907 resultados para Public good provision
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Millions of homes previously owned by councils have been transferred to the ownership of registered social landlords. Many of these are run as private companies under the principles first set out in the Combined Code of Corporate Governance. This articled considers whether it is appropriate to apply both the principles of the Code and regulation from the Housing Corporation as forms of control over such companies, and whether extensive government regulation negates the requirement for a board comprising independent directors expected to make strategic decisions while overseeing the executive. Conflict is created when trying to run these companies with a unitary board structure adhering to Combined Code principles while considering the wider interests of the community. It is questioned whether it is inefficient to try to meet these two objectives simultaneously and whether this system produces the best results for the community, the lenders and the end users.
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This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.
Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.
Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.
Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.
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We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.
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Aquesta tesi utilitza l'anàlisi econòmica per a estudiar les hisendes locals, especialment els aspectes relacionats amb la provisió i finançament dels béns i serveis públics locals. Les hisendes locals, tant a Catalunya com a la resta d'Espanya, pateixen diversos problemes. Dos són especialment rellevants per a aquesta tesi. El primer és la reduïda dimensió dels municipis, l'altre la seva insuficient dotació financera. A la tesi es tracten aquestes dues qüestions en cinc capítols. Primer s'introdueix la problemàtica, exposant-ne els antecedents, la situació actual i la metodologia per al seu anàlisi. A continuació s'aborda la relació entre la grandària dels municipis i la seva capacitat per a proveir béns i serveis públics. De manera recurrent es produeixen debats sobre els problemes que pateixen els municipis petits. El problema més evident d'aquests municipis és el dèficit de serveis públics. Es sol argumentar que els municipis petits pateixen aquests dèficits en la provisió de serveis públics a causa de la manca d'un nombre crític d'habitants. Normalment es presenta la consolidació municipal com a solució a aquest problema. En aquest treball analitzem les diferents vessants de la qüestió dels dèficits de serveis municipals. Es continua analitzant com influeix sobre el sector privat la incapacitat per part dels municipis de prestar la quantitat i/o qualitat correcta de béns i serveis públics. Sembla clar que l'atractiu d'un hotel per als seus clients depèn tant dels serveis que ofereix com de l'entorn en què es troba. Com s'ha dit sovint "un hotel de quatre estrelles necessita un entorn de quatre estrelles". Aquests atributs que configuren l'entorn són complementaris a l'oferta privada dels serveis hotelers i són essencials a l'hora de definir les opcions de comercialització, ja que sembla raonable que diferències en les dotacions de serveis públics, capital natural i imatge de la localitat generaran diferències en els preus d'hotels que altrament són idèntics. A la següent etapa s'estudia la situació financera a la qual s'enfronten els municipis a l'hora de proveir els béns i serveis públics, especialment en el cas de les localitats amb forta implantació de l'activitat turística. L'objectiu d'aquest estudi és doble. Primer, realitzar una anàlisi i un diagnòstic del finançament als municipis turístics i, segon, discutir diferents vies de millora. En una primera part s'exposa el marc que cal tenir en compte a l'hora de considerar les qüestions de provisió de serveis públics i els consegüents aspectes pressupostaris. Després es presenta un model estilitzat de provisió de béns públics i d'estructura pressupostària que explicita, amb la intenció de portar a terme l'anàlisi economètrica, les interrelacions rellevants entre provisió de serveis públics, ingressos fiscals i despeses. Tot seguit es presenten les dades que han de servir per a una anàlisi empírica que té dues vessants. Primer, estudiar si realment els municipis amb un fort pes de l'activitat turística presenten diferències en l'àmbit pressupostari i, segon, concretar quantificar en què consisteixen i de què depenen les diferències. El sisè apartat tracta la complementarietat entre béns i serveis públics des d'un marc normatiu, posant de manifest els aspectes que ha de tenir en compte un municipi turístic en les qüestions de provisió i finançament dels béns públics i que fan que tingui un comportament diferent d'un municipi no turístic. El penúltim apartat del treball inclou la discussió i l'avaluació d'algunes propostes correctores dels problemes detectats a l'anàlisi estadística i economètrica. El treball conclou amb un resum de les principals conclusions. La tesi conclou amb una discussió dels resultats obtinguts.
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Há décadas os economistas se preocupam com o problema de calcular o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público (MCF, em inglês). Um dos maiores sucessos nessa área é o modelo de provisão de bem público com taxação distorciva de Wildasin (1984). Nós generalizamos o modelo de Wildasin para incluir uma cesta de bens públicos, ao invés de um único bem. Em seguida realizamos várias estimativas do MCF para o Brasil, algumas inclusive sem a hipótese de independência entre o nível de bem público e a oferta de trabalho, usual na literatura. Os resultados mostram que o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público no Brasil é relativamente pequeno, entre outras causas devido à pequena sensibilidade da oferta de trabalho ao gasto governamental
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This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.
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Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.
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This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).
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This research examined the transformation of public space in contemporary urban neighbourhoods of the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal. The development of neighbourhood public space remains a considerable challenge in the present changing context, with significant consequences for public life and social interaction. The findings will aid policy makers, urban planners and designers in addressing the adverse effects of the current urban growth and change, and in winning back public space for the well-being of the local community.
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The report ‘Sustainability of Open Access Services - Phase 3: The Collective Provision of Open Access Resources’ discusses the economic and institutional issues faced by those sustaining free infrastructure services. It also identifies strategies to coordinate the collective provision of infrastructure services. These considerations are valuable input for the phases 4 and 5 of the project ‘Sustainability of Open Access Services’. This body of work will lead to practical recommendations for funders and project planners to consider when initiating an infrastructure service. The report was written by Raym Crow and funded by SPARC. Several key messages from the report are of interest. Providing infrastructure services as a public good imposes specific requirements on the design of the sustainability model. The challenge is to get enough institutions to reveal their demand for the service and support this. Arguments for an institution to support can be altruism or reciprocity or there being sufficient benefit to the institution for supporting a service. Institutions can also work together on a service through collective action (collecting voluntary contributions) and cross subsidies (funding collected by offering exclusive benefits to contributors).
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The welfare of farm animals is a policy area that has increased greatly in importance in recent years. When deciding whether a proposed policy should be implemented, it can be useful for policymakers to compare the costs of the proposed improvement with the perceived benefits. The costs are relatively straightforward to calculate but little is known about the benefits. The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), a direct survey-based method, can be used to shed some light on this. This approach elicits the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the provision of some public good or service. This paper reports the results of a contingent valuation study of the value of welfare improvements for growing pigs. Attitudes and opinions with regard to form animal welfare are explored and WTP elicited for various pig welfare improvements including increases in space allowance, environmental enrichment and research into improved pig housing design. The results reveal a positive WTP for these improvements. However, it is also noteworthy that a significant proportion of the general public is willing to pay nothing for these improvements. Overall, the study illustrates the usefulness of the CVM approach as a tool for policymakers in assessing the merits of possible policy initiatives affecting the welfare of animals.
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We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e
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We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.