Fab antibodies capable of blocking T cells by competitive binding have the identical specificity but a higher affinity to the MHC-peptide-complex than the T cell receptor.

In transplant rejection, graft versus host or autoimmune diseases T cells are mediating the pathophysiological processes. Compared to unspecific pharmacological immune suppression specific inhibition of those T cells, that are involved in the disease, would be an alternative and attractive approach. T cells are activated after their T cell receptor (TCR) recognizes an antigenic peptide displayed by the Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC). Molecules that interact with MHC-peptide-complexes in a specific fashion should block T cells with identical specificity. Using the model of the SSX2 (103-111)/HLA-A*0201 complex we investigated a panel of MHC-peptide-specific Fab antibodies for their capacity blocking specific T cell clones. Like TCRs all Fab antibodies reacted with the MHC complex only when the SSX2 (103-111) peptide was displayed. By introducing single amino acid mutations in the HLA-A*0201 heavy chain we identified the K66 residue as the most critical binding similar to that of TCRs. However, some Fab antibodies did not inhibit the reactivity of a specific T cell clone against peptide pulsed, artificial targets, nor cells displaying the peptide after endogenous processing. Measurements of binding kinetics revealed that only those Fab antibodies were capable of blocking T cells that interacted with an affinity in the nanomolar range. Fab antibodies binding like TCRs with affinities on the lower micromolar range did not inhibit T cell reactivity. These results indicate that molecules that block T cells by competitive binding with the TCR must have the same specificity but higher affinity for the MHC-peptide-complex than the TCR.

Antitumor activities of ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR in colon cancer cells.

BACKGROUND: The mammalian target of rapamycin (mTOR) is frequently activated in colon cancers due to mutations in the phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase (PI3K) pathway. Targeting mTOR with allosteric inhibitors of mTOR such as rapamycin reduces colon cancer progression in several experimental models. Recently, a new class of mTOR inhibitors that act as ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR, has been developed. The effectiveness of these drugs in colon cancer cells has however not been fully characterized. METHODS: LS174T, SW480 and DLD-1 colon cancer cell lines were treated with PP242 an ATP-competitive inhibitor of mTOR, NVP-BEZ235, a dual PI3K/mTOR inhibitor or rapamycin. Tumor cell growth, proliferation and survival were assessed by MTS assay, 5-bromo-2'-deoxyuridine (BrDU) incorporation or by quantification of DNA fragmentation respectively. In vivo, the anticancer activity of mTOR inhibitors was evaluated on nude mice bearing colon cancer xenografts. RESULTS: PP242 and NVP-BEZ235 reduced the growth, proliferation and survival of LS174T and DLD-1 colon cancer cells more efficiently than rapamycin. Similarly, PP242 and NVP-BEZ235 also decreased significantly the proliferation and survival of SW480 cells which were resistant to the effects of rapamycin. In vivo, PP242 and NVP-BEZ235 reduced the growth of xenografts generated from LS174T and SW480 cells. Finally, we also observed that the efficacy of ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR was enhanced by U0126, a MEK inhibitor. CONCLUSIONS: Taken together, these results show that ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR are effective in blocking colon cancer cell growth in vitro and in vivo and thus represent a therapeutic option in colon cancer either alone or in combination with MEK inhibitors.

Competitive location and pricing on networks

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presentedto solve the model together with computational experience.

Location of hubs in a competitive environment

We offer a formulation that locates hubs on a network in a competitiveenvironment; that is, customer capture is sought, which happenswhenever the location of a new hub results in a reduction of thecurrent cost (time, distance) needed by the traffic that goes from thespecified origin to the specified destination.The formulation presented here reduces the number of variables andconstraints as compared to existing covering models. This model issuited for both air passenger and cargo transportation.In this model, each origin-destination flow can go through either oneor two hubs, and each demand point can be assigned to more than a hub,depending on the different destinations of its traffic. Links(``spokes'' have no capacity limit. Computational experience is provided.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique.We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.

Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.

Inventory-routing model, for a multi-period problem with stochastic and deterministic demand

The need for integration in the supply chain management leads us to considerthe coordination of two logistic planning functions: transportation andinventory. The coordination of these activities can be an extremely importantsource of competitive advantage in the supply chain management. The battle forcost reduction can pass through the equilibrium of transportation versusinventory managing costs. In this work, we study the specific case of aninventory-routing problem for a week planning period with different types ofdemand. A heuristic methodology, based on the Iterated Local Search, isproposed to solve the Multi-Period Inventory Routing Problem with stochasticand deterministic demand.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

A model of conglomeration and synergy traps

We present a model of conglomeration motivated by technology synergies and strategic reductions in variable costs in the face of competitive pressures. The resulting firm integration is neither horizontal nor vertical but rather congeneric integration of firms in related industries. We endogenize the industrial conglomeration structure and examine the effects of competition between conglomerates, and between a conglomerate and independent firms. We show that there is an equilibrium synergy trap in which conglomerates are formed to exploit economies of scope, but resulting profits are lower than under the status quo. We also show that strategic firm integration can occur even in the presence of diseconomies of scope. The model helps to explain features of recent mergers and acquisitions experience.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Computer-Aided Business Model Design

There is a lack of dedicated tools for business model design at a strategic level. However, in today's economic world the need to be able to quickly reinvent a company's business model is essential to stay competitive. This research focused on identifying the functionalities that are necessary in a computer-aided design (CAD) tool for the design of business models in a strategic context. Using design science research methodology a series of techniques and prototypes have been designed and evaluated to offer solutions to the problem. The work is a collection of articles which can be grouped into three parts: First establishing the context of how the Business Model Canvas (BMC) is used to design business models and explore the way in which CAD can contribute to the design activity. The second part extends on this by proposing new technics and tools which support elicitation, evaluation (assessment) and evolution of business models design with CAD. This includes features such as multi-color tagging to easily connect elements, rules to validate coherence of business models and features that are adapted to the correct business model proficiency level of its users. A new way to describe and visualize multiple versions of a business model and thereby help in addressing the business model as a dynamic object was also researched. The third part explores extensions to the business model canvas such as an intermediary model which helps IT alignment by connecting business model and enterprise architecture. And a business model pattern for privacy in a mobile environment, using privacy as a key value proposition. The prototyped techniques and proposition for using CAD tools in business model modeling will allow commercial CAD developers to create tools that are better suited to the needs of practitioners.

Towards a dynamic model of e-commerce: environmental, technological and organisational drivers of B2C along time

Despite the important benefits for firms of commercial initiatives on the Internet, e-commerce is still an emerging distribution channel, even in developed countries. Thus, more needs to be known about the mechanisms affecting its development. A large number of works have studied firms¿ e-commerce adoption from technological, intraorganizational, institutional, or other specific perspectives, but there is a need for adequately tested integrative frameworks. Hence, this work proposes and tests a model of firms¿ business-to-consumer (called B2C) e-commerce adoption that is founded on a holistic vision of the phenomenon. With this integrative approach, the authors analyze the joint influence of environmental, technological, and organizational factors; moreover, they evaluate this effect over time. Using various representative Spanish data sets covering the period 1996-2005, the findings demonstrate the suitability of the holistic framework. Likewise, some lessons are learned from the analysis of the key building blocks. In particular, the current study provides evidence for the debate about the effect of competitive pressure, since the findings show that competitive pressure disincentivizes e-commerce adoption in the long term. The results also show that the development or enrichment of the consumers¿ consumption patterns, the technological readiness of the market forces, the firm¿s global scope, and its competences in innovation continuously favor e-commerce adoption.