The law of Moses as a rule of national and individual life and the enigmatical enunciation of divine principles and purposes /

Includes index.

«Corruption» and social and economic criminal law: criminology, criminal policy, political science and law&economics - a new idea about criminal liability of legal entities

Abstract: If we think there is a significant number of legal offshore in the globalized world, then there is not even a global consensus about what «corruption» is. The «illegal corruption» in a country may be legal in another. Moreover, the great global corruption is above the law or above democratic States. And not all democratic States are «Rule of Law». Therefore, the solution is global earlier in time and space law, democratic, free and true law. While the human being does not reach a consensus of what «corruption» really is, the discussion will not go further than a caricature. One of the other problems about «corruption» is that it is very difficult to establish the imputation of crimes, including «corruption» (v.g. Portugal) on some «companies», corporations. We have a juridical problem in the composition of the art. 11. of the Portuguese Penal Code.

Civilian casualties and nuclear weapons: the application of the rule of distinction

This chapter considers the possible use in armed conflict of low-yield (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion maintained that it is a cardinal principle that a State must never make civilians an object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. As international humanitarian law applies equally to any use of nuclear weapons, it is argued that there is no use of nuclear weapons that could spare civilian casualties particularly if you view the long-term health and environmental effects of the use of such weaponry.

Rule of selection of delinquents, 1801 April 8

Four-page handwritten draft of a public statement to the students from the Harvard Faculty related to the amendment of College Law XVIII, Chapter IV concerning the suppression of concealed disorders. The document appears to be in the hand of President Joseph Willard.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

Whitehall Ceiling: The Wise Rule of James

Peter Paul Rubens; 25 ft.x 18 ft. 9/64 in.; oil on canvas adhered to canvas laid down on a laminated wood support

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

A simple rule of thumb for elegant prehension

Reaching out to grasp an object (prehension) is a deceptively elegant and skilled behavior. The movement prior to object contact can be described as having two components [1], the movement of the hand to an appropriate location for gripping the object, the transport component, and the opening and closing of the aperture between the fingers as they prepare to grip the target, the grasp component. The grasp component is sensitive to the size of the object, so that a larger grasp aperture is formed for wider objects [1]; the maximum grasp aperture (MGA) is a little wider than the width of the target object and occurs later in the movement for larger objects [1, 2]. We present a simple model that can account for the temporal relationship between the transport and grasp components, We report the results of an experiment providing empirical support for our rule of thumb. The model provides a simple, but plausible, account of a neural control strategy that has been the center of debate over the last two decades.

