The budget and economic outlook /

Mode of access: Internet.

The Economic and budget outlook /

Vols. for 1986-1990- have also title on cover, 1985- Annual report.

Simulating aggregate and distributional effects of various plans for modifying the retirement earnings test /

"July 1990."

Baseline budget projections for fiscal years 1983-1987 /

Principal authors are Paul N. Van de Water and Rosemary D. Marcuss.

Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment

It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them.

What if tax reform was a fundamental human right?

As an election looms in Australia, the tax debate continues unabated. Self-interest abounds. When we remove self-interest, we are often reduced to standard design principles for a taxation system. Lost in this discussion is the fundamental purpose of tax, which is to finance government expenditure. Most would argue that tax revenue should be sufficient to meet basic economic and social needs of the community. But how does a community determine what these basic economic and social needs should be? One way is by using a human rights framework. This can provide guidance for both developing and developed countries considering tax reform.

Tax principles, product differentiation and the nature of competition

We analyze the choice between the origin and destination principles of taxation when there is product differentiation and Bertrand competition. If taxes are redistributed to consumers and demand is linear the origin principle dominates the destination principle whatever the degree of product differentiation and extent of economic integration. With nonlinear demand the origin principle dominates if there is sufficient economic integration. When the social value assigned to tax revenue is higher than the private value, the destination principle dominates for intermediate values of product differentiation and economic integration. The same results are also shown to hold with Cournot competition.

Simulating the impact on health of internalising the cost of carbon in food prices combined with a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages

Rising greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs) have implications for health and up to 30 % of emissions globally are thought to arise from agriculture. Synergies exist between diets low in GHGEs and health however some foods have the opposite relationship, such as sugar production being a relatively low source of GHGEs. In order to address this and to further characterise a healthy sustainable diet, we model the effect on UK non-communicable disease mortality and GHGEs of internalising the social cost of carbon into the price of food alongside a 20 % tax on sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs). Developing previously published work, we simulate four tax scenarios: (A) a GHGEs tax of £2.86/tonne of CO2 equivalents (tCO2e)/100 g product on all products with emissions greater than the mean across all food groups (0.36 kgCO2e/100 g); (B) scenario A but with subsidies on foods with emissions lower than 0.36 kgCO2e/100 g such that the effect is revenue neutral; (C) scenario A but with a 20 % sales tax on SSBs; (D) scenario B but with a 20 % sales tax on SSBs. An almost ideal demand system is used to estimate price elasticities and a comparative risk assessment model is used to estimate changes to non-communicable disease mortality. We estimate that scenario A would lead to 300 deaths delayed or averted, 18,900 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs, and £3.0 billion tax revenue; scenario B, 90 deaths delayed or averted and 17,100 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs; scenario C, 1,200 deaths delayed or averted, 18,500 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs, and £3.4 billion revenue; and scenario D, 2,000 deaths delayed or averted and 16,500 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs. Deaths averted are mainly due to increased fibre and reduced fat consumption; a SSB tax reduces SSB and sugar consumption. Incorporating the social cost of carbon into the price of food has the potential to improve health, reduce GHGEs, and raise revenue. The simple addition of a tax on SSBs can mitigate negative health consequences arising from sugar being low in GHGEs. Further conflicts remain, including increased consumption of unhealthy foods such as cakes and nutrients such as salt.

Flypaper effect revisited : evidence for tax collection efficiency in Brazilian municipalities

This paper has two purposes. First, to construct efficiency scores in tax collection for Brazilian municipalities in 2004, taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy- tax base. This methodology eliminates the price- effect of tax collection. Second, using the rules established on the Brazilian Constitution in 1988 to transfer unconditional funds among municipalities as instrument, to estimate the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and efficiency in tax collection. We conclude that transfers affect negatively the efficiency in tax collection, leading to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.

Cash-cum-in-kind transfers and income tax function

This paper investigates income tax revenues response to tax rate changes taking into consideration that cash-cum-in-kind transfers are used as a redistributive package to the community. First, we show that when cash and in-kind transfers are not tied to be substitute instruments, a marginal income tax increase may unambiguously decrease the quantity supplied of labor (and tax revenues therein). Next, we show that whenever the government chooses the optimum provision for the publicly provided good the tax revenue function has a negatively-sloped part with respect to tax rates except for one case. Last, we consider Brazilian data - PNAD - from 1976 to 2008 to test our theoretical implications. Our estimations suggest a weak evidence in favor of the existence of a La er-type curve for Brazilian income tax revenues data. Moreover, wend that the actual average income tax rate seems to be below the estimated optimum level. In a shorter sample from 1996-1999, we nd evidence that labor supply decreases with tax rate when cash and in-kind transfers are in play. Using a pseudo-panel from the same shorter sample, we try to estimate the elasticity of taxable income, following Creedy and Gemmell (2012) and Saez et al. (2009). We explore a small tax reform between 1997 and 1998 that a ected only the higher income tax bracket, and evidence that Brazil is on the revenue reducing side of the La er Curve, at least for individuals in the higher income tax bracket.

Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2013: tax reform and renewal of the fiscal covenant

Includes bibliography

Tax performance and reform in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Includes bibliography

International tax cooperation and capital mobility

Includes bibliography

Tax reform for human development in Central America

Includes bibliography

Tax Collection in History

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including sharing arrangements which divide the tax revenue between the government and collectors at fixed proportions, negotiated payment schemes based on the tax base, and sale of the revenue to a collector in exchange for a lump-sum payment determined at auction. We propose an economic theory of tax collection that can coherently explain the temporal and spatial variation in contractual forms. We begin by offering a simple classification of tax collection schemes observed in history. We then develop a general economic model of tax collection that specifies the cost and benefits of alternative schemes and identifies the conditions under which a government would choose one contractual form over another in maximizing the net revenue. Finally, we use the conclusions of the model to explain some of the well-known patterns of tax collection observed in history and how choices varied over time and space.