The ornithology of Illinois. Part I. Descriptive catalogue. By Robert Ridgway. Part II. Economic ornithology. By S. A. Forbes. Pub. by the authority of the state Legislature.

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Geological Survey of California. Palæontology Pub. by authority of the Legislature of California.

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Geological Survey of California. Palæontology Pub. by authority of the Legislature of California.

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Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience

Recent episodes of public dissent (such as the demonstrations against G8 policies) raise the issue of the psychological processes triggered in obeying and disobeying the authority. Even if obedience to authority is an important aspect of social life and it plays a key role in maintaining social order, the concept of obedience has been studied in social psychology mainly in terms of its destructive aspects. Besides, most of the studies have overlooked the role of disobedience in the authority relationship. Disobedience may be conceived of as a protest that undermines the legitimacy of the authority or it can represent an instrument for controlling the legitimacy of the authority's demands, becoming a factor protecting against authoritarianism. In this article, a new perspective on the study of the relationship between the individual and the authority is put forward, considering obedience and disobedience as parallel concepts, each having constructive and destructive aspects. 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Déconstruction de la maîtrise théologique et nécessité éthique de l'instabilité normative

Dans une première partie, l'A. de cet article considère les relations instables qui existent entre l'éthique et la théologie, car il s'agit de deux problématiques distinctes. Dans le deuxième point, il montre que ces deux problématiques ne sont pas si distinctes qu'il eût été possible, traitant de la première, d'en taire complètement la seconde, qui aborde de front la tension entre la maîtrise et le chaos. La partie finale développe la reconstruction de l'avenir public de l'éthique théologique : signaler la transcendance, répondre du mal et résister aux injustices.

The normative dimension of social life from a second-person perspective

This thesis argues that insofar as we want to account for the normative dimension of social life, we must be careful to avoid construing that normative dimension in such a way as to exclude that which the second-person perspective reveals is important to social life and our ability to participate in it.¦The second-person perspective reveals that social life ought to be understood as a mix or balance of the regular and the irregular, where, in addition, those one interacts with are always to some extent experienced as other in a way that is neither immediately, nor perhaps ultimately, understandable. For persons to be able to participate in social life, conceived of in this way, they must have abilities that allow them to be, to some extent, hesitant and tentative in their relations with others, and thus tolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictability, and responsive to and capable of learning from the otherness of others in the course of interacting with them.¦Incorporating the second-person perspective means we have to make some changes to the way we think about the normative in general, and the normative dimension of social life in particular. It does not mean giving up on the distinction between the normative and the regular - that continues to be fundamentally important but it does mean not excluding, as part of social life and as worthy of explanation, all that which is irregular. A radical way of putting it would be to say that there must be a sense in which the irregular is part of the normative. A less radical way, and the way adopted by this thesis, is to say that any account of the normative dimension of social life must not be such as to exclude the importance of irregularity from social life. This will mean 1) not characterising conventions, norms and rules as determinants of appropriateness and inappropriateness; 2) not thinking of them as necessary; 3) not thinking of them as necessarily governing minds; and 4) not thinking of them as necessarily shared.¦-¦L'argument principal de la thèse est que, pour rendre compte de la dimension normative de la vie sociale, il faut veiller à ne pas exclure la perspective de la deuxième personne - une perspective importante pour comprendre la vie sociale et la capacité requise pour y participer.¦Cette perspective nous permet d'imaginer la vie sociale comme un mélange ou un équilibre entre le régulier et l'irrégulier, l'interaction entre des individus pouvant être appréhendée comme l'expérience de chaque personne avec «l'autre» d'une manière qui n'est pas immédiatement compréhensible, et qui ne peut pas, peut-être, être ultimement comprise. Pour participer à la vie sociale, l'on doit avoir la capacité de rester hésitant et «réactif» dans ses relations avec les autres, de rester ouvert à leur altérité et de tolérer l'ambiguïté, l'incertitude et l'imprévisibilité des interactions sociales.¦Adopter une perspective «à la deuxième personne» conduit à une autre manière de penser la normativité en général, et la dimension normative de la vie sociale en particulier. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il faut abandonner la distinction entre le normatif et le régulier - une distinction qui garde une importance fondamentale - mais qu'il faut reconnaître l'irrégulier comme faisant partie de la vie sociale et comme étant digne, en tant que tel, d'être expliqué. Une conception radicale pourrait même concevoir l'irrégulier comme faisant partie intégrante de la normativité. Une approche moins radicale, qui est celle adoptée dans cette thèse, est de dire que tout compte-rendu de la dimension normative de la vie sociale doit prendre en considération l'importance de l'irrégularité dans la vie sociale. Une telle approche implique que les conventions, normes et règles (1) ne déterminent pas ce qui est approprié ou inapproprié; (2) ne sont pas toujours nécessaires ; (3) ne gouvernent pas le fonctionnement de l'esprit ; et (4) ne sont pas nécessairement partagées.

