Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

From e-voting to smart-voting : e-Tools in and for elections and direct democracy in Switzerland

To what extent do and could e-tools contribute to a democracy like Switzerland? This paper puts forward experiences and visions concerning the application of e-tools for the most traditional democratic processes- elections and, of special importance in Switzerland, direct-democratic votes.Having the particular voting behaviour of the Swiss electorate in mind (low voter turnout - especially among the youngest age group, low political knowledge, etc.) we believe that e-tools which provide information in the forefront of elections or direct-democratic votes offer an enormous service to the voter. As soon as e-voting will be possible in Switzerland (as planned by the government), those e-tools for gathering information online will become indispensable and will gain power enormously. Therefore political scientists should not only focus on potential effects of e-voting itself but rather on the combination of (connected)e-tools of the pre-voting and the voting sphere. In the case of Switzerland, we argue in this paper, the offer of VAAs such as smartvote for elections and direct-democratic votes can provide the voter with more balanced and qualitatively higher information and thereby make a valuable contribution to the Swiss democracy.

Automatic Mallampati Classification Using Active Appearance Models

Difficult tracheal intubation assessment is an important research topic in anesthesia as failed intubations are important causes of mortality in anesthetic practice. The modified Mallampati score is widely used, alone or in conjunction with other criteria, to predict the difficulty of intubation. This work presents an automatic method to assess the modified Mallampati score from an image of a patient with the mouth wide open. For this purpose we propose an active appearance models (AAM) based method and use linear support vector machines (SVM) to select a subset of relevant features obtained using the AAM. This feature selection step proves to be essential as it improves drastically the performance of classification, which is obtained using SVM with RBF kernel and majority voting. We test our method on images of 100 patients undergoing elective surgery and achieve 97.9% accuracy in the leave-one-out crossvalidation test and provide a key element to an automatic difficult intubation assessment system.

Impact of voting advice applications on voters's decision-making

So-called online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become very popular all over Europe. Millions of voters are using them as an assistance to make up their minds for which party they should vote. Despite this popularity there are only very few studies about the impact of these tools on individual electoral choice. On the basis of the Swiss VAA smartvote we present some first findings about the question whether VAAs do have a direct impact on the actual vote of their users. In deed, we find strong evidence that Swiss voters were affected by smartvote. However, our findings are somewhat contrary to the results of previous studies from other countries. Furthermore, the quality of available data for such studies needs to be improved. Future studies should pay attention to both: the improvement of the available data, as well as the explanation of the large variance of findings between the specific European countries.

Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Textural classification of land cover using support vector machines: an empirical comparison with parametric, non parametric and hybrid classifiers in the Bolivian Amazon

Land cover classification is a key research field in remote sensing and land change science as thematic maps derived from remotely sensed data have become the basis for analyzing many socio-ecological issues. However, land cover classification remains a difficult task and it is especially challenging in heterogeneous tropical landscapes where nonetheless such maps are of great importance. The present study aims to establish an efficient classification approach to accurately map all broad land cover classes in a large, heterogeneous tropical area of Bolivia, as a basis for further studies (e.g., land cover-land use change). Specifically, we compare the performance of parametric (maximum likelihood), non-parametric (k-nearest neighbour and four different support vector machines - SVM), and hybrid classifiers, using both hard and soft (fuzzy) accuracy assessments. In addition, we test whether the inclusion of a textural index (homogeneity) in the classifications improves their performance. We classified Landsat imagery for two dates corresponding to dry and wet seasons and found that non-parametric, and particularly SVM classifiers, outperformed both parametric and hybrid classifiers. We also found that the use of the homogeneity index along with reflectance bands significantly increased the overall accuracy of all the classifications, but particularly of SVM algorithms. We observed that improvements in producer’s and user’s accuracies through the inclusion of the homogeneity index were different depending on land cover classes. Earlygrowth/degraded forests, pastures, grasslands and savanna were the classes most improved, especially with the SVM radial basis function and SVM sigmoid classifiers, though with both classifiers all land cover classes were mapped with producer’s and user’s accuracies of around 90%. Our approach seems very well suited to accurately map land cover in tropical regions, thus having the potential to contribute to conservation initiatives, climate change mitigation schemes such as REDD+, and rural development policies.

Pre-Election Positions and Voting Behaviour in Parliament: Consistency among Swiss MPs

This article examines the determinants of positional incongruence between pre-election statements and post-election behaviour in the Swiss parliament between 2003 and 2009. The question is examined at the individual MP level, which is appropriate for dispersion-of-powers systems like Switzerland. While the overall rate of political congruence reaches about 85%, a multilevel logit analysis detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her mind once elected. The results show that positional changes are more likely when (1) MPs are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the electoral district magnitude is not small, (4) the vote is not about a party's core issue, (5) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (6) if the pre-election statement dissents from the majority position of the legislative party group. Of these factors, the last one is paramount.