Anchovia landivarensis, a new species of Anchovy (Pisces: Engraulidae) from Belize, Central America : with comments on related species / David W. Greenfield and Terry Greenfield.

v.65:no.9(1975) [Incomplete]

Eupomacentrus diencaeus Jordan and Rutter; a valid species of damselfish from the western tropical Atlantic [by] David W. Greenfield and Loren P. Woods.

v.65:no.2(1974)

Camptopterohelea, a new genus of Ceratopogonidae, from the Philippines (Diptera) [By] W. W. Wirth and A. A. Hubert.

v.42:no.7(1960)

Macfarlaniella, a new genus of false spider mites (Acarina: Tenuipalpidae) [by] Edward W. Baker and A. Earl Pritchard.

v.44:no.15(1962)

The micrographic dictionary; a guide to the examination and investigation of the structure and nature of microscopic objects, by J. W. Griffith and Arthur Henfrey.

2, Plates

New genera and subgenera of augochlorine bees (Hymenoptera: Halictidae) / by Michael S. Engel, Robert W. Brooks, and Douglas Yanega.

no.5

Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.

Academic Institutions and the Olympic Movement

This paper was presented in the V Forum on Sport, Education and Culture Forum by the IOC undertaken in Beijing, in October, 2006. This aim of this paper is to explore the potential of the relations between the Olympic Movement and academic institutions, and in particular the role of universities.

Political institutions and the development of telecomunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries’ political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.

Institutions and the Scale Effect

Growth models which imply a scale effect are commonly refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. A focus on the extent of the market as opposed to the scale of the country has led recent studies to reconsider the role that country scale plays when conditioning on other factors. We consider a variant of a simple learning by doing model to account for the potential role for institutions in determining the strength – and direction – of the scale effect. Using cross-country data, we find a significant interaction between property rights institutions and the effect of scale on long-run growth: In countries with poor property rights institutions, scale is positively related with income per capita; where property rights institutions are good, higher scale is associated with lower per capita ncomes. We find no evidence of such role for contracting institutions.

Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts.

Is institutional quality a major driver of economic development? This paper tackles the question by focusing on the within-country variation of growth rates of GDP per capita. While previous attempts using this methodology have controlled for many of the standard de- terminants of the empirical growth literature, we argue that such ap- proach is not adequate if good institutions are the main reason behind decisions to invest in human or physical capital accumulation or to engage in international trade. Our regressions exclude the proximate causes of growth in order to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutional quality. Perhaps surprisingly, we nd no support for the thesis that institutional quality improves economic growth. These results encourage a reconsideration of the evidence provided elsewhere in the literature.

Contracting Institutions and Development

The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.

Institutions and prosperity

This article reviews ‘Pillars of Prosperity’ by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson and ‘Why Nations Fail’ by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. Both books are focussed on the role of institutions in determining the wealth of nations and the review compares and contrasts the different approaches contained in the two texts. The review also attempts to locate the texts within the broader literature in development and political economics and to link them to other recent work in these areas.