A new system of logic and development of the principles of truth and reasoning : applicable to moral subjects and the conduct of human life /

Mode of access: Internet.

A treatise of human nature : being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects ; and Dialogues concerning natural religion /

First published 1874.

Populational reasoning

This section focuses on systems of reasoning that imagine youth as a unified whole, one that can be researched, talked about, planned for, and managed. Even research that focuses on individuals or specific contexts depends on and reproduces ideas of youth as an identifiable population. This section interrogates the rules and scaffolding of discourses that construct the social spaces in which we problematize and study youth in society. This introduction will set the agenda by addressing four elements of this process: the first addresses the rise of some of the crucial elements of contemporary governance, the instrument and practices through which the notion of the population was able to take shape. The second examines the rise of the personage of “the child,” and how new forms of governance not only utilized this new identity for the purposes of ongoing social management, but also organized its differentiation into a growing array of new social and administrative categories. The third specifically addresses “youth,” examining its various predecessors as targets for moral concern, as well as some of the recent cultural triggers for its formation. Finally, there is an assessment of the contemporary governance of populations of youth, based as it is around its twin existence as a governmental object, a target for an almost endless array of social, educational, legal, and psychological concerns and interventions, but also as an identity, a set of practices of the self.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

O pragmatismo antiteórico de Richard A. Posner e as respostas da teoria moral para a decisão judicial

Este trabalho apresenta uma análise crítica à forma de se abordar casos jurídicos e proferir decisões judiciais denominada abordagem judicial pragmática, disseminada pelo magistrado e professor norte-americano Richard A. Posner. O objetivo é explicitar suas principais características e contornos, bem como sua repulsa pela teorização abstrata e pelos debates e argumentos morais na decisão judicial. A partir disso, pretende-se refutar parte dessa abordagem pragmática, por meio de argumentos levantados por filósofos morais e profissionais do direito a saber: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan Jr e Martha C. Nussbaum - em defesa de uma abordagem que prega a inevitável utilização do raciocínio teórico, assim como a argumentação e reflexão moral na resolução de casos difíceis relacionados ao direito. Também será destacado como a repulsa pragmática pela teoria moral e abstrata é incompatível com a conjuntura justeórica contemporânea e como a análise de alguns casos difíceis expõe a falibilidade, ainda que parcial, desse estilo de abordagem pregado por Posner.

Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view

One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterization of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope, which, according to them, characterizes these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently, many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate proposing an original, deflationary view in which perceptions of basic-rights violation and injustice are fundamental for the folk understanding of harmful transgressions as moral transgressions in Turiel’s sense. In this article, we elaborate and refine our deflationary view, while reviewing the debate, addressing various criticisms raised against our perspective, showing how our perspective explains the existent evidence, and suggesting new lines of inquiry.

Exclusão étnica, julgamento moral e emoções morais : estudo em adolescentes

Os pressupostos defendidos na declaração de Salamanca sobre a Educação Inclusiva não são fáceis de concretizar pois as pessoas, por causa de diferenças de sexo, etnia, aparência, etc, têm frequentemente condutas diferenciais. Um dos critérios sociais que mais provoca exclusão social são as diferenças étnicas, um fenómeno mais estudado pela psicologia social. Porém, a atitude de exclusão social pode estar relacionada com a competência moral dos indivíduos, uma relação que foi analisada neste estudo. Para isso recorremos ao suporte da psicologia moral que valoriza o papel das emoções na compreensão das condutas sociais, bem exemplificada nos estudos do vitimizador feliz (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1998). Nas perspectivas mais recentes da psicologia moral tem sido atribuída grande ênfase à necessidade de analisar cognições e emoções nas condutas morais (e.g., Malti & Latzko, 2010; Turiel & Killen, 2010). Apoiados no estudo de Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) sobre a exclusão social analisámos os julgamentos e as emoções morais de adolescentes em três contextos, etnia africana, etnia cigana e género, numa amostra de 45 adolescentes, com idades entre os 13 e os 19 anos, através da aplicação de uma versão traduzida da Survey Instrument for Measuring Judgments about Emotions about Exclusion (Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2009). Os jovens avaliaram a exclusão étnica como mais incorreta que a exclusão por género mas não foram encontradas diferenças nos juízos e emoções expressas pelos portugueses e estrangeiros. As emoções de culpa, tristeza, vergonha, atribuídas ao excludente confirmam a avaliação negativa da atitude de exclusão. Porém, a emoção normal que revela indiferença expressa que alguns jovens avaliaram positivamente a exclusão. A intensidade emocional intermédia das emoções atribuídas mostra inconsistência com o juízo moral. Relativamente ao excluído existe consenso pois as emoções de tristeza e raiva foram as mais atribuídas. As justificações dos juízos e emoções atribuídos são de tipo diverso, ou seja, argumentos morais de justiça e igualdade, argumentos de inclusão por empatia e argumentos convencionais relativos à coesão intragrupal. A atitude de exclusão não é estritamente moral pois também é vista em função de benefícios para o funcionamento do grupo. A relação complexa entre juízos, emoções e justificações requisita mais investigação de modo a percebermos melhor os processos psicológicos que induzem a conduta social.

