Forest Policy Reform in Brazil

Rapid deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, caused by economic, social, and policy factors, has focused global and national attention on protecting this valuable forest resource. In response, Brazil reformed its federal forest laws in 2006, creating new regulatory, development, and incentive policy instruments and institutions. Federal forestry responsibilities are maintained within the ministry of the environment; its regulatory agency responsibilities are divided among three different branches of the agency; many powers are delegated to states and municipalities; and a new private concession system is being developed. These reforms offer promise to improve forest protection and management in Brazil but must overcome significant institutional and social resistance for success.

Least-Cost Planning and electricity industry reform in Australia

Least-Cost Planning played a key role in the development of the energy efficiency and renewable energy industries in the USA, It has not been widely used elsewhere, largely due to differences in other nations' regulatory environments and the emergence of competitive markets as the dominant paradigm for electricity planning, Least-Cost Planning, however may over valuable insights for creating regulatory framework for competitive electricity markers. This paper examines some lessons which may be extracted from an analysis of the Least-Cost Planning experience in the USA and suggests how these lessons might prove beneficial in guiding Australia's electricity industry reform, This analysis demonstrates how market-based reforms may be flawed if they ignore the history of previous reform processes.

Caught Between Theory and Practice: Government, Market, and Regulatory Failure in Electricity Sector Reforms

The world-wide electricity sector reforms of the early 1990s have revealed the considerable complexities of making market driven reforms in network and infrastructure industries. This paper reflects on the experiences to date with the process and outcomes of marketbased electricity reforms across less-developed, transition and developed economies. The reforms outcomes suggest similar problems facing the electricity sector of these countries though their contexts vary significantly. Many developing and developed economies continue to have investment inadequacy concerns and the need to balance economy efficiency, sustainability and social equity after more than two decades of experience with reforms. We also use a case study of selected countries that in many respects represent the current state of the reform though they are rarely examined. Nepal, Belarus and Ireland are chosen as country-specific case studies for this purpose. We conclude that the changing dynamics of the electricity supply industry (ESI) and policy objectives imply that analysing the success and failure of reforms will indeed remain a complex process.

The financial system reform in China: the lesson learnt from the global financial crisis

This paper reviews the impact of the global financial crisis on financial system reform in China. Scholars and practitioners have critically questioned the efficiencies of the Anglo- American principal-agent model of corporate governance which promotes shareholder-value maximisation. Should China continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform? This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature, regulatory reports and news articles from the financial press. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, the paper considers the risks in opening up China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. The paper outlines a critique of shareholder-capitalism in relation to the German team-production model of corporate governance, promoting a “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis, the paper explores numerous implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model. China needs to follow its own financial reform through understanding its particular economy. The global financial crisis might help China rethink the nature of corporate governance, identify its weakness and assess the current reform agenda.

The post-financial crisis challenges for corporate governance and banking reform in China

The purpose of this paper is to review the impact of the global financial crisis on banking reform in China. The significant doubt concerning the efficiencies of Anglo-American model of corporate governance has raised a critical political question amongst scholars and practitioners as to whether China should continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform. This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature and regulatory reports. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, which promotes greater liberalization and less control, the paper considers the risks in opening China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. A critique of shareholder-capitalism is outlined in relation to the German’s “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis the paper explores a number of implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model applicable to the Chinese context.

Investment and economic reform in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Tax performance and reform in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Includes bibliography

Port privatization, labour reform and social equity

Includes bibliography

Potential and limits of health management reform in Chile

Includes bibliography

Making infrastructure reform in Latin America work for the poor

Includes bibliography

The market and water management reform in Peru

Includes bibliography

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

WTO oriented telecommunications reform in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Socialist Republic of Vietnam's reform process in the telecommunications sector - obligations imposed on Vietnam by the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) - the regulatory framework required by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the associated, telecommunications-specific WTO agreements - institutional and political problems that may hinder full implementation of these international obligations.