892 resultados para Trade competition law
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From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.
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From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.
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Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.
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The laws of all countries have been analyzed and arranged under a series of headings; full texts of the various international conventions on the subject of trade-marks and a complete collection of the trade-mark classifications in force in the various countries are also included. cf. Pref.
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"Trade union act rules, 1913": 2 p. inserted between p. 132 and 133.
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Legislation: Directive 89/104 on trade marks art.5 Directive 84/450 on misleading advertising Directive 97/55 amending Directive 84/450 concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising Case: O2 Holdings Ltd v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd (C-533/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4231 (ECJ (1st Chamber)) *Comms. L. 155 Long, long ago a trade mark allowed a craftsman to be identified and held accountable for shoddy goods. Today in the era of the ‘Lovemark,’1 due to extensive advertising hopes and aspirations a lifestyle can be purchased with a brand. For many products a trademark is no longer merely a badge of origin but has a commercial value of its own. Through advertising an emotional attachment is created in the heart of the consumer for particular brands. Brand owners are determined that the value of this attachment be preserved and protected against any encroachment into the aura that has been painstakingly created. Comparative advertising, the allusive use of a mark, is seen by the owners of such emotive brands as likely to jeopardise the character of the brand that they have so carefully nurtured. As they have invested so heavily in creating their concept these owners want to control its use by others. There is an issue however as to how far this control ought to extend when the image is used in the marketing of a rival's goods or services.
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This thesis is an examination of the ASEAN’s prospects in establishing regional competition policy in the Southeast Asia region, a topic of contemporary relevance in light of the ASEAN’s recent foray into the economic integration field on 31 December 2015. It questions whether the current approach undertaken by the ASEAN could contribute to an effective regional competition policy under the regional market integration. In answering this question, the thesis first critically surveys the current terrain of regional competition laws and policies in order to determine the possible existence of an optimal template. It argues that although the EU model is oft used as a source of inspiration, each regional organisation conceives different configurations of the model in order to best adjust to the local regional contexts. The thesis makes an inquiry into the narratives of the ASEAN’s competition policy, as well as the ASEAN’s specific considerations in the development of competition policy, before comparing the findings to the actual approaches taken by the ASEAN in its pursuit of regional competition policy. This thesis reveals that the actual approach taken by the ASEAN demonstrates an important discrepancy from the economic integration goal. The ASEAN applies a soft harmonisation approach regarding substantive competition law while refraining from establishing a centralised institution or a representative institution. The sole organ with regards to competition policy at the regional level is an expert organ. The thesis also conducts an investigation into the reception of the ASEAN’s regional policy by the member states in order to ascertain the possibility of the achievement of the ASEAN’s aspiration of regional competition policy. The study reveals that despite some shared similarities in the broad principles of competition law amongst the member states, the various competition law regimes are not harmonised thus creating challenging obstacle to the ASEAN’s ambition. The thesis then concludes that the ASEAN’s approach to regional competition law is unlikely to be effective.
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Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS