Financial integration and public financial institutions

This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

Development banks, risk and Basle II: some assessments

The implementation of the Basle II agreement in the financial markets of world economies has been seen as a significant advance in relation to the model enforced under the first agreement (Basle I). It is generally understood that the new agreement represents a substantial advance in relation to the first because it allows banks to better deal with the risks to which they are exposed. Nevertheless, when the application of these principles to development banks is considered it can be noted that certain inconsistencies exist, notably the fact that these institutions are typically public institutions - or at least strongly dependent on public funding - and they do not operate the payment system of the economy. Therefore, the application of the Basle rules to these institutions does not make sense. This means that Basle does not represent an appropriate set of recommendations for how these institutions should deal with their risks, whether because the proposed form of dealing with risks is inadequate, or because other relevant risks for these institutions are not covered by Basle I and II.

Cyclicality of SME Lending and Government Involvement in Banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

Cyclicality of SME lending and government involvement in banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

Estudos bioquímicos na pós-colheita de estrelítzia (Strelitzia reginae Banks ex Aiton)

Pós-graduação em Agronomia (Horticultura) - FCA

Influência da temperatura de armazenamento na qualidade das inflorescências de estrelítzia (strelitzia reginae banks ex aiton)

This work was based to study the influence of the storage temperature (cold and room temperature) in the quality of inflorescences strelitzia. The scapes were selected, labeled and there were zero problems concerning mechanical damage, disease and/or plagues. Subsequently this period, the scapes were moved randomly to recipients with water, in which two postharvest trials were conducted. In experiment 1, the flower scapes were placed in buckets with water from public supply and sanitation department and taken to a cold room at temperature of 7.5 degrees C and RH of 90%, for a twelve day period. For the experiment 2, were kept under the same conditions but at room temperature for a period of six days. In both experiments, the visual analysis: color, gloss, stains (by assigning notes), opening and drop florets (count) were evaluated at intervals of four days in cold and every 48 hours at ambient temperature conditions. In both experiments, the visual analysis: color, gloss, stains (by assigning notes), opening and drop florets (count) were evaluated at intervals of four days in cold and every 48 hours at ambient temperature conditions. The sepal is the organ that showed greater loss in coloration. The variable gloss showed the same pattern for the two experiments. Incidences of stains on the inflorescences occurred in patches at room temperature. The scapes increased number of florets open in cold. This tendency did not occur at room temperature. No were observed differences in the fall of florets. Conclude that the storage temperature does not contribute to postharvest quality of strelitzia.

Sir Joseph Banks, Bart. [Material gráfico] : Proof.

Resumen: Descripción: retrato de tres cuartos de figura de frente, mirando ligeramente hacia la izquierda. Con la mano derecha nos muestra una pequeña bola

What's wrong with Europe's banks? CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2013

In offering his diagnosis of Europe’s ailing banking sector, Daniel Gros finds that it is undercapitalised, too large and populated by too many players without a viable long-term business model. In his view, it is the combination of the last two factors that is the most worrying and he warns that any major problem could overburden public budgets, making the sector, with total liabilities over 250% of GDP, possibly “too big to be saved”.

Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 234, October 2012

This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/16, 29 November 2013

As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate about which parts of the proposed SRM-SBRF to add to the BRRD. The BRRD sets out a resolution toolkit that can be used by national resolution authorities. The SRM would involve European institutions more at the expense of national resolution authorities. This change could affect resolution outcomes. Domestic resolution authorities might be more generous than supranational authorities in providing assistance to banks. A supranational approach might be more effective in minimising costs for taxpayers. But regardless of the final design, more attention is needed to ensure that resolution authorities are politically independent from governments. When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts.

Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts. CES Papers - Open Forum #8, 2012

How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.

Compliance program reference : inspections of licensed and unlicensed blood banks (compliance program #7342.001) and inspections of source plasma establishments (compliance program #7342.002).

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual report - Superintendent of Banks, State of New York.

Some vols. issued with: Detailed statement.

Business looks at banks.

Mode of access: Internet.

Business looks at banks; a study of business behavior,

"This report is based on a nation-wide sample interview survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan."