Flag state responsibility for maritime terrorism

Modern international shipping is largely a flag state-based system. Only the flag state has complete authority over the vessels that fly its flag, and as a result, other states’ jurisdiction over these vessels is very limited. Against this backdrop, this article examines the flag state’s responsibility for maritime terrorism, a major security issue and vulnerability in the global supply chain. It is not an exaggeration that the global community’s repeated statements regarding the illegality of terrorism have created a customary international law obligation for states to take all possible steps for the prevention of terrorism. This article argues that providing flags to suspicious entities in an obscure registration system is not compatible with this obligation.

State responsibility for maritime terrorism

Maritime terrorism is one of the main maritime security issues in the contemporary world. The threat of maritime terrorism is more apparent than ever in the post-September 11 era. Although maritime terrorism is an old issue, the disastrous events of 11 September 2001 brought this issue again onto the global agenda. This incident brought to the forefront the longstanding concerns that terrorists could severely disrupt the global maritime supply chain by using shipping containers or vessels to attack major business centres, port facilities and offshore installations. A number of international criminal law studies have been conducted to identify international legal challenges in maritime security. Some of these works have critically examined the international legal framework for maritime security and identified the lacunas in the existing system. Some of these writings have also identified that emerging maritime terrorism issues are prompting States to introduce some stringent measures. Although the international legal regime related to maritime terrorism is a well-researched area, very little research work has explored the legal issues related to State responsibility for maritime terrorism. This article argues that, although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions related to maritime piracy may not be applicable for some dimensions of maritime violence, different provisions of UNCLOS may relevant in identifying State responsibility for maritime terrorism.

From "Secondary Punishment" to "Supermax" : the human costs of high-security regimes in Australia

“Supermax” prisons, conceived by the United States in the early 1980s, are typically reserved for convicted political criminals such as terrorists and spies and for other inmates who are considered to pose a serious ongoing threat to the wider community, to the security of correctional institutions, or to the safety of other inmates. Prisoners are usually restricted to their cells for up to twenty-three hours a day and typically have minimal contact with other inmates and correctional staff. Not only does the Federal Bureau of Prisons operate one of these facilities, but almost every state has either a supermax wing or stand-alone supermax prison. The Globalization of Supermax Prisons examines why nine advanced industrialized countries have adopted the supermax prototype, paying particular attention to the economic, social, and political processes that have affected each state. Featuring essays that look at the U.S.-run prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanemo, this collection seeks to determine if the American model is the basis for the establishment of these facilities and considers such issues as the support or opposition to the building of a supermax and why opposition efforts failed; the allegation of human rights abuses within these prisons; and the extent to which the decision to build a supermax was influenced by developments in the United States. Additionally, contributors address such domestic matters as the role of crime rates, media sensationalism, and terrorism in each country’s decision to build a supermax prison.

Security and the War on Terror

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in international politics, representing a new type of threat that could not easily be anticipated or prevented through state-based structures of security alone. Opening up interdisciplinary conversations between strategic, economic, ethical and legal approaches to global terrorism, this edited book recognises a fundamental issue: while major crises initially tend to reinforce old thinking and behavioural patterns, they also allow societies to challenge and overcome entrenched habits, thereby creating the foundations for a new and perhaps more peaceful future. This volume addresses the issues that are at stake in this dual process of political closure, and therefore rethinks how states can respond to terrorist threats. The contributors range from leading conceptual theorists to policy-oriented analysts, from senior academics to junior researchers. The book explores how terrorism has had a profound impact on how security is being understood and implemented, and uses a range of hitherto neglected sources of insight, such as those between political, economic, legal and ethical factors, to examine the nature and meaning of security in a rapidly changing world.

The rise and fall of the international law of maritime terrorism : the ghost of piracy is still hunting!