A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security

This article addresses the normative dilemma located within the application of `securitization,’ as a method of understanding the social construction of threats and security policies. Securitization as a theoretical and practical undertaking is being increasingly used by scholars and practitioners. This scholarly endeavour wishes to provide those wishing to engage with securitization with an alternative application of this theory; one which is sensitive to and self-reflective of the possible normative consequences of its employment. This article argues that discussing and analyzing securitization processes have normative implications, which is understood here to be the negative securitization of a referent. The negative securitization of a referent is asserted to be carried out through the unchallenged analysis of securitization processes which have emerged through relations of exclusion and power. It then offers a critical understanding and application of securitization studies as a way of overcoming the identified normative dilemma. First, it examines how the Copenhagen School’s formation of securitization theory gives rise to a normative dilemma, which is situated in the performative and symbolic power of security as a political invocation and theoretical concept. Second, it evaluates previous attempts to overcome the normative dilemma of securitization studies, outlining the obstacles that each individual proposal faces. Third, this article argues that the normative dilemma of applying securitization can be avoided by firstly, deconstructing the institutional power of security actors and dominant security subjectivities and secondly, by addressing countering or alternative approaches to security and incorporating different security subjectivities. Examples of the securitization of international terrorism and immigration are prominent throughout.

The Security Council and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force: Legal, Normative, and Social Aspects.

Tal i com estableix la Carta de les Nacions Unides, el Consell de Seguretat determina l’existència d’una amenaça a la pau, un trencament de la pau o un acte d’agressió i decideix les mesures que han de fer-se servir per restaurar la pau i seguretat internacionals, també l’ús de la força. L’objectiu d’aquest article és explorar la legitimitat d’aquest ús de la força. Amb aquest objectiu, el text parteix d’una definició centrada en les seves dimensions legal, normativa i social. En segon lloc, s’analitzarà com aquestes dimensions estan representades als debats del Consell de Seguretat de la guerra d’Irak de 2003, un dels usos de la força més controvertits i que més debat ha generat als darrers anys. Finalment, l’anàlisi proposat permet treure algunes conclusions sobre les bases canviants de la legitimitat de l’ús de la força.

Holy harlots : authority, gender, and the body in medieval English hagiography

This doctoral dissertation aims at describing the representation of holy harlots (Mary Magdalene, Mary of Egypt, Pelagia, Thai's, Afra of Augsburg) in medieval English hagiography. These saints are unique representatives that combine both extremes of the feminine in the medieval imaginaire: she is both, as a saint, the Virgin Mary, the pure and virtuous woman, and, in her past as a prostitute, Eve, the evil female tempter who led all mankind to destruction. The initial question of this thesis is how did hagiographers negotiate the representation of a formerly sinful, sexually active, long- living woman as an authoritative saint? This thesis aims at finding elements of answer to this question, investigating the intersections between gender and authority in the saints' lives of repentant prostitutes in all the vernaculars of medieval England: Old English, Anglo-Norman, and Middle English. It posits that the portrayal of holy harlots' authority and gender is dependent upon social, religious and literary shifts during the medieval period. My contention is that the harlot's gender portrayal changes over the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, due notably to the rise of affective piety and the important influence of the romance genre over hagiography. In Anglo-Saxon England, the harlot's gender changes with the saint's conversion: a woman beforehand, her gender is portrayed after her repentance as ambiguous in order for her to become a saint. Her authority derives from her own sanctity in this case. From the twelfth century onward, however, the harlot, now often turned into a beautiful and landed romance lady, is more and more represented as a woman throughout her life, and becomes after her conversion a Bride of Christ. In this way, the dangerously free woman who roamed the streets and prostituted her body becomes less threatening after her conversion, being (re-)inscribed within the male dominated institution of marriage. She now draws her authoritative stance from her gendered intimacy with Christ: although she submits to Christ as his bride, she also gains greater authority than before by way of her privileged relationship with the Savior.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.