A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

O percurso gerativo de sentido aplicado à análise documental de textos narrativos de ficção: perspectivas de utilização em bibliotecas universitárias

Pós-graduação em Ciência da Informação - FFC

Filosofia com crianças: estudo de uma proposta paulista e considerações a partir da ética

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

O ensino da filosofia como criação de conceitos

A presente dissertação objetiva analisar os desafios e contribuições da noção ‘criação de conceitos’ no pensamento de Gilles Deleuze para o ensino da filosofia. Apresentamos o ensino de filosofia no Brasil como um problema histórico e político, partindo dos pressupostos de que a instabilidade de inclusão e exclusão desse ensino foi o resultado dos interesses da ordem social vigente. Com a recente inserção da filosofia nos currículos de ensino das escolas de educação básica essa discussão passou a ser preocupação da comunidade filosófica, pelo fato de saber em que sentido o ensino da filosofia pode ser considerado o elemento da diferença na educação. Nesse sentido, procuramos mostrar outra via de conceber o ensino da filosofia, que é a proposta da filosofia como criação de conceitos da filosofia deleuzeana construindo um diálogo com o ensino da filosofia. Observamos que é um grande desafio para os professores de filosofia, construir a experiência da criação de conceitos em sala de aula, isso significa fazer do horizonte da repetição um ato de criação. No entanto, acreditamos que esse desafio nos permite pensar os problemas do momento atual e fazer dele a realização de algo novo para a educação e ao ensino da filosofia. Pensar o ensino da filosofia como criação de conceitos é fazer dos conteúdos, currículo e didática movimento de construção e desconstrução e, somente nessa direção podemos construir um novo aluno, uma nova aula, um novo professor e, por conseguinte, uma nova educação.

O ensino da filosofia no limiar da contemporâneidade: o que faz o filósofo quando seu ofício é ser professor de filosofia

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente

O presente livro pretende delinear uma possível interpretação do behaviorismo radical como teoria da mente, o que significa, em outros termos, contextualizá-lo no âmbito das discussões da filosofia da mente. Em que implica, exatamente, essa contextualização? Possivelmente existem muitas diferenças entre o behaviorismo radical e as teorias que compõem a filosofia da mente, inclusive diferenças de agenda: o primeiro surge como uma proposta de filosofia da ciência do comportamento, e as segundas foram desenvolvidas para tratar de questões que permeiam a filosofia desde o seu surgimento entre os gregos. O sentido da presente contextualização, portanto, é simplesmente o de tratar de alguns temas da filosofia da mente a partir da óptica behaviorista radical, mas sempre tendo em vista que esse trabalho não esgotará todos os problemas e todas as questões que formam essa subdivisão da filosofia. Pretende-se neste livro contextualizar o behaviorismo radical na filosofia da mente por meio de três atividades. A primeira delas consiste em apresentar uma resposta possível à questão O que é a mente? . A segunda delas, por sua vez, demanda o tratamento de outra questão, a saber, Qual a natureza da mente?. À primeira questão subjaz o problema de se delimitar que coisas ou fenômenos são considerados mentais. Trata-se, portanto, da busca de uma definição conceitual da mente. Já a segunda questão é endereçada à ontologia do mental, isto é, às características essenciais à sua existência. Em seu turno, a terceira atividade não possui uma questão específica, mas nem por isso deixa de ser importante: consiste na análise de algumas teses, problemas e questões apresentadas pelas teorias da mente através do ponto de vista behaviorista radical. Espera-se que essas atividades representem, ao menos, um passo em direção à construção de uma teoria behaviorista radical da mente.