The effects of accounting students` ethical reasoning and personal factors on their ethical sensitivity

Purpose – Rest posited that to behave morally, an individual must have performed at least four basic psychological processes: moral sensitivity; moral judgment; moral motivation; and moral character. Though much ethics research in accounting has been focused on component two, ethical judgment, less research has been undertaken on the other three components. The purpose of this study is to focus on component one, ethical sensitivity, of Rest's four-component model.
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 156 accounting undergraduates was employed to investigate the ethical sensitivity of accounting students and the effects of their ethical reasoning and personal factors on their ethical sensitivity.
Findings – Results of this study show that accounting students vary in their ability to detect the presence of ethical issues in a professional scenario. There is no significant relationship between accounting students' ethical sensitivity and their ethical reasoning (P-score). Accounting students characterized as “internals” are more likely to show an ability to recognize ethical issues than those characterized as “externals.” The results also indicate that an accounting ethics intervention may have positive effect on accounting students' ethical sensitivity development. Hence, an individual who possesses the ability to determine what is ethically right or wrong (high ethical reasoning) may fail to behave ethically due to a deficiency in identifying ethical issues (low ethical sensitivity) in a situation.
Originality/value – Whilst much research has concentrated on ethical reasoning and ethics education to enhance the ethical conduct of accountants, it is important that the profession and researchers also direct their attention and efforts to cultivating the ethical sensitivity of accountants. The findings of this study provide additional evidence to support Rest's theory of a more comprehensive cognitive model of ethical decision-making and suggest a more balanced research effort in evaluating the ethical development of individuals.

Australia's first moral rights decision : a critical approach to Meskenas v ACP Publishing

Judgment in Australia's first moral rights case concerned issues of attribution and false attribution of authorship - reasoning in judgment is open to question - ways in which moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act may have been misunderstood - importance of distinguishing between UK right against false attribution and its Australian counterpart.

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.

Templanza y continencia en Tomás de Aquino : razones para una concepción no dualista de la virtud moral

El propósito de esta investigación es mostrar las razones que tiene Tomás de Aquino para privilegiar una moral de la templanza por sobre una de mera continencia. Pero más allá de detenerse en los pocos artículos que Santo Tomás dedica a comparar ambas disposiciones, el fin de nuestro trabajo es, a partir de los textos referidos a la naturaleza de la virtud moral, mostrar por qué sólo la templanza puede ser considerada una virtud, mientras la continencia es una “mezcla" de virtud y desorden. En segundo lugar, esta investigación pretende justificar la validez de los argumentos tomasianos, demostrando que si se prescinde de esta distinción entre virtud perfecta y continencia, necesariamente se introduce un dualismo antropológico en el plano de la acción. En esta misma línea, se buscará, a su vez, comparar la postura de Santo Tomás con la postura de Escoto, para quien los afectos y las pasiones son meros “facilitadores" de la elección, pero no elementos constitutivas de ésta.

Discourses and dissertations on the scriptural doctrines of atonement and sacrifice : and on the principal arguments advanced, and the mode of reasoning employed, by the opponents of those doctrines as held by the established church : with an appendix containing some structures on Belsham's account of the unitarian scheme, in his review of Wilberforce's treatise /

Index included in The principles of physiology ... by Andrew Combe.

Ethical reasoning through simulation: a phenomenological analysis of student experience

Background
Medical students transitioning into professional practice feel underprepared to deal with the emotional complexities of real-life ethical situations. Simulation-based learning (SBL) may provide a safe environment for students to probe the boundaries of ethical encounters. Published studies of ethics simulation have not generated sufficiently deep accounts of student experience to inform pedagogy. The aim of this study was to understand students’ lived experiences as they engaged with the emotional challenges of managing clinical ethical dilemmas within a SBL environment.

Methods
This qualitative study was underpinned by an interpretivist epistemology. Eight senior medical students participated in an interprofessional ward-based SBL activity incorporating a series of ethically challenging encounters. Each student wore digital video glasses to capture point-of-view (PoV) film footage. Students were interviewed immediately after the simulation and the PoV footage played back to them. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. An interpretative phenomenological approach, using an established template analysis approach, was used to iteratively analyse the data.

Results
Four main themes emerged from the analysis: (1) ‘Authentic on all levels?’, (2)‘Letting the emotions flow’, (3) ‘Ethical alarm bells’ and (4) ‘Voices of children and ghosts’. Students recognised many explicit ethical dilemmas during the SBL activity but had difficulty navigating more subtle ethical and professional boundaries. In emotionally complex situations, instances of moral compromise were observed (such as telling an untruth). Some participants felt unable to raise concerns or challenge unethical behaviour within the scenarios due to prior negative undergraduate experiences.

Conclusions
This study provided deep insights into medical students’ immersive and embodied experiences of ethical reasoning during an authentic SBL activity. By layering on the human dimensions of ethical decision-making, students can understand their personal responses to emotion, complexity and interprofessional working. This could assist them in framing and observing appropriate ethical and professional boundaries and help smooth the transition into clinical practice.