Maritime terrorism is a serious threat to global security. A major debate in this regard is the treating of acts of maritime terrorism as piracy by some scholars and a rejection of this view by others. Moreover, the international law of maritime terrorism suffers from fundamental definitional issues, much like the international law of terrorism. This article examines the current international law of maritime terrorism with a particular emphasis on the debate regarding the applicability of the international law of piracy in the case of maritime terrorism. It argues that the international law of piracy is not applicable in the enforcement and prosecution of maritime terrorists on the high seas. International treaties on terrorism and the post-September 11 developments relating to international laws on terrorism have created a workable international legal framework for combating maritime terrorism, despite some bottlenecks.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

Paradox between democracy and security- case study on Pakistan

Pro gradu-tutkielma tutkii demokratian ja turvallisuuden paradoksia Pakistanissa esitellen kuusi tekijää, jotka vaikuttavat kyseiseen paradoksiin. Näitä tekijöitä ovat historiallinen kehitys; eliittihallinto; taloudellinen kehitys; Pakistanin poliittisten tekijöiden demokratian eri määritelmät; opetuksen puuttuminen; ja valtataistelu hallituksen, armeijan, tiedustelupalvelun, oikeusjärjestelmän, poliittisten puolueiden sekä eri heimojen, uskonnollisten ja etnisten ryhmien välillä. Tutkimus tarkastelee myös sitä miten nämä tekijät vaikuttavat demokratian kehitykseen Pakistanissa. Keskeinen argumentti on, että länsimainen demokratia ei esiinny eikä toimi Pakistanissa vallitsevissa oloissa, etenkin historiallisen kehityksen ja ulkoisen turvallisuuden takia. Pro gradu-tutkielma käyttää sekundäärisiä lähteitä, kuten kirjoja, artikkeleita, maaraportteja, kommentaareja sekä omiin kokemuksiin perustuvia havaintoja Pakistanin matkalta 2010-2011. Keskeiset teoriat gradussa ovat Guillermo O’ Donnelin delegaattidemokratia sekä Duncan McCargon eliittihallintoteoria, jotka yhdessä selittävät historiallista kehitystä ja eliittihallinnon dynamiikkaa, mitkä johtavat paradoksiin. Kautta historian armeija on hallinnut Pakistania, ja siviilihallinto on ainoastaan neljä kertaa onnistunut olemaan vallassa, mutta silloinkin siviilihallinto päättyi korruptioväitteisiin tai armeijan vallankaappaukseen. Armeijahallinnoille on luonteenomaista hyvät suhteet USA:n, positiivinen taloudellinen kehitys ja vakaus, kun taas siviilihallinnot ovat epävakaita ja korruptoituneita. Tämä kehitys on paradoksin tausta, joka rakentuu turvallisuuspoliittisen tilanteen pohjalle eli hallitusten ja muiden tekijöiden yritykseen löytää vastapaino Intian uhalle. Tämä on ollut keskeinen huoli kelle tahansa poliittiselle päättäjälle itsenäisyydestä lähtien. Loputon valtataistelu eri poliittisten tekijöiden kesken sekä eliittihallinto pitävät yllä paradoksia, koska eliitit ovat kiinnostuneempia oman valtansa säilyttämisestä kuin kansan tahdon huomioonottamisesta. Koska valtaosa ihmisistä ei ole koulutettuja, he ovat paljolti kiinnostuneita omasta selviytymisestään, ja tämän takia sekä kansa että eliitit suosivat armeijahallintoa, koska se tuo vakautta ja taloudellista kehitystä. Sen vuoksi vallitsevissa oloissa demokratian tulevaisuus Pakistanissa näyttää huonolta, koska liberaalidemokratian vaatimukset eivät täyty puoliksi vapaan oikeussysteemin, puoliksi vapaan lehdistön, valtavan korruption ja monien ihmisoikeusloukkauksien takia unohtamatta armeijan ja tiedustelupalvelun sekaantumista siviilihallintoon.

Limits of Dissent, Perils of Activism: Spaces of Resistance and the New Security Logic

On 26 December 2003 an Israeli activist was shot by the Israeli Army while he was participating in a demonstration organized by Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) in the West Bank. This was the first time Israeli Soldiers have deliberately shot live bullets at a Jewish-Israeli activist. This paper is an attempt to understand the set of conditions, the enveloping frameworks, and the new discourses that have made this event, and similar shootings that soon followed, possible. Situating the actions of AAtW within a much wider context of securitization—of identities, movements, and bodies—we examine strategies of resistance which are deployed in highly securitized public spaces. We claim that an unexpected matrix of identity in which abnormality is configured as security threat render the bodies of activists especially precarious. The paper thus provides an account of the new rationales of security technologies and tactics which increasingly govern public spaces.

