907 resultados para Objectivity in law and legal reasoning
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This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.
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This dissertation addresses the timely questions of transitional justice (TJ) in the aftermath of revolutions against autocratic regimes, dealing with TJ as a constitutional arrangement through the lenses of constitutional economics. After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 deals with why nations rarely adopt meaningful TJ processes in the first place, it then explains the limitations of civil society as the arbiter, facilitator, and enforcer of TJ policies. Chapter 3 tackles the question of which mechanisms to choose? It uses the UN Guidelines on TJ that sets five principal TJ mechanisms. It provides a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of each mechanism and suggests policy implications accordingly. The CBA inspires chapter 4 analysis, suggesting a tradeoff between restrictive fair trial standards under constitutional laws and justice considerations. The tradeoff explains the suggested efficiency of the balanced TJ approaches that combine trials and amnesties. This approach is used for the case study analysis of TJ in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution in chapter 5. The chapter presents the first index of TJ mechanisms in Tunisia through novel data collected by the author. It shows an ultimate TJ design that ended with a modest harvest in the application. The lack of cooperation between the Tunisian parties, added to the absence of transparency in many TJ measures, threatens any possible positive outcomes of the partial TJ process. It is also alarming regarding constitutional compliance in a system that – until recently - was considered the only democracy in the Arab region. Chapter 6 is a summary
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Original Paper European Journal of Information Systems (2001) 10, 135–146; doi:10.1057/palgrave.ejis.3000394 Organisational learning—a critical systems thinking discipline P Panagiotidis1,3 and J S Edwards2,4 1Deloitte and Touche, Athens, Greece 2Aston Business School, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK Correspondence: Dr J S Edwards, Aston Business School, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK. E-mail: j.s.edwards@aston.ac.uk 3Petros Panagiotidis is Manager responsible for the Process and Systems Integrity Services of Deloitte and Touche in Athens, Greece. He has a BSc in Business Administration and an MSc in Management Information Systems from Western International University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA; an MSc in Business Systems Analysis and Design from City University, London, UK; and a PhD degree from Aston University, Birmingham, UK. His doctorate was in Business Systems Analysis and Design. His principal interests now are in the ERP/DSS field, where he serves as project leader and project risk managment leader in the implementation of SAP and JD Edwards/Cognos in various major clients in the telecommunications and manufacturing sectors. In addition, he is responsible for the development and application of knowledge management systems and activity-based costing systems. 4John S Edwards is Senior Lecturer in Operational Research and Systems at Aston Business School, Birmingham, UK. He holds MA and PhD degrees (in mathematics and operational research respectively) from Cambridge University. His principal research interests are in knowledge management and decision support, especially methods and processes for system development. He has written more than 30 research papers on these topics, and two books, Building Knowledge-based Systems and Decision Making with Computers, both published by Pitman. Current research work includes the effect of scale of operations on knowledge management, interfacing expert systems with simulation models, process modelling in law and legal services, and a study of the use of artifical intelligence techniques in management accounting. Top of pageAbstract This paper deals with the application of critical systems thinking in the domain of organisational learning and knowledge management. Its viewpoint is that deep organisational learning only takes place when the business systems' stakeholders reflect on their actions and thus inquire about their purpose(s) in relation to the business system and the other stakeholders they perceive to exist. This is done by reflecting both on the sources of motivation and/or deception that are contained in their purpose, and also on the sources of collective motivation and/or deception that are contained in the business system's purpose. The development of an organisational information system that captures, manages and institutionalises meaningful information—a knowledge management system—cannot be separated from organisational learning practices, since it should be the result of these very practices. Although Senge's five disciplines provide a useful starting-point in looking at organisational learning, we argue for a critical systems approach, instead of an uncritical Systems Dynamics one that concentrates only on the organisational learning practices. We proceed to outline a methodology called Business Systems Purpose Analysis (BSPA) that offers a participatory structure for team and organisational learning, upon which the stakeholders can take legitimate action that is based on the force of the better argument. In addition, the organisational learning process in BSPA leads to the development of an intrinsically motivated information organisational system that allows for the institutionalisation of the learning process itself in the form of an organisational knowledge management system. This could be a specific application, or something as wide-ranging as an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementation. Examples of the use of BSPA in two ERP implementations are presented.
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Of the many dimensions of the problem of violence exercised by men toward women in the context of the relations of partner or ex partner, this article deals with the analysis of the discursive productions of the institutional actors that are part of the judicial process. Our intention is to investigate the relationship between criminal law and gender-based violence starting from the implementation of the Law of Integral Gender-based Violence in Spain (LO. 1 / 2004) from a theoretical perspective which includes contributions from social psychology, and socio-legal feminism. We have approached the legal instrument - the Law of Integral Gender-based Violence - through the discourse of legal officers with a perspective that questions the values, so often proclaimed, of universality, objectivity and neutrality of the law
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This article seeks to demonstrate how Law inter-related with Economy, constitutes in modern societies one of the main instruments for the construction of citizen consensus or the construction of political hegemony in modern societies. If we consider this affirmation —as is argued here— the transformations suffered in recent decades by Law as a consequence of the new phase of capitalistic globalization, have played an important role in the constitution of a new subjectivity (“single thought”) in the population.
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Conventional wisdom holds that economic analysis of law is either embryonic or nonexistent outside of the United States generally and in civil law jurisdictions in particular. Existing explanations for the assumed lack of interest in the application of economic reasoning to legal problems range from the different structure of legal education and academia outside of the United States to the peculiar characteristics of civilian legal systems. This paper challenges this view by documenting and explaining the growing use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. We argue that, given the ever-greater role of courts in the formulation of public policies, the application of legal principles and rules increasingly calls for a theory of human behavior (such as that provided by economics) to help foresee the likely aggregate consequences of different interpretations of the law. Consistent with the traditional role of civilian legal scholarship in providing guidance for the application of law by courts, the further development of law and economics in Brazil is therefore likely to be mostly driven by judicial demand.
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[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.
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From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.
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From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.