Canada Park Official Award Commemorative Medal

Obverse: Canada state emblem, a maple leaf, within the leaf there is a group of trees. Reverse: The area abounds in tree tops, all of them bending toward the center of the medal.

Whiteness scholarship in early childhood education

This paper explores how whiteness scholarship can support deep engagement with both historical and contemporary forms of whiteness and racism in early childhood education. To this point, the uptake of whiteness scholarship in the field of early childhood has focused predominantly on autobiographical narratives. These narratives recount white educators’ stories of ‘becoming aware’ or ‘unmasking’ their whiteness. In colonising contexts including Australia, New Zealand and Canada, understanding how whiteness operates in different ways and what this means for educational research and practice, can support researchers and educators to identify and describe more fully the impacts of subtle forms of racism in their everyday practices. In this paper, whiteness is explored in a broader sense as: a form of property; an organising principle for institutional behaviours and practices; and as a fluid identity or subject position. These three intersecting elements of whiteness are drawn on to analyse data from a doctoral study about embedding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives in early childhood education curricula in two Australian urban childcare settings. Analysis is focused on how whiteness operated within the research site and research processes, along with the actions, inaction and talk of two educators engaged in embedding work. Findings show that both the researcher and educators reinforced, rather than reduced the impacts of whiteness and racism, despite the best of intentions.

Open access and soft power: Chinese voices in international scholarship

Networked digital technologies and Open Access (OA) are transforming the processes and institutions of research, knowledge creation and dissemination globally: enabling new forms of collaboration, allowing researchers to be seen and heard in new ways and reshaping relationships between stakeholders across the global academic publishing system. This article draws on Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘Soft Power’ to explore the role that OA is playing in helping to reshape academic publishing in China. It focusses on two important areas of OA development: OA journals and national-level repositories. OA is being supported at the highest levels, and there is potential for it to play an important role in increasing the status and impact of Chinese scholarship. Investments in OA also have the potential to help China to re-position itself within international copyright discourses: moving beyond criticism for failure to enforce the rights of foreign copyright owners and progressing an agenda that places greater emphasis on equality of access to the resources needed to foster innovation. However, the potential for OA to help China to build and project its soft power is being limited by the legacies of the print era, as well as the challenges of efficiently governing the national research and innovation systems.

A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoe wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to he bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Reforming technology company incentive programs for achieving knowledge-based economic development:a Brazil-Australia comparative study

This doctoral thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of incentives to technology-based firms as a strategy to promote knowledge-based economic development (KBED). To remain competitive, technology-based firms must innovate and seek new markets; therefore, this study aims to propose an incentive model to technology-based firms as a strategy to promote knowledge-based urban development, according to framework described by Yigitcanlar (2011). This is an exploratory and descriptive research with a qualitative approach. Surveys were carried out with national trade associations that represented technology-based firms both in Brazil and Australia. After analysing the surveys, structured interviews were conducted with government representatives, trade associations and businessmen who had used financial support by the federal government. When comparing both countries, the study found the importance of direct incentives through tax incentives, for it is a less bureaucratic, quicker and more direct process for firms. We suggest to include the terms incentives in the framework of knowledge-based urban development, as one of the pillars that contribute to knowledge-based economic development.

Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

The EC context for private forestry incentive evaluation.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.