Does ownership structure matter? Three essays in finance

Management

Universal banks and corporate control: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market

We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank- firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.

Understanding multi-asset factor models: Factor exposure interpretation

Field lab: Business project

Garland, since 1776- a unique ownership structure

The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Car ownership and access to jobs in Spain

This study analyses the impact that job accessibility in public transport has on car ownership. An ordered probit explaining the number of cars per household is estimated as a function of head of household characteristics, household characteristics and job accessibility. The data used in the analysis come from the Microcensus of year 2001 of the Spanish Institute of Statistics for the areas of Barcelona and Madrid. Our results show a significant effect of accessibility on car ownership. Additionally, we carried out simulation exercises in which the expected number of vehicles decreases as accessibility improves. For instance, in the case of households living outside the central city, an improvement of accessibility up to the average level of the central city would offset the effect of the number of working adults on the expected number of vehicles.

Cross-section data, disequilibrium situations and estimated coefficients: evidence from car ownership demand

The objective of this paper is to analyse to what extent the use of cross-section data will distort the estimated elasticities for car ownership demand when the observed variables do not correspond to a state equilibrium for some individuals in the sample. Our proposal consists of approximating the equilibrium values of the observed variables by constructing a pseudo-panel data set which entails averaging individuals observed at different points of time into cohorts. The results show that individual and aggregate data lead to almost the same value for income elasticity, whereas with respect to working adult elasticity the similarity is less pronounced.

Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns

The contributions of this paper are twofold: On the one hand, the paper analyses the factors determining the growth in car ownership in Spain over the last two decades, and, on the other, the paper provides empirical evidence for a controversial methodological issue. From a methodological point of view, the paper compares the two alternative decision mechanisms used for modelling car ownership: ordered-response versus unordered-response mechanisms. A discrete choice model is estimated at three points in time: 1980, 1990 and 2000. The study concludes that on the basis of forecasting performance, the multinomial logit model and the ordered probit model are almost undistinguishable. As for the empirical results, it can be emphasised that income elasticity is not constant and declines as car ownership increases. Besides, households living in rural areas are less sensitive than those living in urban areas. Car ownership is also sensitive to the quality of public transport for those living in the largest cities. The results also confirmed the existence of a generation effect, which will vanish around the year 2020, a weak life-cycle effect, and a positive effect of employment on the number of cars per household. Finally, the change in the estimated coefficients over time reflects an increase in mobility needs and, consequently, an increase in car ownership.

The Timing of Asset Trade and Optimal Policy in Dynamic Open Economies

Using a standard open economy DSGE model, it is shown that the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation of monetary policy at the individual country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes place before the announcement of policy, a national policymaker can choose a policy rule which reduces the work effort of households in the policymaker’s country in the knowledge that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions. But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent and households in the policymaker’s country bear the full consumption consequences of the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policymakers are very different between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset market timing has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.

Asset Prices, Business Cycles, and Markov-Perfect Fiscal Policy when Agents are Risk-Sensitive

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.

Comparative Statics of Asset Prices: the effect of other assets' risk

Currently, financial economics is unable to predict changes in asset prices with respect to changes in the underlying risk factors, even when an asset's dividend is independent of a given factor. This paper takes steps towards addressing this issue by highlighting a crucial component of wealth effects on asset prices hitherto ignored by the literature. Changes in wealth do not only alter an agents risk aversion, but also her perceived 'riskiness' of a security. The latter enhances significantly the extent to which market- clearing leads to endogenously-generated correlation across asset prices, over and above that induced by correlation between payoffs, giving the appearance of 'contagion.'

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Essays in higher moment asset pricing and liquidity risk

