L'herència deweyana: la Philosophy for Children de Matthew Lipman i les bases del coneixement

L'objectiu d'aquest treball s'emmarca dintre del que tradicionalment s'ha anomenat teoria del coneixement, perquè pretén examinar alguns conceptes bàsics que fonamenten i participen en el procés de coneixement. Tot això, des duna perspectiva clarament pragmatista i, més específicament, deweyana. Optar per una perspectiva clarament deweyana suposa una reformulació de nocions tradicionalment emprades per la filosofia en general i per la teoria del coneixement en particular. Els primers conceptes afectats són els de "filosofia" i "coneixement", que hauran de ser reconstruïts. Però si la noció de coneixement ha de ser replantejada, també ho haurà de ser la qüestió de les seves bases: en el millor dels casos, les bases tradicionals del coneixement no podran ser interpretades com fins ara; en el pitjor dels casos, caldrà substituir-les per noves bases. És evident que no es pot construir un nou edifici sobre vells fonaments. Així, l'anàlisi de les bases del coneixement haurà d'incidir en les diferències respecte a la interpretació tradicional del coneixement. Aquesta investigació estableix, com a hipòtesi inicial, que la noció reconstruïda de coneixement té com a condicions de possibilitat - el que hem anomenat "bases del coneixement" - l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici. Si és cert que són condicions de possibilitat del coneixement, aleshores haurien d'aparèixer com a nocions fonamentals de qualsevol teoria del coneixement - sempre que s'acceptin d'entrada els pressupòsits pragmatistes. D'altra banda, el coneixement sempre ha estat vinculat a l'educació. Així, segons la visió tradicional, el coneixement era substancial, mentre que l'educació (identificada amb la instrucció) era el procés pel qual s'adquiria aquesta fi-en-si. Ara bé, que el coneixement ja no sigui substancial sinó instrumental no significa que desaparegui la seva íntima relació amb l'educació, sinó que - necessàriament - es replantegi: l'educació passa a ser el procés obert, social, de diàleg, en el qual es desenvolupa el coneixement; un coneixement que ja no és un fi-en-si sinó que retroalimenta el mateix procés "educatiu", enriquint-lo. Hem dit que les condicions de possibilitat del coneixement són l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici. Però, alhora, aquests resulten ser també els fonaments filosòfics de l'educació; respondre realment a les necessitats dels individus i de la societat. Experiència, recerca, diàleg i judici sorgeixen tant de la mateixa naturalesa de la filosofia com de la naturalesa de l'educació. Són alhora elements d'una filosofia reconstruïda i assumpcions del paradigma reflexiu en l'educació. Així doncs, podríem dir que el judici, l'experiència de l'individu i la comunitat de recerca (aquesta en tant que context en què es donen el diàleg filosòfic i la recerca) esdevenen pressupòsits inevitables de la "nova" filosofia i de la "nova educació. "Aprendre a pensar pel propi compte" - que apareix com a l'objectiu de l'educació - suposa atendre a totes i cadascuna d'aquestes bases. En aquest context, la filosofia o teoria de l'educació esdevé una teoria filosòfica del coneixement: una reflexió sobre el coneixement i el pensament, sobre les condicions de possibilitat del coneixement, sobre els seus límits. Aquest plantejament s'enfronta explícitament a altres alternatives força més comunes i que volem intentar d'evitar: -un estudi de la filosofia de l'educació i/o de la teoria del coneixement simplement historicista, com a mer compendi de teories i autors ordenats més o menys cronològicament; -una reflexió abstracta sobre el coneixement, sense cap mena de contrastació empírica; -una investigació sociològica sobre el coneixement en el qual es privilegiïn els condicionaments sociològics (que no vol dir necessàriament socials) de l'adquisició del coneixement basant-se en realitats culturals i educatives existents però oblidant tot fonament filosòfic; o -una teoria sobre el coneixement de caire marcadament psicologista. Per tal d'evitar fer hipòtesis i reflexions en el buit, concretem el nostre estudi en un projecte concret: Philosophy for Children, perquè entenem que és una teoria del coneixement portada a la pràctica filosòfica; que posa en joc, doncs, les mateixes bases que garanteixen el coneixement. Així, aquesta investigació no és solament una reflexió sobre les bases epistemològiques de Philosophy for Children, ni una apologia del projecte, sinó que pretén posar i analitzar les bases d'una visió més global del coneixement prenent en consideració totes les seves vessants. En aquest sentit, Philosophy for Children en és útil en la mesura que serveix de suport concret per a la nostra anàlisi. Així doncs, establim que les bases del coneixement - en la seva acceptació pragmatista - són tres: experiència, comunitat de recerca i judici. Alhora, aquests elements són també condicions d'una educació reflexiva. Queden així estretament vinculades la filosofia i l'educació. Confirmar aquestes hipòtesis suposa una sèrie de passos: 1r. Analitzar la noció de filosofia que hi ha al darrera d'aquesta concepció del coneixement. No pretenem que les nostres conclusions siguin vàlides universalment (trairíem el mateix esperit pragmatista!) sinó solament que ho són en l'espai que queda delimitat per una determinada manera d'entendre la filosofia. 2n. Investigar cadascuna de les bases del coneixement en el context de les filosofies de Dewey i , especialment, de Lipman per tal d'oferir-ne una interpretació i veure en quina mesura es vinculen amb el coneixement. Això suposarà, en algun cas, recórrer a algun altre autor, per tal d'afinar més en la demarcació del concepte en qüestió. 3r. Clarificar el concepte d'educació relacionat amb el coneixement i establir els lligams corresponents amb cadascuna de les bases analitzades. Un cop fets aquests passos esperem que quedarà manifest que l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici són bases del coneixement i, alhora, elements essencials de qualsevol procés educatiu. Tot això, a més, ha d'anar acompanyat de l'exigència d'un paper actiu del filòsof en el procés educatiu. No n'hi ha prou amb "baixar la filosofia del cel a la terra"; cal que, a més, aquest descens repercuteixi en la manera com l'home es relaciona amb els altres i amb el seu entorn. Només així podrà ser superat el vell dualisme entre pensament i acció.

