[Rome. Basilica di San Giovanni in Laterano, baptistère]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 521a

[Rome. Basilica di San Giovanni in Laterano, cloître]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 518

[Rome. Basilica di San Giovanni in Laterano, baptistère]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 519

[Rome. Basilica di Sant'Agnese fuori le mura]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 544

[Rome. Basilica di Sant'Agnese fuori le mura]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 545

[Rome. Basilica di Sant'Agnese fuori le mura]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 546

[Rome. Basilica di Sant'Agnese fuori le mura]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 547

[Rome. Basilica di Sant'Agnese fuori le mura, candélabre]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 548

[Rome. Basilica di San Clemente al Laterano]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 509

[Rome. Basilica di San Clemente al Laterano]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 510

[Rome. Basilica di San Clemente al Laterano]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 512

[Rome. Basilica di San Clemente al Laterano]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 511

[Rome. Tomba di Cecilia Metella]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 609

[Rome. Tomba di Cecilia Metella]

Référence bibliographique : Weigert, 610

Local home bias: Theory and new empirical evidence from Italy

This thesis examines the literature on local home bias, i.e. investor preference towards geographically nearby stocks, and investigates the role of firm’s visibility, profitability, and opacity in explaining such behavior. While firm’s visibility is expected to proxy for the behavioral root originating such a preference, firm’s profitability and opacity are expected to capture the informational one. I find that less visible, and more profitable and opaque firms, conditionally to the demand, benefit from being headquartered in regions characterized by a scarcity of listed firms (local supply of stocks). Specifically, research estimates suggest that firms headquartered in regions with a poor supply of stocks would be worth i) 11 percent more if non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque; ii) 16 percent more if profitable; and iii) 28 percent more if both profitable and opaque. Overall, as these features are able to explain most, albeit not all, of the local home bias effect, I reasonably argue and then assess that most of the preference for local is determined by a successful attempt to exploit local information advantage (60 percent), while the rest is determined by a mere (irrational) feeling of familiarity with the local firm (40 percent). Several and significant methodological, theoretical, and practical implications come out.