This thesis focuses on theoretical asset pricing models and their empirical applications. I aim to investigate the following noteworthy problems: i) if the relationship between asset prices and investors' propensities to gamble and to fear disaster is time varying, ii) if the conflicting evidence for the firm and market level skewness can be explained by downside risk, Hi) if costly learning drives liquidity risk. Moreover, empirical tests support the above assumptions and provide novel findings in asset pricing, investment decisions, and firms' funding liquidity. The first chapter considers a partial equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous propensities to gamble and fear disaster. Skewness preference represents the desire to gamble, while kurtosis aversion represents fear of extreme returns. Using US data from 1988 to 2012, my model demonstrates that in bad times, risk aversion is higher, more people fear disaster, and fewer people gamble, in contrast to good times. This leads to a new empirical finding: gambling preference has a greater impact on asset prices during market downturns than during booms. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay introduces a foramula based on conditional CAPM for decomposing the market skewness. We find that the major market upward and downward movements can be well preadicted by the asymmetric comovement of betas, which is characterized by an indicator called "Systematic Downside Risk" (SDR). We find that SDR can efafectively forecast future stock market movements and we obtain out-of-sample R-squares (compared with a strategy using historical mean) of more than 2.27% with monthly data. The second essay reconciles a well-known empirical fact: aggregating positively skewed firm returns leads to negatively skewed market return. We reconcile this fact through firms' greater response to negative maraket news than positive market news. We also propose several market return predictors, such as downside idiosyncratic skewness. The third chapter studies the funding liquidity risk based on a general equialibrium model which features two agents: one entrepreneur and one external investor. Only the investor needs to acquire information to estimate the unobservable fundamentals driving the economic outputs. The novelty is that information acquisition is more costly in bad times than in good times, i.e. counter-cyclical information cost, as supported by previous empirical evidence. Later we show that liquidity risks are principally driven by costly learning. Résumé Cette thèse présente des modèles théoriques dévaluation des actifs et leurs applications empiriques. Mon objectif est d'étudier les problèmes suivants: la relation entre l'évaluation des actifs et les tendances des investisseurs à parier et à crainadre le désastre varie selon le temps ; les indications contraires pour l'entreprise et l'asymétrie des niveaux de marché peuvent être expliquées par les risques de perte en cas de baisse; l'apprentissage coûteux augmente le risque de liquidité. En outre, des tests empiriques confirment les suppositions ci-dessus et fournissent de nouvelles découvertes en ce qui concerne l'évaluation des actifs, les décisions relatives aux investissements et la liquidité de financement des entreprises. Le premier chapitre examine un modèle d'équilibre où les investisseurs ont des tendances hétérogènes à parier et à craindre le désastre. La préférence asymétrique représente le désir de parier, alors que le kurtosis d'aversion représente la crainte du désastre. En utilisant les données des Etats-Unis de 1988 à 2012, mon modèle démontre que dans les mauvaises périodes, l'aversion du risque est plus grande, plus de gens craignent le désastre et moins de gens parient, conatrairement aux bonnes périodes. Ceci mène à une nouvelle découverte empirique: la préférence relative au pari a un plus grand impact sur les évaluations des actifs durant les ralentissements de marché que durant les booms économiques. Exploitant uniquement cette relation générera un revenu excédentaire annuel de 7,74% qui n'est pas expliqué par les modèles factoriels populaires. Le second chapitre comprend deux essais. Le premier essai introduit une foramule base sur le CAPM conditionnel pour décomposer l'asymétrie du marché. Nous avons découvert que les mouvements de hausses et de baisses majeures du marché peuvent être prédits par les mouvements communs des bêtas. Un inadicateur appelé Systematic Downside Risk, SDR (risque de ralentissement systématique) est créé pour caractériser cette asymétrie dans les mouvements communs des bêtas. Nous avons découvert que le risque de ralentissement systématique peut prévoir les prochains mouvements des marchés boursiers de manière efficace, et nous obtenons des carrés R hors échantillon (comparés avec une stratégie utilisant des moyens historiques) de plus de 2,272% avec des données mensuelles. Un investisseur qui évalue le marché en utilisant le risque de ralentissement systématique aurait obtenu une forte hausse du ratio de 0,206. Le second essai fait cadrer un fait empirique bien connu dans l'asymétrie des niveaux de march et d'entreprise, le total des revenus des entreprises positiveament asymétriques conduit à un revenu de marché négativement asymétrique. Nous décomposons l'asymétrie des revenus du marché au niveau de l'entreprise et faisons cadrer ce fait par une plus grande réaction des entreprises aux nouvelles négatives du marché qu'aux nouvelles positives du marché. Cette décomposition révélé plusieurs variables de revenus de marché efficaces tels que l'asymétrie caractéristique pondérée par la volatilité ainsi que l'asymétrie caractéristique de ralentissement. Le troisième chapitre fournit une nouvelle base théorique pour les problèmes de liquidité qui varient selon le temps au sein d'un environnement de marché incomplet. Nous proposons un modèle d'équilibre général avec deux agents: un entrepreneur et un investisseur externe. Seul l'investisseur a besoin de connaitre le véritable état de l'entreprise, par conséquent, les informations de paiement coutent de l'argent. La nouveauté est que l'acquisition de l'information coute plus cher durant les mauvaises périodes que durant les bonnes périodes, comme cela a été confirmé par de précédentes expériences. Lorsque la récession comamence, l'apprentissage coûteux fait augmenter les primes de liquidité causant un problème d'évaporation de liquidité, comme cela a été aussi confirmé par de précédentes expériences.

Degree Dissertation Report Asset Management

L'objectiu d'aquest treball no és oferir els mateixos serveis que els productes comercials, sinó utilitzar el coneixement bàsic en aquest sector per crear una aplicació simple