Dissonant Voices : Philosophy, Children's Literature, and Perfectionist Education

Dissonant Voices has a twofold aspiration. First, it is a philosophical treatment of everyday pedagogical interactions between children and their elders, between teachers and pupils. More specifically it is an exploration of the possibilities to go on with dissonant voices that interrupt established practices – our attunement – in behaviour, practice and thinking. Voices that are incomprehensible or expressions that are unacceptable, morally or otherwise. The text works on a tension between two inclinations: an inclination to wave off, discourage, or change an expression that is unacceptable or unintelligible; and an inclination to be tolerant and accept the dissonant expression as doing something worthwhile, but different. The second aspiration is a philosophical engagement with children’s literature. Reading children’s literature becomes a form of philosophising, a way to explore the complexity of a range of philosophical issues. This turn to literature marks a dissatisfaction with what philosophy can accomplish through argumentation and what philosophy can do with a particular and limited set of concepts for a subject, such as ethics. It is a way to go beyond philosophising as the founding of theories that justify particular responses. The philosophy of dissonance and children’s literature becomes a way to destabilise justifications of our established practices and ways of interacting. The philosophical investigations of dissonance are meant to make manifest the possibilities and risks of engaging in interactions beyond established agreement or attunements. Thinking of the dissonant voice as an expression beyond established practices calls for improvisation. Such improvisations become a perfectionist education where both the child and the elder, the teacher and the student, search for as yet unattained forms of interaction and take responsibility for every word and action of the interaction. The investigation goes through a number of picture books and novels for children such as Harry Potter, Garmann’s Summer, and books by Shaun Tan, Astrid Lindgren and Dr. Seuss as well narratives by J.R.R. Tolkien, Henrik Ibsen, Jane Austen and Henry David Thoreau. These works of fiction are read in conversation with philosophical works of, and inspired by, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, their moral perfectionism and ordinary language philosophy.

Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

'In Charge of the Truffula Seeds' : On Children's Literature, Rationality and Children's Voices in Philosophy

In this paper I investigate how philosophy can speak for children and how children can have a voice in philosophy and speak for philosophy. I argue that we should understand children as responsible rational individuals who are involved in their own philosophical inquiries and who can be involved in our own philosophical investigations-not because of their rational abilities, but because we acknowledge them as conversational partners, acknowledge their reasons as reasons, and speak for them as well as let them speak for us and our rational community. In order to argue this I turn, first, to Gareth Matthews' philosophy of childhood and suggest a reconstruction of some of his concepts in line with the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Second, in order to examine more closely our conceptions of rationality and our pictures of children, I consider the children's books, The Lorax and Where is My Sister? and Henrik Ibsen's play, The Wild Duck.

