911 resultados para State-society cycles
Resumo:
Introduction : Triggered by the Asian currency crisis, Indonesia plunged into the times of violent change. With the downfall of the long-standing Soeharto rule in May 1998, changes of the state order started with great magnitude and rapidity under a new banner of “reformasi” (reform). What changes have occurred in this reformasi period? What do these changes signify? To answer these questions, it would be better to have a certain yardstick to allow us comparison. One possibility is to use a yardstick of history. What picture will emerge if we see the current array of changes in long-term historical perspectives is a main question of this paper. This paper intends to provide a bird’s-eye picture illustrating where in the Indonesian history the current restructuring of the state order is located. Rather than focusing on a specific area, I here attempt to broaden our outlook on Indonesia’s political, economic and social arenas in order to identify what are happening in these arenas, how they are mutually related, and what those events signify in the Indonesia’s historical context.
Resumo:
Los programas de desarrollo regional promovidos por los gobiernos nacionales y las agencias multilaterales, como el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), se orientan a las políticas públicas de suministro de bienes públicos, ya sean servicios públicos o infraestructuras, a las regiones subdesarrolladas. Las evidencias apuntan que el éxito de estos programas depende en parte de externalidades, las cuales se relacionan con los cambios del tejido asociativo y los valores de los participantes de la comunidad. Estas externalidades se definen como el capital social. Cómo las externalidades no son directamente evaluadas en el impacto económico y social de los proyectos, pero su existencia es aceptada por los planificadores que reconocen la importancia de desarrollar el tejido de relaciones en la comunidad. Sin embargo este capital social no es medido. El objeto de esta tesis es investigar y proponer procesos de medida y evaluación del capital social de un proyecto, y relacionarlos con las actividades del mismo en un territorio y proyecto dado como casos de estudio. El Programa de Desarrollo de la Zona de Mata (PROMATA) en el Estado de Pernambuco, Brasil, financiado por el Estado de Pernambuco en Brasil y el BID, finalizado en 2010, ha sido elegido como caso de estudio. Para la evaluación y medida del capital social se han estudiado dos periodos. Uno considerando solo los planes del proyecto, sin considerar su implantación, que se ha denominado evaluación A Priori, basada en un panel de expertos con visión de las externalidades generadas. Y otra con la participación de las partes de la comunidad después de su finalización, denomina evaluación A Posteriori, para lo cual se han entrevistado un número significativo de partes interesadas utilizando un cuestionario especialmente diseñado. Los resultados han sido procesados mediante análisis estadísticos avanzados. El proyecto PROMATA es considerado un caso de éxito en Brasil, en parte por su aproximación al desarrollo asociativo. Sin embargo las valoraciones del capital social muestran que algunas relaciones Estado-sociedad y sociedad-personas no han cambiado todo lo esperado, en oposición a las evaluaciones de satisfacción de los indicadores del proyecto. Es el efecto externo del capital social. ABSTRACT The regional development programs promoted by the national governments and international multilateral agencies, like the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank (BID), are oriented to public policies under which public goods, like public services and infrastructures, are supplied to underdeveloped regions. More and more evidences are pointing to the fact that success of these programs depends in a good part of externalities, which are related to the changes in the networking and values among the stakeholders in the territory. These externalities are defined as the Social Capital. As externalities, they are not directly evaluated in the projects economic and social impact, but accepted to exist and the planners of the projects do acknowledge the important of social networking. However never assessed. The objective of this thesis is to investigate and propose a way to measure and assess the social capital of a given project, and relate that with the activities of the project, with a given project and territory as base case. The Development Program in Zona da Mata (PROMATA) in the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, funded by the Brazil State and the BID, ended in 2010, was chosen as the base case. For the assessment of the social capital two periods in time where studied. One considering only the project program named a priori evaluation and based in a panel of experts, which are aware of the possible externalities of the project. Other, considering the stakeholders view after the project ended, named posterior evaluation, which required interviewing a number of stakeholders using a specially designed questionnaire. The results were processed using advanced statistical techniques. PROMATA is considered a success case story in Brazil, in part for its social networking approach. However when the social capital is assessed there are areas of state-society and society-community relations not that well transformed, as the satisfaction research of the project indicators. This unforeseen externality is the social capital effect.
