Potential theory on metric spaces

This work revolves around potential theory in metric spaces, focusing on applications of dyadic potential theory to general problems associated to functional analysis and harmonic analysis. In the first part of this work we consider the weighted dual dyadic Hardy's inequality over dyadic trees and we use the Bellman function method to characterize the weights for which the inequality holds, and find the optimal constant for which our statement holds. We also show that our Bellman function is the solution to a stochastic optimal control problem. In the second part of this work we consider the problem of quasi-additivity formulas for the Riesz capacity in metric spaces and we prove formulas of quasi-additivity in the setting of the tree boundaries and in the setting of Ahlfors-regular spaces. We also consider a proper Harmonic extension to one additional variable of Riesz potentials of functions on a compact Ahlfors-regular space and we use our quasi-additivity formula to prove a result of tangential convergence of the harmonic extension of the Riesz potential up to an exceptional set of null measure

Shunt active compensation based on the Conservative Power Theory current's decomposition

Considering the operation of shunt active compensators, such as active power filters, this paper proposes possible compensation strategies by means of the recent formulation of the Conservative Power Theory (CPT). The CPT current's decomposition results in several current components, which are associated with specific load characteristics (power transfer, energy storage, unbalances and/or non linearities). These current components are used for the definition of different compensation strategies, which can be selective in terms of minimizing particular disturbing effects. In order to validate the applicability of these new compensation strategies, simulation and experimental results for three-phase four-wire systems are presented. © 2011 IEEE.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

On the theory of the moon : and on the pertubations of the planets /

Issued in 11 pts., 1833-1861.

On the theory of the moon, and on the perturbations of the planets /

A new edition, 1834 (x, 115, [1], 15, xxxii p.) forms the first part of the author's treatise on this subject, issued in 10 parts, 1834-61.

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation:an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

A questão da licenciatura em Educação Fisica : a transição a pratica profissional

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Contribuições da praxologia motriz para a educação fisica escolar : ensino fundamental

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Testing insect movement theory: empirical analysis of pest data routinely collected from agricultural crops

Observations of an insect's movement lead to theory on the insect's flight behaviour and the role of movement in the species' population dynamics. This theory leads to predictions of the way the population changes in time under different conditions. If a hypothesis on movement predicts a specific change in the population, then the hypothesis can be tested against observations of population change. Routine pest monitoring of agricultural crops provides a convenient source of data for studying movement into a region and among fields within a region. Examples of the use of statistical and computational methods for testing hypotheses with such data are presented. The types of questions that can be addressed with these methods and the limitations of pest monitoring data when used for this purpose are discussed. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

A educação Pré-Escolar e o 1.º ciclo do Ensino Básico: dinâmicas de cidadania em contextos de práticas curriculares e didáticas

Mestrado (PES II), Educação Pré-Escolar e Ensino do 1.º Ciclo do Ensino Básico, 1 de Julho de 2014, Universidade dos Açores.

In dialogue with self and the world: Cape Verdean migrant pregnancy in Portugal

The voices of Cape Verdean migrant student mothers in Portugal are examined in the light of Archer’s (2003) theory on the ‘inner dialogue’. The article frames the mothers as complex social actors who respond to the uncertainties surrounding unplanned pregnancy through self-reflection and dialogue with and about the world, turning the disorientation of unexpected motherhood into a meaningful project. The analysis reveals how the women’s agency is located within the wider influences of kinship and gender norms and how these are already negotiated in the case of unconfirmed pregnancy.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

On a problem of Alfréd Rényi

Alfréd Rényi, in a paper of 1962, A new approach to the theory ofEngel's series, proposed a problem related to the growth of theelements of an Engel's series. In this paper, we reformulate andsolve Rényi's problem for both, Engel's series and Pierceexpansions.