The Philosophy of Dissonant Children : Stanley Cavell's Wittgensteinian Philosophical Therapies as an Educational Conversation

Education is often understood as a process whereby children come to conform to the norms teachers believe should govern our practices. This picture problematically presumes that educators know in advance what it means for children to go on the way that is expected of them. In this essay Viktor Johansson suggests a revision of education, through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell, that can account for both the attunement in our practices and the possible dissonance that follows when the teacher and child do not go on together. There is an anxiety generated by the threat of disharmony in our educational undertakings that may drive teachers toward philosophy in educational contexts. Here Johansson offers a philosophical treatment of this intellectual anxiety that teachers may experience when they, upon meeting dissonant children, search for epistemic justifications of their practices—a treatment whereby dissonant children can support teachers in dissolving their intellectual frustrations.

The Development of Science Education Research in Brazil and Contributions from the History and Philosophy of Science

Over the last 50 years a new research area, science education research, has arisen and undergone singular development worldwide. In the specific case of Brazil, research in science education first appeared systematically 40 years ago, as a consequence of an overall renovation in the field of science education. This evolution was also related to the political events taking place in the country. We will use the theoretical work of Rene Kaes on the development of groups and institutions as a basis for our discussion of the most important aspects that have helped the area of science education research develop into an institution and kept it operating as such. The growth of this area of research can be divided into three phases: The first was related to its beginning and early configurations; the second consisted of a process of consolidation of this institution; and the third consists of more recent developments, characterised by a multiplicity of research lines and corresponding challenges to be faced. In particular, we will analyse the special contributions to this study gleaned from the field known as the history and philosophy of science.

The informational turn in Philosophy: any novelty in the study of Mind?

The concept of information is analyzed starting from Adams' hypothesis in The Informational Turn in Philosophy, according to which there has been a far-reaching turn in Philosophy following the publication of Turing's article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". Adams maintains that new guidelines are being indicated in philosophical research, having the concept of "information" as the basis for treatment of classical problems, such as the relationships between mind-body, perception-action, and the nature of knowledge, amongst others. Partially agreeing with Adams, we believe, however, that his hypothesis faces difficulties, the most fundamental of which concerns the different meanings given to the concept of information. We argue that even though the concept of information underlying the mechanicist proposal of Turing, according to which "to think is to compute", is indeed being employed in Philosophy, this is not because of its mechanistic nature, but mainly due to the representationist presupposition dominant in this area. From this point of view, the informational turn in philosophy would not provide any great novelty, given that since the earliest days philosophical approaches to the nature of mind have always been mainly representationist. The novelty would not lie specifically in the Turing thesis, but in reflections on the nature of information, especially ecological information, and its relation to action.

The Rechtslehre doctrine and Kant's philosophy of history

The text is divided in two phases. In the first phase, consisting of three parts, the main concepts of Kant's Doctrine of Right are considered in a comprehensive approach related to: the issue of the relations between natural right and positive right, problem closely connected to that of the relations between natural state and civil state, private right and public right; to the doctrine of property and its connection with political right. on treating the right in its several types, we intend to appoint the practical reasoning as a background of the Doctrine. In the second phase, concerning its last section, the consideration on the presence of the practical reasoning into the right is placed before some specificities of Kant's phylosophy of history, with the intent of establishing the possible relation between Rechtslehre and that philosophy.

Humanization of health care: a reflexive theoretical essay based on the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Pedagogical practices carried out during an in-service teachers education project: approaching history and philosophy of science to physics teaching

We report here part of a research project developed by the Science Education Research Group, titled: "Teachers’ Pedagogical Practices and formative processes in Science and Mathematics Education" which main goal is the development of coordinated research that can generate a set of subsidies for a reflection on the processes of teacher training in Sciences and Mathematics Education. One of the objectives was to develop continuing education activities with Physics teachers, using the History and Philosophy of Science as conductors of the discussions and focus of teaching experiences carried out by them in the classroom. From data collected through a survey among local Science, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Mathematics teachers in Bauru, a São Paulo State city, we developed a continuing education proposal titled “The History and Philosophy of Science in the Physics teachers’ pedagogical practice”, lasting 40 hours of lessons. We followed the performance of five teachers who participated in activities during the 2008 first semester and were teaching Physics at High School level. They designed proposals for short courses, taking into consideration aspects of History and Philosophy of Science and students’ alternative conceptions. Short courses were applied in real classrooms situations and accompanied by reflection meetings. This is a qualitative research, and treatment of data collected was based on content analysis, according to Bardin [1].