Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2007

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2008

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2010

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2012

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefit systems for the period April 16, 2012 through May 4, 2012

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefit systems for the period April 16, 2012 through May 4, 2012

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development’s MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefits systems for the period April 29, 2013 through May 10, 2013

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development’s MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefits systems for the period April 29, 2013 through May 10, 2013

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2013

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2013

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2014

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2014