Defining health law or the edgewood syndrome

ABSTRACT - The authors’ main purpose is to present ideas on defining Health Law by highlighting the particularities of the field of Health Law as well as of the teaching of this legal branch, hoping to contribute to the maturity and academic recognition of Health Law, not only as a very rich legal field but also as a powerful social instrument in the fulfillment of fundamental human rights. The authors defend that Health Law has several characteristics that distinguish it from traditional branches of law such as its complexity and multidisciplinary nature. The study of Health Law normally covers issues such as access to care, health systems organization, patients’ rights, health professionals’ rights and duties, strict liability, healthcare contracts between institutions and professionals, medical data protection and confidentiality, informed consent and professional secrecy, crossing different legal fields including administrative, antitrust, constitutional, contract, corporate, criminal, environmental, food and drug, intellectual property, insurance, international and supranational, labor/employment, property, taxation, and tort law. This is one of the reasons why teaching Health Law presents a challenge to the teacher, which will have to find the programs, content and methods appropriate to the profile of recipients which are normally non jurists and the needs of a multidisciplinary curricula. By describing academic definitions of Health Law as analogous to Edgewood, a fiction house which has a different architectural style in each of its walls, the authors try to describe which elements should compose a more comprehensive definition. In this article Biolaw, Bioethics and Human Rights are defined as complements to a definition of Health Law: Biolaw because it is the legal field that treats the social consequences that arise from technological advances in health and life sciences; Bioethics which evolutions normally influence the shape of the legal framework of Health; and, finally Human Rights theory and declarations are outlined as having always been historically linked to medicine and health, being the umbrella that must cover all the issues raised in the area of Health Law. To complete this brief incursion on the definition on Health Law the authors end by giving note of the complex relations between this field of Law and Public Health. Dealing more specifically on laws adopted by governments to provide important health services and regulate industries and individual conduct that affect the health of the populations, this aspect of Health Law requires special attention to avoid an imbalance between public powers and individual freedoms. The authors conclude that public trust in any health system is essentially sustained by developing health structures which are consistent with essential fundamental rights, such as the universal right to access health care, and that the study of Health Law can contribute with important insights into both health structures and fundamental rights in order to foster a health system that respects the Rule of Law.-------------------------- RESUMO – O objectivo principal dos autores é apresentar ideias sobre a definição de Direito da Saúde, destacando as particularidades desta área do direito, bem como do ensino deste ramo jurídico, na esperança de contribuir para a maturidade e para o reconhecimento académico do mesmo, não só como um campo juridicamente muito rico, mas, também, como um poderoso instrumento social no cumprimento dos direitos humanos fundamentais. Os autores defendem que o Direito da Saúde tem diversas características que o distinguem dos ramos tradicionais do direito, como a sua complexidade e natureza multidisciplinar. O estudo do Direito da Saúde abrangendo normalmente questões como o acesso aos cuidados, a organização dos sistemas de saúde, os direitos e deveres dos doentes e dos profissionais de saúde, a responsabilidade civil, os contratos entre instituições de saúde e profissionais, a protecção e a confidencialidade de dados clínicos, o consentimento informado e o sigilo profissional, implica uma abordagem transversal de diferentes áreas legais, incluindo os Direitos contratual, administrativo, antitrust, constitucional, empresarial, penal, ambiental, alimentar, farmacêutico, da propriedade intelectual, dos seguros, internacional e supranacional, trabalho, fiscal e penal. Esta é uma das razões pelas quais o ensino do Direito da Saúde representa um desafio para o professor, que terá de encontrar os programas, conteúdos e métodos adequados ao perfil dos destinatários, que são normalmente não juristas e às necessidades de um currículo multidisciplinar. Ao descrever as várias definições académicas de Direito da Saúde como análogas a Edgewood, uma casa de ficção que apresenta um estilo arquitectónico diferente em cada uma de suas paredes, os autores tentam encontrar os elementos que deveriam compor uma definição mais abrangente. No artigo, Biodireito, Bioética e Direitos Humanos são descritos como complementos de uma definição de Direito da Saúde: o Biodireito, dado que é o campo jurídico que trata as consequências sociais que surgem dos avanços tecnológicos na área da saúde e das ciências da vida; a Bioética cujas evoluções influenciam normalmente o quadro jurídico da Saúde; e, por fim, a teoria dos Direitos Humanos e as suas declarações as quais têm estado sempre historicamente ligadas à medicina e à saúde, devendo funcionar como pano de fundo de todas as questões levantadas na área do Direito da Saúde. Para finalizar a sua breve incursão sobre a definição de Direito da Saúde, os autores dão ainda nota das complexas relações entre este último e a Saúde Pública, onde se tratam mais especificamente as leis aprovadas pelos governos para regular os serviços de saúde, as indústrias e as condutas individuais que afectam a saúde das populações, aspecto do Direito da Saúde que requer uma atenção especial para evitar um desequilíbrio entre os poderes públicos e as liberdades individuais. Os autores concluem afirmando que a confiança do público em qualquer sistema de saúde é, essencialmente, sustentada pelo desenvolvimento de estruturas de saúde que sejam consistentes com o direito constitucional da saúde, tais como o direito universal ao acesso a cuidados de saúde, e que o estudo do Direito da Saúde pode contribuir com elementos

Drivers of China's foreign direct investment into Africa

We assess the determinants of Chinese direct investment in Africa compared with those of global FDI. We find that economic size and macroeconomic stability are positively correlated with Chinese and global FDI in Africa. Institutional variables, such as accountability and rule of law, are not significant in either case and the same can be said about FDI-aid complementarities. The presence of oil is a determinant of Chinese FDI but not of global FDI into Africa. Conversely, the openness of the economy is a determinant for global FDI but not of Chinese FDI, which appears to favour closed economies possibly due to industrial organizational concerns. While these differences accord with intuition, we find no evidence for the claim that Chinese FDI in Africa is related to non-economic governance in a specific way that differs from global practice. More refined governance indicators should be used to verify whether Chinese and global FDI into Africa remain indistinguishable on this score: we plan to do this in future research.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.