902 resultados para The Orthodox churches
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Series title also at head of t.-p.
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Bibliography: p. xi-xxxi.
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Includes index.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Edition de Luxe."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Extracted from the author's "Memoirs of the life of the Reverend Theophilus Lindsey" printed in London, 1812, and now published for the benefit of the Christian churches in this country without note or alteration.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Paris: printed by J. Smith, rue Montmorency, 16"--T.p. verso.
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Includes indexes.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a number of actors started to engage in the power struggle for the opportunities to shape the new order in successive nation-states. In Serbia and Georgia historically hegemonic Orthodox Christian churches were among the firsts in the frontlines for political and economic power. More than a decade has passed since the so-called Coloured Revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, and the Orthodox churches still remain participants of an ongoing socio-political transition of these states. The revival of public role of religion appeared temporary in Serbia followed by a gradual decline of an influence of the Orthodox Church over political life and legal process. However, in Georgia the public and political role of religion increased rather than declined albeit changed shape. Examining the degree to which the two Orthodox churches can influence the political agenda in Serbia and Georgia, the paper attempts to understand how church-State relations work in practice. By bringing rich empirical data from the field (70 interviews with (arch)bishops, priests and religious clerics in Georgia and Serbia added to field observations), the paper reflects on the themes under which the two Orthodox churches mobilize public protest in Serbia and Georgia. The paper further looks at varying State responses and their broader implication for church-state problematique.
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The protests on Kyiv’s Maidan which commenced in November 2013, followed by the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions, have redefined the political and social relations between Russia and Ukraine, and have added complexity to the dependences between the Orthodox Churches operating in the two countries. The Kremlin’s policy has put the Russian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) in an awkward position. The ROC is Russia’s largest religious organisation, which also exercises symbolic sovereignty over Ukraine’s most numerous Orthodox community, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which since 13 August has had a new leader, Metropolitan Onufry. The head of the ROC, the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Kirill, has been facing a dilemma as to how he should respond to the Russian government’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. His firm support of the Kremlin’s moves in Ukraine, may lose the Russian Church its social influence in this country. This might also catalyse a process within which Ukraine’s largest Orthodox Church would gradually become independent of Moscow. On the other hand, if he condemns the Kremlin’s policy, this would adversely affect the co-operation between ‘the altar and the throne’ which has been rapidly developing over the past few years in Russia, and which has offered multiple benefits to the Russian Church. As a result, Patriarch Kirill has distanced the ROC from the recent developments in Ukraine and has adopted a neutral stance. However, Kirill’s choice has aggravated the negative perception of the ROC among the Orthodox community in Ukraine. Given its close relations with the Kremlin, the ROC is increasingly viewed there as an instrument of political struggle and an exponent of the Russian government’s interests. The ROC’s stance has cast the UOC–MP, which has links with the Russian Church, in an unfavourable light, and has fostered its efforts to become more independent from the Moscow Patriarchate. Regardless of how the situation evolves, the recent developments in Ukraine have made it clear that the interests of the Russian Church and the Kremlin, which have coincided for years, now come into conflict, mainly due to the disagreement over the methods used. Despite this, the Russian Church is not withdrawing from the cooperation of ‘the altar and the throne’, and submits itself to the Kremlin’s decisions.
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At first glance, the nationalist ideology of the French Revolution seems to have had little impact on the Orthodox Church in Romanian-speaking territories. Romanians were the predominant inhabitants of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the neighboring territories of Transylvania (including Crişana, Maramureş and Banat), Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Dobrudja. The majority of ethnic Romanians belonged to the Orthodox faith while their communities were at the intersection of geopo liti cal interests of the Rus sian, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires. In 1859 the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (known as the Old Kingdom between 1866 and 1918) united into a single state under the rule of a local prince. The term "Romania" began to be used by the new state in its of cial documents in 1862. Two years later, the state supported the declaration of a Romanian autocephalous (in de pen dent) church that was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1885. As an integrative part of the Orthodox commonwealth, the church was situated between the competing jurisdictions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Rus sian Orthodox Church, while its declaration of autocephaly followed a pattern in the spread of national churches in Southeastern Europe. From the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774 to the beginning of the Greek War for In de pen dence in 1821, the Romanian principalities were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, which had full control of their po liti cal and economic affairs. The sultan appointed princes, and the Porte determined their po liti cal and judicial status. The princes were drawn from the "Phanariots," and were directly appointed by the Porte from preponderantly Greek elite rather than the Romanian local elite, the boyars (boieri).1 In each principality, the church was headed by a metropolitan who was under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. That religion mattered to local population as a means of social cohesion was suggestively depicted by Anatole de Demidoff, an En glish traveler in the region in 1837. Arriving in Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, he claimed that: I know of no city in Europe in which it is possible to find more agreeable society, or in which there is a better tone, united with the most charming gaiety⋯. Religion, which is here of the schismatic Greek creed, does not, properly speaking, hold any great empire over the minds of the Wallachian people, but they observe its outward forms, and particularly the austerities of fasting, with scrupulous exactitude. The people are seen to attend divine ser vice with every sign of respect, and the great number of churches existing in Wallachia, bear witness to the ardent zeal with which outward worship is honored.2 The Romanian Orthodox Church was a national institution, closely linked to social, economic, and po liti cal structures. In most cases, Orthodox hierarchs were appointed from the families of boyars, thus ensuring a close relationship with the state authorities and its policies. As one of the largest landowners in the principalities, the church had a prime role in administrating healthcare and education. Although the majority of the clergy was uneducated, it dispensed both ecclesiastical and civil justice and in many cases worked closely with boyars in local administration.3 The lower clergy not only contributed directly to the economy but also benefited from tax privileges. Some small villages had an unusually high proportion of clergy in comparison to the overall population. For example, in 1810, Stənisləveşti, a village in the south of Wallachia, was composed of eleven houses and had two priests, five deacons, and three cantors; similarly, the Frəsinet village of nineteen houses had two priests and five deacons.4 Although these cases were exceptional, they indicate both the economic value of being a member of the clergy and the wider canonical dimension of church jurisdiction. The special status of the clergy was reflected not only at lower but also at higher levels. Bishops and metropolitans engaged with state policy and in many cases opposition to the authorities led to the loss of a spiritual seat. The metropolitan of each principality worked with the prince and was president of the divan, the gathering of all boyars. He held the right to be the first person to comment on state policy and to make recommendations when the prince was absent. The metropolitan replaced the prince when the principality had no political ruler, such as in the cases of Metropolitan Veniamin Costachi of Moldavia in 1806 and Metropolitan Dositei Filitti of Wallachia, while the bishops of Buzəu and Argeş were members of the provisional government during the Rus sian occupation of the principalities in 1808. The higher clergy had both religious and political prerogatives in relation to foreign powers as evident in their heading of the boyars' delegation to peace negotiation between the Rus sian and Ottoman empires at Focşani in 1772 and addressing memoranda to the Austrian and Rus sian governments in 1802.5 The primary role of the church in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia was paralleled by the national mobilization of Orthodox communities in the neighboring territories that had Romanian inhabitants. Although throughout the region Orthodox communities were incorporated into church structures as part of the Habsburg, Austrian or Rus sian empires, the nineteenth century was characterized by the leadership's search for political autonomy and the building of a Romanian national identity. The Orthodox communities outside the Old Kingdom maintained relations with the faithful in principalities across the Carpathian Mountains and the Dniester River and sought support in their struggle for political and religious rights.