribbean 2009: crisis and recovery

Includes bibliography

Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives

Includes bibliography

Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent financial crisis to Central America through trade finance

Includes Bibliography

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.

The Portuguese Economic Crisis: Policies and Outcomes. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 19.02.2015

The financial and economic crisis in the aftermath of 2008 is unique for several reasons: its depth, its speed and its global entanglement. Simultaneous economic decline in many economies around the globe sent out political shockwaves. In Europe, the crisis served as a wake-up call. Policymakers responded to the social and political insecurity triggered by economically unsound practices with solidarity and with EU-scepticism. The recession confronted Euro zone countries with a number of similar problems, although each was embedded in its own set of country-specific challenges. The tools with which each began to counteract the financial and sovereign debt crisis differed. This policy brief examines the Portuguese path to recovery. It outlines some of the great recession’s main impacts on the country’s labour market, as well as analyses the path it has taken to restore sustainable jobs.

Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it.

Bank financing of Hungarian SMEs: Getting over to credit crisis by state interventions

In this article we aimed to present and analyse the 21st century history of bank financing in the Hungarian small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in the period ranging from 2000 to 2012. The credit products offered by banks and credit unions are the most fundamental means of external financing capable of fulfilling the financing needs of a wide array of SMEs. The conditions of accessing credits and their prices exert a decisive influence on the profitability and business opportunities of SMEs. As a result of economic slowdown SMEs had to face higher interest rates, decreasing credit limits, and bank financing options that became increasingly slowly accessible alongside stricter conditions. Due to this process SMEs business performance had been falling continuously which has a destructive contribution to the national economy. In the first chapter of the article we present the dynamic development of credit financing in the Hungarian SME sector, along with the causes that triggered it, then we will continue with the negative tendencies dating from the onset of the 2008 debt crisis. In the second chapter we discuss the vicious circle, due to which the business performance of the SMEs, as well as the conditions of access to credits and their prices, have entered into a negative spiral. In the third and final chapter we make suggestions regarding the direction and means of necessary government intervention, in order to stop and reverse the negative tendencies observed in SME credit financing.

Effect of Earnings Volatility on Cost of Debt: The case of Swedish Limited Companies

The paper empirically tests the relationship between earnings volatility and cost of debt with a sample of more than 77,000 Swedish limited companies over the period 2006 to 2013 observing more than 677,000 firm years. As called upon by many researchers recently that there is very limited evidence of the association between earnings volatility and cost of debt this paper contributes greatly to the existing literature of earnings quality and debt contracts, especially on the consequence of earnings quality in the debt market. Earnings volatility is a proxy used for earnings quality while cost of debt is a component of debt contract. After controlling for firms’ profitability, liquidity, solvency, cashflow volatility, accruals volatility, sales volatility, business risk, financial risk and size this paper studies the effect of earnings volatility measured by standard deviation of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) on Cost of Debt. Overall finding suggests that lenders in Sweden does take earnings volatility into consideration while determining cost of debt for borrowers. But a deeper analysis of various industries suggest earnings volatility is not consistently used by lenders across all the industries. Lenders in Sweden are rather more sensitive to borrowers’ financial risk across all the industries. It may also be stated that larger borrowers tend to secure loans at a lower interest rate, the results are consistent with majority of the industries. Swedish debt market appears to be well prepared for financial crises as the debt crisis seems to have no or little adverse effect borrowers’ cost of capital. This study is the only empirical evidence to study the association between earnings volatility and cost of debt. Prior indirect research suggests earnings volatility has a negative effect on cost debt (i.e. an increase in earnings volatility will increase firm’s cost of debt). Our direct evidence from the Swedish debt market is consistent for some industries including media, real estate activities, transportation & warehousing, and other consumer services.