Bottom-up review : analysis of DOD war game to test key assumptions : report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives /

"B-272119"--P. 1.

National security seminar; presentation outlines

Includes bibliographies

Organizing for national security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate.

jsk

Copyright law as a matter of (inter)national security? – The attempt to securitise commercial infringement and its spill-over onto individual liability

This article evaluates the way in which copyright infringement has been gradually shifting from an area of civil liability to one of criminal penalty. Traditionally, consideration of copyright issues has been undertaken from a predominantly legal and/or economic perspectives. Whereas traditional legal analysis can explain what legal changes are occurring, and what impact these changes may have, they may not effectively explain ‘how’ these changes have come to occur. The authors propose an alternative inter-disciplinary approach, combining legal analysis with critical security studies, which may help to explain in greater detail how policies in this field have developed. In particular, through applied securitisation theory, this article intends to demonstrate the appropriation of this field by a security discourse, and its consequences for societal and legal developments. In order to explore how the securitisation framework may be a valid approach to a subject such as copyright law and to determine the extent to which copyright law may be said to have been securitised, this article will begin by explaining the origins and main features of securitisation theory, and its applicability to legal study. The authors will then attempt to apply this framework to the development of a criminal law approach to copyright infringement, by focusing on the security escalation it has undergone, developing from an economic issue into one of international security. The analysis of this evolution will be mainly characterised by the securitisation moves taking place at national, European and international levels. Finally, a general reflection will be carried out on whether the securitisation of copyright has indeed been successful and on what the consequences of such a success could be.

Trojan horses: On the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008

In this thesis I sought to explain the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008. I identified and examined 29 cases of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States during that period, and argued that in order to understand the circumstances under which foreign investments in the United States are perceived to be threats to the U.S. security we must rely on a combination of democratic peace theory and the version of political realism known as power transition theory. Thus, I tested the argument that national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008 resulted from: (1) perceptions of international power transition, (2) perceptions of ideological and institutional differences between the United States and the home country of the investor, (3) perceptions of the strategic importance of the sector where the investment is made, and (4) perceptions of participation or control of the foreign investor by the government of the country of origin. I found that all these hypotheses have some explanatory power.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

New threats - old routines : bureaucratic adaptability in the security policy environment

Within the framework of state security policy, the focus of this dissertation are the relations between how new security threats are perceived and the policy planning and bureaucratic implementation that are designed to address them. In addition, this thesis explores and studies some of the inertias that might exist in the core of the state apparatus as it addresses new threats and how these could be better managed. The dissertation is built on five thematic and interrelated articles highlighting different aspects of when new significant national security threats are detected by different governments until the threats on the policy planning side translate into protective measures within the society. The timeline differs widely between different countries and some key aspects of this process are also studied. One focus concerns mechanisms for adaptability within the Intelligence Community, another on the policy planning process within the Cabinet Offices/National Security Councils and the third focus is on the planning process and how policy is implemented within the bureaucracy. The issue of policy transfer is also analysed, revealing that there is some imitation of innovation within governmental structures and policies, for example within the field of cyber defence. The main findings of the dissertation are that this context has built-in inertias and bureaucratic seams found in most government bureaucratic machineries. As much of the information and planning measures imply security classification of the transparency and internal debate on these issues, alternative assessments become limited. To remedy this situation, the thesis recommends ways to improve the decision-making system in order to streamline the processes involved in making these decisions. Another special focus of the thesis concerns the role of the public policy think tanks in the United States as an instrument of change in the country’s national security decision-making environment, which is viewed from the perspective as being a possible source of new ideas and innovation. The findings in this part are based on unique interviews data on how think tanks become successful and influence the policy debate in a country such as the United States. It appears clearly that in countries such as the United States think tanks smooth the decision making processes, and that this model with some adaptations also might be transferrable to other democratic countries.

National interest to global reform: patterns of reasoning in British foreign policy discourse

Discussion of the national interest often focuses on how Britain's influence can be maximized, rather than on the goals that influence serves. Yet what gives content to claims about the national interest is the means-ends reasoning which links interests to deeper goals. In ideal-typical terms, this can take two forms. The first, and more common, approach is conservative: it infers national interests and the goals they advance from existing policies and commitments. The second is reformist: it starts by specifying national goals and then asks how they are best advanced under particular conditions. New Labour's foreign policy discourse is notable for its explicit use of a reformist approach. Indeed, Gordon Brown's vision of a 'new global society' not only identifies global reform as a key means of fulfilling national goals, but also thereby extends the concept of the national interest well beyond a narrow concern with national security.

Integrated luminescent chemical microsensors based on GaN LEDs for security applications using smartphones

Development of PCB-integrateable microsensors for monitoring chemical species is a goal in areas such as lab-on-a-chip analytical devices, diagnostics medicine and electronics for hand-held instruments where the device size is a major issue. Cellular phones have pervaded the world inhabitants and their usefulness has dramatically increased with the introduction of smartphones due to a combination of amazing processing power in a confined space, geolocalization and manifold telecommunication features. Therefore, a number of physical and chemical sensors that add value to the terminal for health monitoring, personal safety (at home, at work) and, eventually, national security have started to be developed, capitalizing also on the huge number of circulating cell phones. The chemical sensor-enabled “super” smartphone provides a unique (bio)sensing platform for monitoring airborne or waterborne hazardous chemicals or microorganisms for both single user and crowdsourcing security applications. Some of the latest ones are illustrated by a few examples. Moreover, we have recently achieved for the first time (covalent) functionalization of p- and n-GaN semiconductor surfaces with tuneable luminescent indicator dyes of the Ru-polypyridyl family, as a key step in the development of innovative microsensors for smartphone applications. Chemical “sensoring” of GaN-based blue LED chips with those indicators has also been achieved by plasma treatment of their surface, and the micrometer-sized devices have been tested to monitor O2 in the gas phase to show their full functionality. Novel strategies to enhance the sensor sensitivity such as changing the length and nature of the siloxane buffer layer are discussed in this paper.

Environmental Information Access as a Security Risk

The United Sates was founded on the principles of freedom. Events in recent history have threatened the freedoms we as individuals enjoy. Notably, changes to government legislation and policies regarding access to environmentally sensitive information following September 11, 2001, are troubling. The government has struggled with a difficult balancing act. The public has the right of access to information, yet, information some view as sensitive or dangerous must be kept out of the hands of terrorists. This project examines and discusses the information access debate within the United States and how to best provide the public environmentally sensitive information.

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

Arms industries : new suppliers and regional security /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-189) and index.

Commission on Government Security : hearings ... Eighty-fourth Congress, first session, on S.J. Res. 21, a joint resolution to establish a commission on government security. March 8-11, 14-18, 1955.

Mode of access: Internet.

Coordinated information sharing and homeland security : hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, June 7, 2002.

"Serial no. 107-182."