O ensino de Filosofia no Brasil: história e perspectivas para o filosofar

The following article has as the main concern and tendency to think and offer some ideas on the Teaching of Philosophy in Brazil and historically conceptions constructed about the philosophy, this constituting itself a challenge to Brazilian education and the formation of people. It is pertinent to the conciliation in the Teaching of Philosophy, from the History of Philosophy, the philosophize and not to join immediately to philosophical systems and their conceptions, but that is structured from the real problems of each situation and experienced in education space and society in general as an macrostructure that requires reflection about your problems. Note that, during the 500 years of education in Brazil, especially in this aspect of Teaching Philosophy characteristics with respect to the concerns and the philosophical problems have been modified, initially, a more obedient to the rules, passing, sometime later, the valorization of polemic and, finally, the systematization of reality and reflection of the real problems faced by a society such as the Brazilian. In this sense, it is proposed to understand and analyze the Teaching of Philosophy in both, the primary and secondary education and, especially, in the university.

A virada informacional na Filosofia: alguma novidade para o estudo da mente?

The concept of information is analyzed starting from Adams’ hypothesis in The Informational Turn in Philosophy, according to which there has been a far-reaching turn in Philosophy following the publication of Turing’s article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”. Adams maintains that new guidelines are being indicated in philosophical research, having the concept of “information” as the basis for treatment of classical problems, such as the relationships between mind-body, perception-action, and the nature of knowledge, amongst others. Partially agreeing with Adams, we believe, however, that his hypothesis faces difficulties, the most fundamental of which concerns the different meanings given to the concept of information. We argue that even though the concept of information underlying the mechanicist proposal of Turing, according to which “to think is to compute”, is indeed being employed in Philosophy, this is not because of its mechanistic nature, but mainly due to the representationist presupposition dominant in this area. From this point of view, the informational turn in philosophy would not provide any great novelty, given that since the earliest days philosophical approaches to the nature of mind have always been mainly representationist. The novelty would not lie specifically in the Turing thesis, but in reflections on the nature of information, especially ecological information, and its relation to action.

Auto-organização e autonomia em Hegel: uma abordagem a partir das linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito

The German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) had as one of his thesis in the doctorate the affirmation that philosophy can only be properly taken as a system. He intends with that to point out the identity between thinking and being. This is, for Hegel, the task of philosophy, i. e., to bring together all that was set apart. This position can be recognized in all his works and it is tried here to exemplify it in The Philosophy of Right and in special in the section dedicated to the abstract right. This one is the first moment of the text in question that begins with the statement of the dignity of the person confirmed in the property. The following moments make evident that the formal ones are also results. It becomes clear in this way that the all the moments create together an ongoing organization, disorganization and reorganization. This process reveals the relation as a constitutive element of thinking and being exemplified in the abstract right. Each moment overcomes the preceding one and comes out as a much more complex one. In the case of the abstract right what appears is the realization of a free subject in all that he does as the making of himself.

Acordo, reflexão e filosofia - uma análise a partir de Wittgenstein

Within the Wittgensteinian approach, the ideal of exactness, disconnected from concrete situations of language use, does not make any sense. Such an approach takes into account every and any kind of intersubjective communication, inasmuch as it is based on a previous agreement concerning the use of language and the interpretation of the world linked to it. This paper, throughout its three parts, seeks to understand this agreement, and evaluates whether or not philosophy plays a role in relation to it. To start with, the obstacles to such an agreement will be considered, namely, solipsism and private, subjective language. In the following stage, the intention is to indicate that the rupture from the subjectivist conception of language allows Wittgenstein to visualize another subject, the one incorporated by the community. From then on, the question is to verify whether reflectivity is possible in the ambit of a linguistic community or not, since the objectivity of concepts is not sought within knowledge, but within forms of life. In the third and last part, we will point to the language game metaphor correlative to the meaning emerging from the flow of life, of thought, and of culture and see how philosophy can represent a significant activity in the search for understanding that flow.

Repensando o lugar da representação, da transmissão e da experiência no ensino da Filosofia

The question that we develop in this study can be proposed as follows: can knowledge be transmitted in a representational way through an explanation in such a way that the one who is learning does not have an experience itself of what he is learning? Grounded on Hume, Deleuze, Rancière and Gallo, we aim to show that only the experience with the object can promote effective learning, for violating the thought to search by itself for its meaning and for its own understanding, and not for the mere repetition of contents that have been shared and taken as important, as we have seen in schools.

