Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Non-contributory pensions: Bolivia and Antigua in an international context

Includes bibliography

Tax Treaty Override

What exactly is tax treaty override ? When is it realized ? This thesis, which is the result of a co-directed PhD between the University of Bologna and Tilburg University, gives a deep insight into a topic that has not yet been analyzed in a systematic way. On the contrary, the analysis about tax treaty override is still at a preliminary stage. For this reason the origin and nature of tax treaty override are first of all analyzed in their ‘natural’ context, i.e. within general international law. In order to characterize tax treaty override and deeply understand its peculiarities the evaluation of the effects of general international law on tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention is a necessary pre-condition. Therefore, the binding effects of an international agreement on state sovereignty are specifically investigated. Afterwards, the interpretation of the OECD Model Convention occupies the main part of the thesis in order to develop an ‘interpretative model’ which can be applied every time a case of tax treaty override needs to be detected. Fictitious income, exit taxes and CFC regimes are analyzed in order to verify their compliance with tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention and establish when the relevant legislation realizes cases of tax treaty override.

Restructuring Justice: Moving Towards Gender-Responsive Programming and Alternatives to Incarceration for Non-Violent Female Offenders

The United States¿ Federal and State laws differentiate between acceptable (or, legal) and unacceptable (illegal) behavior by prescribing restrictive punishment to citizens and/or groups that violate these established rules. These regulations are written to treat every person equally and to fairly serve justice; furthermore, the sanctions placed on offenders seek to reform illegal behavior through limitations on freedoms and rehabilitative programs. Despite the effort to treat all offenders fairly regardless of social identity categories (e.g., sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, ability, and gender and sexual orientation) and to humanely eliminate illegal behavior, the American penal system perpetuates de facto discrimination against a multitude of peoples. Furthermore, soaring recidivism rates caused by unsuccessful re-entry of incarcerated offenders puts economic stress on Federal and State budgets. For these reasons, offenders, policy-makers, and law-abiding citizens should all have a vested interest in reforming the prison system. This thesis focuses on the failure of the United States corrections system to adequately address the gender-specific needs of non-violent female offenders. Several factors contribute to the gender-specific discrimination that women experience in the criminal justice system: 1) Trends in female criminality that skew women¿s crime towards drug-related crimes, prostitution, and property offenses; 2) Mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes that are disproportionate to the crime committed; 3) So-called ¿gender-neutral¿ educational, vocational, substance abuse, and mental health programming that intends to equally rehabilitate men and women, but in fact favors men; and 4) The isolating nature of prison structures that inhibits smooth re-entry into society. I argue that a shift in the placement and treatment of non-violent female offenders is necessary for effective rehabilitation and for reducing recidivism rates. The first component of this shift is the design and implementation of gender- responsive treatment (GRT) rather than gender-neutral approaches in rehabilitative programming. The second shift is the utilization of alternatives to incarceration, which provide both more humane treatment of offenders and smoother reintegration to society. Drawing on recent scholarship, information from prison advocacy organizations, and research with men in an alternative program, I provide a critical analysis of current policies and alternative programs, and suggest several proposals for future gender- responsive programs in prisons and in place of incarceration. I argue that the expansion of gender-responsive programming and alternatives to incarceration respond to the marginalization of female offenders, address concerns about the financial sustainability of the United States criminal justice system, and tackle high recidivism rates.

A Natural Gas Severance Tax-An Economic Analysis

This study estimates the economic effects of a severance tax on the market for natural gas produced from shale sources using non-conventional extraction methods, such as horizontal drilling and fracking. Results suggest that a severance tax of 5% would increase the price of natural gas by as much as 3.82% and decrease gas extraction by an estimated 1.16% to a value of 9.52%. If applied to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the United States, a 5% severance tax is estimated to raise between US$443 and $486 million per year in public revenue. The marginal deadweight loss associated with a 5% severance tax is estimated between 1.27% and 12.85% of the last dollar earned. The burden of this tax falls on both producers and consumers and depends upon the underlying assumptions made regarding the price responsiveness of consumers and producers. Under plausible assumptions, a family consuming 1000 MMcfs (approximate to 2.8 x 10(4) m(3)) per year of natural gas is estimated to pay an additional $100 per year after the implementation of a 5% severance tax.

Investigating the effects of the 2007 Texas tobacco tax increase on the smoking behavior of adults

Smoking is major cause of premature mortality and morbidity in the United States. The health consequences of tobacco usage are increasingly concentrated in minority and lower socioeconomic groups. One of the most effective means of deterring tobacco consumption and generating revenue to fund prevention activities is the levying of excise taxes. In 2007 the state of Texas increased the excise tax on cigarettes by $1.00 per pack. This study sought to determine if there was a significant effect on smoking prevalence in the state by examining Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data for two years leading up to the tax increase-2005 and 2006- and two years post tax increase -2007 and 2008. Results were compared against a chi square distribution and three multiple logistic regression models were created to adjust for race/ethnicity, age, education and income. Results from this study show that there was not a significant decrease in smoking prevalence for most of the groups stratified by age, income and ethnicity. There was not a significant decrease in the younger adults aged 18-34 by income, ethnicity, or education. Smoking prevalence increased for some groups, e.g., Hispanic females. In the regression models, the tax effect was not significant. While overall prevalence decreased by 9%, there were not significant reductions among non-White or Hispanic survey participants. Taxed sales dropped by approximately 17% according to the Texas Comptroller. Without BRFSS data measuring daily cigarette consumption among current smokers, now not assessed, it is impossible to determine whether the discrepancy in reported prevalence and taxes sales is attributable to consumption of fewer cigarettes among smokers or tax avoidance.^

More Is Not Always Better: An Experimental Individual-Level Validation of the Randomized Response Technique and the Crosswise Model

Social desirability and the fear of sanctions can deter survey respondents from responding truthfully to sensitive questions. Self-reports on norm breaking behavior such as shoplifting, non-voting, or tax evasion may therefore be subject to considerable misreporting. To mitigate such misreporting, various indirect techniques for asking sensitive questions, such as the randomized response technique (RRT), have been proposed in the literature. In our study, we evaluate the viability of several variants of the RRT, including the recently proposed crosswise-model RRT, by comparing respondents’ self-reports on cheating in dice games to actual cheating behavior, thereby distinguishing between false negatives (underreporting) and false positives (overreporting). The study has been implemented as an online survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 6,505). Our results indicate that the forced-response RRT and the unrelated-question RRT, as implemented in our survey, fail to reduce the level of misreporting compared to conventional direct questioning. For the crosswise-model RRT, we do observe a reduction of false negatives (that is, an increase in the proportion of cheaters who admit having cheated). At the same time, however, there is an increase in false positives (that is, an increase in non-cheaters who falsely admit having cheated). Overall, our findings suggest that none of the implemented sensitive questions techniques substantially outperforms direct questioning. Furthermore, our study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing false negatives and false positives when evaluating the validity of sensitive question techniques.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.

Sales tax enforcement: An empirical analysis of compliance enforcement methodologies and pathologies

Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax. Sales tax evasion has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial. This paper explored the differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance. Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state. Companies engage in a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent of the state for private use. As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to embezzlement than to income tax evasion. It has long been assumed that the sales tax is nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a manner that perpetuates this myth. Current sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies and are based largely on trust. The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small percentage of businesses subject to audit. As a result, there is a very large group of noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions of taxpayer dollars. ^ The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to set forth a typology of sales tax evaders. This study showed that current estimates of voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of violators and enforce compliance. Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated.^