The Extra-territorial Obligations of European States regarding Human Rights in the Context of Terrorism

This chapter focuses on the growing tendency of international human rights law to require states to protect the rights of non-nationals who are in the state unlawfully and of nationals and non-nationals who are outside the state, especially when any of these people are involved in terrorist or counter-terrorist activity. It reviews these additional obligations within a European context, focusing on EU law and the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and drawing on the case law of UK courts. Part 1 considers when a European state must grant asylum to alleged terrorists on the basis that otherwise they would suffer human rights abuses in the state from which they are fleeing. Part 2 examines whether, outside of asylum claims, a European state must not deport or extradite an alleged terrorist because he or she might suffer an abuse of human rights in the receiving state. Part 3 looks at whether a European state whose security forces are engaged in counter-terrorism activities abroad is obliged to protect the human rights of the individuals serving in those forces and/or the human rights of the alleged terrorists they are confronting. While welcoming the extension of state responsibility, the chapter notes that it is occurring in a way which introduces three aspects of relativity into the protection of human rights. First, European law protects only some human rights extra-territorially. Second, it protects those rights only when there is ‘a real risk’ of their being violated. Third, sometimes it protects those rights only when there is a real risk of their being violated ‘flagrantly’.

The First Government of Northern Ireland, Education Reform, and the Failure of Anti-populist Unionism, 1921–1925

This article examines education reform under the first government of Northern Ireland (1921–5). This embryonic period offered the Ulster Unionist leadership a chance to construct a more inclusive society, one that might diminish sectarian animosities, and thereby secure the fledgling state through cooperation rather than coercion. Such aspirations were severely tested by the ruling party’s need to secure the state against insurgency, and, more lastingly, to assuage the concerns of its historic constituency. The former led to a draconian security policy, the latter to a dependency on populist strategies and rhetoric. It is argued here, however, that this dependency was not absolute until July 1925. Before that, the Belfast government withstood growing pressure from populist agitators to reverse controversial aspects of its education reforms, only relenting when Protestant disaffection threatened the unity of the governing party and the existence of the state.

The 'emotionalization of the 'war on terror'': counter-terrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and helplessness

The ‘war on terror’ has marked the existence of exceptional measures involving military action abroad and the introduction of counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom. Within this context fear, risk and insecurity have been intrinsic in legitimizing the measures created as being necessary to maintain national security. This article presents the findings from a study investigating the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims’ emotions. The study revealed how facets of the ‘war on terror’, including ‘human rights and policing’, ‘What if? and pre-emption’, ‘geopolitics and reflexive fear and risk’ and ‘fear from inside the binary’ impacted participants’ emotions. Through exploring how thepolicy measures implemented in the ‘war on terror’ have influenced British Muslims’ emotions, the article takes a small step in addressing the analytical gap in criminological research on emotions in the ‘war on terror’.

The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism

Outrora dominado por ameaças provenientes de Estados-nação, o cenário global actual, dominado por uma rápida mudança de poderes que nos apresenta uma interacção complexa entre múltiplos actores, onde inimigos desconhecidos, anteriormente bem identificados, é actualmente controlado por grupos terroristas bem preparados e bem organizados. Hezbollah é reconhecido como um dos grupos terroristas mais capazes, com uma extensa rede fora do Líbano dedicada a tráfico de droga, armas e seres humanos, tal como o branqueamento de capitais para financiar o terrorismo, representando um grande foco de instabilidade à segurança. Como instrumento de Estado, os serviços de informações detêm a capacidade de estar na linha da frente na prevenção e combate ao terrorismo. Todavia, para compreender este fenómeno é necessário analisar os actores desta ameaça. À luz desta conjuntura, esta dissertação está dividida em três capítulos principais que visam responder às seguintes questões fundamentais: O que é o terrorismo? Como opera um grupo terrorista transnacional? Será que os serviços de informações têm as ferramentas necessárias para prevenir e combater estas ameaças?

El extranjero y el derecho a la justicia en Canadá tras el 11 de septiembre

After the events of September 11, the fear of terrorism led to the adoption of new anti-terrorist measures (elimination of appeals available to foreigners, reduction of legal aid, increased powers of detention, easier use of security certificates…). But in Canadian Charter of Rigths and Freedoms only the right to vote and be elected, the right to enter and remain in the country and the minority language educational rights specifically protect citizens. The protection of Canadian citizens cannot be based on the denial of foreigner´s rights. The same rights are at stake: The violation of a foreigners´s rights is a violation of citizen´s rights.