The abuse of intellectual property rights and regulations in China: a law and economic analysis

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

The Redistribution of Property Rights, Corporate Governance and Company Restructuring after Privatisation"

The project covered the main issues of privatisation, corporate governance and company restructuring after privatisation in Hungary and in the Russian Republic, together with a summary of the broader picture of company-level changes in Central and Eastern Europe, discussing the issues of micro-financial restructuring in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The two countries selected as the focus of research can be regarded as the two most widely differing cases of the economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary began its transition very early in 1989, while Russia was very late in doing so. Hungary first implemented a series of institutional and systemic reforms before stabilising its public finances, while Russia has struggled with financial stabilisation for years without great success. Company restructuring and the introduction of new forms of governance only began in Russia in the mid-1990s. Hungary opted for "traditional" western methods of privatisation and invited a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) while in Russia the bulk of state-owned property was privatised either by free distribution or by a strange blend of ESOP-MBO schemes. FDI in Russia remained modest because of the high risk and uncertainty surrounding economic transactions there. Hungary was a forerunner in privatising public utilities, while Russia has moved cautiously in this area. The group's studies show that the Hungarian economy is now over the "transformation recession" and its economic success is largely due to its successful privatisation and to the dominant participation of foreign investors in company take-overs and in the restructuring process. The study of Russia provides a comprehensive account of the main factors in the so-far modest results in Russian privatisation and economic transformation.

Property-Rights-Verträge im Rahmen des Risikomanagements von Elementarschäden

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GERMANY: Creating New Property Rights on the Basis of General Legal Concepts - Without Limits?

In two cases recently decided by two different senates of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), the following issue was raised: To what extent can the filming of sports events organized by someone else, on the one hand, and the photographing of someone else’s physical property, on the other hand, be legally controlled by the organizer of the sports event and the owner of the property respectively? In its “Hartplatzhelden.de” decision, the first senate of the Federal Supreme Court concluded that the act of filming sports events does not constitute an act of unfair competition as such, and hence is allowed even without the consent of the organizer of the sports event in question. However, the fifth senate, in its “Prussian gardens and parks” decision, held that photographing someone else’s property is subject to the consent of the owner of the grounds, provided the photographs are taken from a spot situated on the owner’s property. In spite of their different outcomes, the two cases do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, read together, they may well lead to an unwanted – and unjustified – extension of exclusive protection, thus creating a new “organizer’s” IP right.

Time-Limited Property Rights and Investment Incentives

Although it is axiomatic that property rights of infinite duration are necessary for owners to make efficient long term investments in their property, time limits on property rights are pervasive in the law. This paper provides an economic justification for such limits by arguing that they actually enhance property values in the presence of various sorts of market failure. The analysis offers a coherent approach for understanding what otherwise appear to be unrelated doctrines in the law.

A Question of Title: Property Rights and Asset Values

This paper examines the impact of land title systems on property values. The predominant system in the U.S., the recording system, awards title to claimants over current possessors, whereas the Torrens registration system awards title to the current owner. In theory, the registration system maximizes property value, all else equal, but in practice, the systems differ depending on the risk of a claim and administrative costs. A natural experiment in Cook County, Illinois, where both systems have existed since 1897, allows a test of the theory. The results, based on commercial and industrial properties, reveal that parcels tend to self-select into the two systems based on the predictions of the theory.

Competition and the Legal Environment: Intellectual Property Rights in the Early American Film Industry

No abstract available.

FDI inflows and outflows, intellectual property rights, and productivity growth

Using panel data of 57 countries during the period of 1995-2012, this study investigates the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) processes on productivity growth. The IPR processes are decomposed into three stages, innovation process, commercialization process, and IPR protection process. Our results suggest that better IPR protection is directly associated with productivity improvement only in developed economies. In addition, the contribution of IPR processes on growth through foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to be very limited. Only FDI inflows in developed countries which help to create a better innovative capability lead to a higher growth. And in connection with FDI outflows, only IPR protection and commercialization processes are proven to improve productivity in the case of developing countries, particularly when the country acts as the investing country.

To Promote the Progress: Why Do States Create New Intellectual Property Rights? ACES Working Papers, August 2012

The question I seek to answer is not about explaining support or resistance to the globalization or harmonization of IP rights. Rather, I am interested in new IP rights: what happened to cause a certain intangible to change from something that was not considered intellectual property to something that was considered intellectual property? Explaining the globalization or harmonization of already-existing IP rights is an important task, but fundamentally different than explaining why some things became intellectual property in the first place.