Proceedings of the National security congress under the auspices of the National security league, Washington, January 20-22, 1916.

Mode of access: Internet.

Organizing for national security : hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, second session [-Eighty-seventh Congress, first session] ...

Pts. 2-9 have also special subtitles.

The national security affairs forum.

Issued by the National War College.

National security seminar; backround readings

Mode of access: Internet.

Bottom-up review : analysis of DOD war game to test key assumptions : report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives /

"B-272119"--P. 1.

National security seminar; presentation outlines

Includes bibliographies

Organizing for national security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate.

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Copyright law as a matter of (inter)national security? – The attempt to securitise commercial infringement and its spill-over onto individual liability

This article evaluates the way in which copyright infringement has been gradually shifting from an area of civil liability to one of criminal penalty. Traditionally, consideration of copyright issues has been undertaken from a predominantly legal and/or economic perspectives. Whereas traditional legal analysis can explain what legal changes are occurring, and what impact these changes may have, they may not effectively explain ‘how’ these changes have come to occur. The authors propose an alternative inter-disciplinary approach, combining legal analysis with critical security studies, which may help to explain in greater detail how policies in this field have developed. In particular, through applied securitisation theory, this article intends to demonstrate the appropriation of this field by a security discourse, and its consequences for societal and legal developments. In order to explore how the securitisation framework may be a valid approach to a subject such as copyright law and to determine the extent to which copyright law may be said to have been securitised, this article will begin by explaining the origins and main features of securitisation theory, and its applicability to legal study. The authors will then attempt to apply this framework to the development of a criminal law approach to copyright infringement, by focusing on the security escalation it has undergone, developing from an economic issue into one of international security. The analysis of this evolution will be mainly characterised by the securitisation moves taking place at national, European and international levels. Finally, a general reflection will be carried out on whether the securitisation of copyright has indeed been successful and on what the consequences of such a success could be.

Trojan horses: On the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008

In this thesis I sought to explain the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008. I identified and examined 29 cases of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States during that period, and argued that in order to understand the circumstances under which foreign investments in the United States are perceived to be threats to the U.S. security we must rely on a combination of democratic peace theory and the version of political realism known as power transition theory. Thus, I tested the argument that national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008 resulted from: (1) perceptions of international power transition, (2) perceptions of ideological and institutional differences between the United States and the home country of the investor, (3) perceptions of the strategic importance of the sector where the investment is made, and (4) perceptions of participation or control of the foreign investor by the government of the country of origin. I found that all these hypotheses have some explanatory power.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

The Communicative Dimension and Security in Asia-Pacific: A communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services

The postwar development of the Intelligence Services in Japan has been based on two contrasting models: the centralized model of the USA and the collegiality of UK, neither of which has been fully developed. This has led to clashes of institutional competencies and poor anticipation of threats towards national security. This problem of opposing models has been partially overcome through two dimensions: externally through the cooperation with the US Intelligence Service under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; and internally though the pre-eminence in the national sphere of the Department of Public Safety. However, the emergence of a new global communicative dimension requires that a communicative-viewing remodeling of this dual model is necessary due to the increasing capacity of the individual actors to determine the dynamics of international events. This article examines these challenges for the Intelligence Services of Japan and proposes a reform based on this new global communicative dimension.

Security Analysis of Randomize-Hash-then-Sign Digital Signatures

At CRYPTO 2006, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed two randomized hash function modes and analyzed the security of digital signature algorithms based on these constructions. They showed that the security of signature schemes based on the two randomized hash function modes relies on properties similar to the second preimage resistance rather than on the collision resistance property of the hash functions. One of the randomized hash function modes was named the RMX hash function mode and was recommended for practical purposes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA standardized a variant of the RMX hash function mode and published this standard in the Special Publication (SP) 800-106. In this article, we first discuss a generic online birthday existential forgery attack of Dang and Perlner on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We show that a variant of this attack can be applied to forge the other randomize-hash-then-sign schemes. We point out practical limitations of the generic forgery attack on the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes. We then show that these limitations can be overcome for the RMX-hash-then-sign schemes if it is easy to find fixed points for the underlying compression functions, such as for the Davies-Meyer construction used in the popular hash functions such as MD5 designed by Rivest and the SHA family of hash functions designed by the National Security Agency (NSA), USA and published by NIST in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). We show an online birthday forgery attack on this class of signatures by using a variant of Dean’s method of finding fixed point expandable messages for hash functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction. This forgery attack is also applicable to signature schemes based on the variant of RMX standardized by NIST in SP 800-106. We discuss some important applications of our attacks and discuss their applicability on signature schemes based on hash functions with ‘built-in’ randomization. Finally, we compare our attacks on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes with the generic forgery attacks on the standard hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War

Jackson, Peter, 'France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War', Journal of Strategic Studies (2006) 29(2) pp.247-280 Special Issue: Enforcing arms limits: Germany post 1919; Iraq post 1991 RAE2008

Health, security and foreign policy

McInnes, C., Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of International Studies, 32 (1), 5-23. RAE2008