Resumo:
This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model. First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their international patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position; nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined. Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept "patriotic dilemma" is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.
Resumo:
Se muestra la existencia en España de una ética civil, coherente con el proceso de secularización y modernización experimentado por las sociedades europeas. Tras una exposición de las bases conceptuales de lo que se considera “ética civil”, y empleando los datos de la encuesta internacional Pew Global Attitudes Project, se contrastan un conjunto de hipótesis para España relativas al peso de factores estructurales (sexo, edad, educación e ideología) en la aceptación de una ética cívica o religiosa, y la influencia de esta en opiniones, actitudes y comportamientos relacionados con la religión en la vida pública. El contraste empírico de las hipótesis especificadas revela la influencia que tiene la opción ética en la opinión pública referida al Estado, la sociedad y la religión. Los resultados son acordes con los expuestos por investigaciones anteriores, validándolos, al emplear expresiones alternativas y permitiendo un análisis novedoso de la ética civil y religiosa en la sociedad española.
Resumo:
Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.
Resumo:
The concept of citizenship is one of the most complicated in political and social sciences. Its long process of historical development makes dealing with it particularly complicated. Citizenship is by nature a multi-dimensional concept: there is a legal citizenship, referring first to the equal legal status of individuals, for instance the equality between men and women. Legal citizenship also refers to a political dimension, the right to start and/or join political parties, or political participation more broadly. Thirdly, it has a religious dimension relating to the right of all religious groups to equally and freely practice their religious customs and rituals. Finally, legal citizenship possesses a socio-economic dimension related to the non-marginalisation of different social categories, for instance women. All of these dimensions, far from being purely objects of legal texts and codifications, are emerging as an arena of political struggle within the Egyptian society. Citizenship as a concept has its roots in European history and, more specifically, the emergence of the nation state in Europe and the ensuing economic and social developments in these societies. These social developments and the rise of the nation state have worked in parallel, fostering the notion of an individual citizen bestowed with rights and obligations. This gradual interaction was very different from what happened in the context of the Arab world. The emerging of the nation state in Egypt was an outcome of modernisation efforts from the top-down; it coercively redesigned the social structure, by eliminating or weakening some social classes in favour of others. These efforts have had an impact on the state-society relation at least in two respects. First, on the overlapping relation between some social classes and the state, and second, on the ability of some social groups to self-organise, define and raise their demands. This study identifies how different political parties in Egypt envision the multi-dimensional concept of citizenship. We focus on the following elements: Nature of the state (identity, nature of the regime) Liberties and rights (election laws, political party laws, etc.) Right to gather and organise (syndicates, associations, etc.) Freedom of expression and speech (right to protest, sit in, strike, etc.) Public and individual liberties (freedom of belief, personal issues, etc.) Rights of marginalised groups (women, minorities, etc.)
Resumo:
Includes a list of members.
Resumo:
Avery Classics (Offsite) copy: Markings.
Resumo:
Proceedings for 1901-06, 1917, 1920-21 never published?
Resumo:
Includes bibliographical references.
Resumo:
According to the textbook approach, the developmental states of the Far East have been considered as strong and autonomous entities. Although their bureaucratic elites have remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, the state capacity has also been utilised in order to allocate resources in the interest of the whole society. Yet, society – by and large –has remained weak and subordinated to the state elite. On the other hand, the general perception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been just the opposite. The violent and permanent conflict amongst rent-seeking groups for influence and authority over resources has culminated in a situation where states have become extremely weak and fragmented, while society – depending on the capacity of competing groups for mobilising resources to organise themselves mostly on a regional or local level (resulting in local petty kingdoms) – has never had the chance to evolve as a strong player. State failure in the literature, therefore, – in the context of SSA – refers not just to a weak and captured state but also to a non-functioning, and sometimes even non-existent society, too. Recently, however, the driving forces of globalisation might have triggered serious changes in the above described status quo. Accordingly, our hypothesis is the following: globalisation, especially the dynamic changes of technology, capital and communication have made the simplistic “strong state–weak society” (in Asia) and “weak state–weak society” (in Africa) categorisation somewhat obsolete. While our comparative study has a strong emphasis on the empirical scrutiny of trying to uncover the dynamics of changes in state–society relations in the two chosen regions both qualitatively and quantitatively, it also aims at complementing the meaning and essence of the concepts and methodology of stateness, state capacity and state-society relations, the well-known building blocks of the seminal works of Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), Migdal (1988) or Myrdal (1968).
Resumo:
According to the textbook approach, the developmental states of the Far East have been considered as strong and autonomous entities. Although their bureaucratic elites have remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, the state capacity has also been utilised in order to allocate resources in the interest of the whole society. Yet, society – by and large –has remained weak and subordinated to the state elite. On the other hand, the general perception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been just the opposite. The violent and permanent conflict amongst rent-seeking groups for influence and authority over resources has culminated in a situation where states have become extremely weak and fragmented, while society – depending on the capacity of competing groups for mobilising resources to organise themselves mostly on a regional or local level (resulting in local petty kingdoms) – has never had the chance to evolve as a strong player. State failure in the literature, therefore, – in the context of SSA – refers not just to a weak and captured state but also to a non-functioning, and sometimes even non-existent society, too. Recently, however, the driving forces of globalisation might have triggered serious changes in the above described status quo. Accordingly, our hypothesis is the following: globalisation, especially the dynamic changes of technology, capital and communication have made the simplistic “strong state–weak society” (in Asia) and “weak state–weak society” (in Africa) categorisation somewhat obsolete. While our comparative study has a strong emphasis on the empirical scrutiny of trying to uncover the dynamics of changes in state–society relations in the two chosen regions both qualitatively and quantitatively, it also aims at complementing the meaning and essence of the concepts and methodology of stateness, state capacity and state-society relations, the well-known building blocks of the seminal works of Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), Migdal (1988) or Myrdal (1968).
Resumo:
The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. ^ The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. prior to, during, and after the crisis. ^ The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'lvoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. ^ This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today. ^
Resumo:
The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire prior to, during, and after the crisis. The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today.
Resumo:
The social participation in Brazil takes a new impetus with the (re)democratization process of the Brazilian society and is strengthened by the resurgence of the civil society and the 1988 Constitution. In this context, the study is conducted with the scope to verify the effectiveness of deliberative Municipal Health Council of Mossoro (CMSM), with theoretical and methodological support based on the following models: the participatory normativity, which measures the degree of institutionalization, democratization and council representation; and the effectiveness of deliberative that, from the calling capacity and agenda of the participants, from the kinds of manifestation, from the decisions and the council’s office, that measures the degree of effectiveness of the deliberative council. It appears, thus, that the council has an average degree of effectiveness deliberative, standing out as means an institution that practice, despite the existence of obstacles and challenges, the role of control over municipal health policies, due, among other factors, the conservative political context, the asymmetry of resources between the counselors, the little substantive participation of the actors who attend its meetings, either counselor or not, and in particular, the reduced influence of the members in its decision-making process. In public management of Mossoro, social participation, especially social control over public actions, face, today, great number of difficulties to be held. The study recognizes that, in such circumstances, the council partially fulfills the role for which it was created, what does not impede, however, be characterized as an important deliberative space, since it allows the participation of representatives of the various segments of the state, society, their demands and intentions. Overcoming such obstacles moves through the interest of civil society to wake up and fight for the spaces in these institutions.