Realismo, Nominalismo e Cartesianismo: Sentido e natureza das idéias como representações do mundo

The approach about the ideas, understood as metal representations, has practically bookmarked the whole Philosophy History, since the ancient Greece to the contemporary period. A lot of interpretations have been given to the meaning and to the nature of the ideas by many schools, among them lots of Realism slopes. This paper aims to present, from a historical and epistemological fragment, some theoretical perpectives, with emphasis in the realistic, nominalist and Cartesian proposals in relation to the formation and nature of the ideas.

A materailidade no caminho da efetivação do Espírito na Filosofia de Hegel

Hegel’s identification with idealism may not apprehend adequately his philosophical thinking if one takes it as a definitive and absolute determination because he is a dialectical thinker or even better speculative. In this sense the moment of materiality cannot be just put aside as a contingency but it is more the opposition through which the spirit fulfills itself. This one cannot be what it is without assuming the materiality as well as the matter cannot be effective without being overtaken in the spirit. The totality appointed by Hegel in the absolute spirit means precisely to know and to recognize one another in the other and also by the other as itself. The spirit only raises to itself insofar it assumes its opposition in matter and by being determined it determines itself but this cannot be fulfilled anywhere but in the matter. In the same way the matter cannot be effective without going beyond itself or being considered in thought, that is not as well establishing itself. If the spirit and the matter are effective insofar they are in relation with one another then the primacy of one over the other can only be understood as a result and not as a starting point. In this way the first moment must not be taken as something static but as coming to be.

A filosofia do direito no sistema filosófico hegeliano

The Hegelian philosophy is presented as a progress in relation to other philosophies and it offers to take in itself all the other demonstrations. Thereby, Hegel intends to carry out his philosophical effort towards the establishment of a philosophical system. It is a comprehension recognized and exposed by Hegel in his doctoral thesis, i.e., that philosophy only becomes possible as a system. In this sense, the treatment dispensed to each one of his works necessarily evokes a relationship with all other. An work taken in isolation gets the feeling that something else should be presented, however, every work written by Hegel also contemplates a relation with his other works. In this sense, the objective here is to considerate Hegel’s Philosophy of Law in his philosophical system seeking to explicit its specific place, as well as its transit among the works of the thinker as a whole. The Philosophy of Law finds its particular moment in the ambit of the objective spirit or during the subjective spirit’s effectuation. However, it is assumed here the perspective that the Philosophy of Law represents, as the objective spirit does, a moment of mediation as well as a there-being whereby the absolute spirit’s effectuation would happen. Furthermore, Hegel’s Philosophy represents the presentation of what he considers as extremely important in philosophy, that is precisely, the need to sublate the separation between man and the world. It is not enough for Hegel, the affirmation of the being and the thinking in itself, but it is required to confirm them in their being other that will be evinced being itself. Thus, Philosophy is given as a reconstruction or as the factual knowledge as a science ceasing to be so only love of learning. This means in other words that philosophy deals with the world, in the world and for the world being much more than a speech to the world to be the talk of the world itself. If philosophy is the owl of Minerva who always arrives late, she does it for the reasons of the other to be recognized.

A Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras de São José do Rio Preto no período de 1957 a 1964: estudo de uma instituição escolar

According to the existing literature, the FFCL of São José do Rio Preto had a pioneering role as regards the organization and management of higher education. This article aims to discuss the originality/innovativeness of the educational project of this institution in the period from 1957 to 1964, based on an analysis of departmental organization and student participation. In order to do so, we use documents about the creation process of the FFCL, reports of courses, and minutes of departmental meetings and of the Academic Philosophical Center. The results show that, indeed, this institution was organized in three departments, though these operated in consonance with the chair system. Student participation varied from equal representation to the representation of a single student per class. Thus, the results show that the innovative/revolutionary character of this institution was exaggerated in the existing literature and may have contributed to the existing “mysticism” in the city as regards the history and the importance of this institution.