Measurements of income inequality: a critique. Inflation and income inequality: a link through the job- search process

In this paper I claim that, in a long-run perspective, measurements of income inequality, under any of the usual inequality measures used in the literature, are upward biased. The reason is that such measurements are cross-sectional by nature and, therefore, do not take into consideration the turnover in the job market which, in the long run, equalizes within-group (e.g., same-education groups) inequalities. Using a job-search model, I show how to derive the within-group invariant-distribution Gini coefficient of income inequality, how to calculate the size of the bias and how to organize the data in arder to solve the problem. Two examples are provided to illustrate the argument.

Is there a price puzzle in Brazil? an application of bias- corrected bootstrap

Using data from the United States, Japan, Germany , United Kingdom and France, Sims (1992) found that positive innovations to shortterm interest rates led to sharp, persistent increases in the price leveI. The result was confirmed by other authors and, as a consequence of its non-expectable nature, was given the name "price puzzle" by Eichenbaum (1992). In this paper I investigate the existence of a price puzzle in Brazil using the same type of estimation and benchmark identification scheme employed by Christiano et aI. (2000). In a methodological improvement over these studies, I qualify the results with the construction of bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals. Even though the data does show the existence of a statistically significant price puzzle in Brazil, it lasts for .only one quarter and is quantitatively immaterial.

Comments on public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. Some potential shortcmomings of the mo dei in explaining the data are discussed. Measures of the overestimation of the welfare gains of reducing distortions from taxation, under the model's simplified time frame, are also provided. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to half a once-for-all 20o/o-of-GDP shock to governemnt spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

The forward and the equity premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

The Forward Premium Puzzle (FPP) is how the empirical observation of a negative relation between future changes in the spot rates and the forward premium is known. Modeling this forward bias as a risk premium and under weak assumptions on the behavior of the pricing kernel, we characterize the potential bias that is present in the regressions where the FPP is observed and we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that the pricing kernel has to satisfy to account for the predictability of exchange rate movements. Next, we estimate the pricing kernel applying two methods: i) one, du.e to Araújo et aI. (2005), that exploits the fact that the pricing kernel is a serial correlation common feature of asset prices, and ii) a traditional principal component analysis used as a procedure 1;0 generate a statistical factor modeI. Then, using on the sample and out of the sample exercises, we are able to show that the same kernel that explains the Equity Premi um Puzzle (EPP) accounts for the FPP in all our data sets. This suggests that the quest for an economic mo deI that generates a pricing kernel which solves the EPP may double its prize by simultaneously accounting for the FPP.

Preços competitivos associados a caminhos de crescimento eficientes

In this note we show that a stronger version of the no-free production assumption is sufficient to guarantee the existence of competitive price system associated with an efficient growth path such that consumption-value is maximized at this growth path.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive

A monthly indicator of Brazilian GDP. The Brazilian business cycle and growth cycle

This paper constructs an indicator of Brazilian GDP at the monthly ftequency. The peculiar instability and abrupt changes of regimes in the dynamic behavior of the Brazilian business cycle were explicitly modeled within nonlinear ftameworks. In particular, a Markov switching dynarnic factor model was used to combine several macroeconomic variables that display simultaneous comovements with aggregate economic activity. The model generates as output a monthly indicator of the Brazilian GDP and real time probabilities of the current phase of the Brazilian business cycle. The monthly indicator shows a remarkable historical conformity with cyclical movements of GDP. In addition, the estimated filtered probabilities predict ali recessions in sample and out-of-sample. The ability of the indicator in linear forecasting growth rates of GDP is also examined. The estimated indicator displays a better in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance in forecasting growth rates of real GDP, compared to a linear autoregressive model for GDP. These results suggest that the estimated monthly indicator can be used to forecast GDP and to monitor the state of the Brazilian economy in real time.

A model of private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (ofmoney) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then the optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and note destruction (redemption) by members of the banking sector.

The effect of financiaI repression & enforcernent on entrepreneurship and economic deveIopment

This paper studies the effect of financiaI repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium mo deI with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financiaI frictions: intermediation costs and financiaI contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The mo deI shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financiaI frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financiaI frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether à general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financiaI markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financiaI capital mobility.

Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.